AT THE PEACE TABLE

Evening Star, Issue 17034, 3 May 1919, Page 11

AT THE PEACE TABLE

NEW ZEALAND DELEGATES. DISPOSAL OF HERMAN COLONIES. MANDATORY CONTROL. [From Mr R. Ruxx, Official Journalist with the New Zealand Peace Delegation.] It threatened lor a lime afe_ the protracted sessions of the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers that the representatives of tho British Dominions would have more difficulty in gaining acceptable control of the German colonies in Africa and tho South Pacific then that generally experienced by their armies in capturing them. The Council insisted upon the adoption of the 'proposed system of mandatory control on behalf of the League of Nations — 3 system which, in its original form, prodded an open economic door for all rations in the League and fiscal equality to ill nations trading with the territory to oe controlled by the mandate; the oversea delegates just as firmly pressed _ for specific safeguards against an idealistic svstem which existed only on paper, and . Tered no guarantee of permanent bocu“Tt: should be restated definitely that there never was at any time any hostility <>: i tho part of the representatives of the British Dominions to the principle of mandatory control on behalf of the League of Nations. Mr Massey, Mr W. M. \ Hughes; and General Botha were opooeed to onlv" a blind faith in theory and experiment as again; :: concrete methods and proved results. They maintained their opposition until they had secured a proyisaon'G.T agreement ■vcrliidti incluxle>d ess-eiitio.l safeguards. As a matter of fact, both Mr Lloyd George and M. Ctemenceau heartily congratulated Mr Massey on the • manner in which he had striven for a guarantee of permanent security from enemv influence in Samoa. It "was reported by a section of the British Press that on© time there _had been talk of ■ disruption of _ tho British I Empire and the alienation ox Japan and Italy from the Allies. There never was anything of the sort, and it was not surprising that a prominent member of the Connell expressed regret that he had lelt his iprofane vocabulary at home. All that need be said as to the sturdy opposition by the representatives of the British Dominions to the principle of mandatory control as originally proposed was that "it was directed against the lack of safeguards in respect of a recurrence of enemy activities or influence in the South Pacific- As Sir Massey phrased it, “A temporary settlement with apparent security was not what New Zealand wantedthey desired a permanent settlement with guaranteed security from the German menace in the Pacific.” There was absolute unanimity on one important point—that was the necessity for refusing completely to consider the restoration of the German colonies in Africa and the Pacific to Germany. Indeed, this principle was accepted without discussion. So there was no “ tenderness towards Germany. In the preliminary conferences in reference to the disposal of the German colonies it had been contended briefly but pointedly that direct British control would be best in German South-west Africa, German New Guinea, and German Samoa. If- for example, the Union of South Africa ■ were given mandatory control of South-west Africa there would in a vast territory, _ geographically one, two forms of administration; in New Guinea, under a similar svstem of control, there should be a Customs barrier between one portion of the island and the other; then, as regards Samoa, would it be worth New Zealand ? while to undertake the task of expensive administration only as a on terms that were, as yet merely theories 7 And it had been pointed out that the Pacific was a world in itself, and tnat the South Sea Islands encompassed the progressive British Dominions in tne South Pacific like fortresses. air Massey had pointed out. . for example, that n'n~-r i- New Zealand’s capture of Samoa in 1914 Samoa, a German naval base, and the centre cf wireless German communication in the Pacific, had lain atniiart New Zealand's main saa routs to lire Mother Land. Such a menace could never again be allowed to exist in any shape or form. There were strings of islands suitable for coaling stations and submarine bases, and unless and until these passed into secure control there could _be i o '-in-nM-'- of nca:e and security for the British Dominions in the Pacific. Furt.i'er*'’ control by a League of Nations would lead to a. confuKon of authority. Where was the specific guarantee that the authority of the" mandatory State would not in time become seriously*overshadowed? AH that tho Dominions wanted was not sordid aggrandisement, but- a rock foundation of security. Them arguments, which were well received br the Council of the Great Powers, drew an important explanation of the principle of mandatory control. The fundamental basis of the principle was the almost universal feeling against further annexations. Then the logical superstructure was a form cf control which fin mild for ever prevent n recurrence of shameful abuses of backward peoples in remote but resourceful territories, and which would at the same time guarantee advancement end protection of the natives. The whole world must become their trustees and guardians. But it was not intended to exercise arbitrary sovereignty over any people. All this," it was maintained by the ardent supporters of the mandatory principle, would serve the backward peoples in the former German colonies, and would protect them from such abuses as had been systematically practised under German administration. Then there was the shining goal towards which a mandatory State could strive—the goal cf securing the desire of the natives mandatorilv controlled for free absorption. In other words, the mandate might be made so successful that union would come in logical sequence to wise and generous administration. There was no objection taken to these arguments, but there was still keen opposition to certain conditions which were to be attached to the proposed mandate. It was made clear, for example, that under ’mandatory control all members of the League of Nations had to be given equal right of economic access to the territories to" be mandatorily controlled. And if Customs duties were necessary, the charges must be precisely the same to all nations trading with the territories. There could lie preference given to any, _ even if under the existing laws of the British Dominions -.any preference were given to the Mother Land. It was the condition in reference to equality of fiscal treatment that prompted: the keenest opposition from the oversea delegates-'"‘Was it proposed to leave the economic door ajar for the possible entry of our present enemies? If such were to lie the policy, then the British Dominions would not favor mandatory control. So the argument went on, until tho British Dominions’ delegates secured a provisional agreement which included essential safeguards, and fixed a special charter, so io speak, as regards the mandates for Southwest Africa, New Guinea, and Samoa. NEW ZEALAND’S POSITION, In the coarse of the protracted conversations before the Council of the Powers, Mr Massey assured President Wilson that he would speak in no spirit of opposition to the principle of the League os Nations; but the nearest precedents of history had ail ended in failure So ho hoped that the Congress now sitting would not end in the same way, teat would bring us nearer to the period! of •ntfreißai peace for which «o many people •—re anxiously looking. Aa far as dangwr from enemy invasion was concerned Australia and New Zealand were “in tho same boat.” The weakness of cue was tho weakness of both. Samoa was of viW importance to New Zealand. It vr&a situated on the main trade rout© from th» ckrath Pacific to Europe through the Panama CkaaJ. If by any chance Samoa were in enemy hands New Zealand would bo strangled. He hoped that he would' b* able to induce President Wilson to see the question from New standpoint.

One of the main reasons p»t forward in support of the mandatory system was that it would benefit tire inhabitants of the teititorios formerly in the possession, of Germany. He could claim with confidence that New Zealand! had already done in this respect as well as, or better than, any mandatory Power was ever likely to do. New Zealand not only included the two islands generally attributed to her, but ehe also controlled the Cook Archipelago, I which had been assigned to the Dominion about 20 years ago. The experiments made by New Zealand in ' administering this territory had been successful. Schools had been instituted in the larger islands; agricultural experts had .been sent from New Zealand to train the population in raising tropical products. The natives had become more industrious, and the islands consequently much more productive. A hospital had been established at Rarotonga, which was the headquarters of the New Zealand Resident Commissioner and his staff. The same treatment had been applied to the natives there as since the Treaty of Waitangi had been applied to the Natives of New Zealand proper. The Maoris of New Zealand were liked and respected by the Europeans, and every trade and profession in the Dominion was open to them. One of his colleagues in the Government was Dx Pomare, a member of the Native race. On account of the great knowledge of the Polynesian races possessed by him it had been suggested that he should come to the Peace Conference to make any necessary explanations, and, but for the expense of sending an additional Minister from New Zealand, ho thought that Dr Pomare would have been a very useful delegate. When Samoa was taken over at the beginning of the war the same policy of improvement was continued there. The Maoris, Cook Islanders, and Samoans were of the same race and spoke dialects of the same language. If any change in control were to be made the inhabitants of Samoa would be intensely dissatisfied. Ho asked the council to compare the treatment accorded to these natives ■with the treatment of African natives by the Germans. The difference between the mandatory principle and that instituted by New Zealand was similar to the difference between leasehold and freehold tenure. No individual would put the same energy into a leasehold of unimproved country as into a freehold. It was the same with Governments. They must have security of tenure to encourage them to develop tho territories under their control. The ■'necessity for development had also been urged as a reason for mandatory control. He (Mr Massey) agreed that it was necessary to increase* production; but in such cases special financial arrangements would have to be made. He saw serious difficulties ahead for the mandatory power in financ-ing-the territories to be'placed under them control. The only security in such cases would be the territory held in trust, and he doubted if money could be raised under such conditions, except at a ruinous rate of interest. He instanced New Guinea, which in the future would require opening up by railways and roads, and where tho mandatory Power would probably be Australia. On the credit of a Government like the Commonwealth loans could be raised for the development of New Guinea which, before it could support a civilised population, would require docks, public buildings, telegraphs, and a number of other utilities.

The territory itself, until developed, would not afford sufficient security for loans. For those purposes this process could not be as successfully set in motion by a mandatory Power as by a strong State to which the, territory was annexed. Though it might not be the time to discuss what should be done with the German Empire, he felt that Germany was an outlaw among nations, and should be treated as such. It had forfeited its right to exist as a great Power. Unless broken up now it would become a danger again, and future generations should be safeguarded against its pernicious activities. Unless these territories were annexed to some strong State the Germans would certainly attempt to get them back. All knew what German intrigue and peaceful penetration meant. It had been experienced even at the Antipodes. He drew attention to the fact that the phrase “ division of spoils ” had been used as a quotation by a member of the council. He pointed out that the phrase would not apply’to New Zealand. Her financial burdens* incurred during this war were very heavy. At a time when New Zealand was not half developed it had been called upon to send large numbers of soldiers immense distances to take their part in the defence of the Empire and civilisation. It had dene so willingly, and not only lost a valuable portion of its population—for which not all the money in Germany would pay—-but had also incurred 100 millions of debt. There was little prospect of any recoupment of such losses. The financial value of Samoa was a mere trifle in comparison. He appealed to the President cf the United States to look at the whole question from the New Zealand point T,f view. Ho would ask him to recall the period immediately after tho American War of Independence. What would Washington and Hamilton and the others associated with them have done or said had it been suggested that a mandatory Power, or even the colonists themselves as mandatories of a League of Nations, should be given charge of the vast territories in North America not at that time occupied. There was little doubt that the American colonists would have scouted any such suggestion, and rightly so, for, had anything of the sort taken place, the United States could not possibly have grown into one of the greatest Powers of tho world, as it was to-day. New Zealand desired to protect the future citizens of the South Pacific from the possibilities of having in the future some turbulent and ambitious Power in that part of the world.