THE IRON GATES

Evening Star, Issue 16848, 25 September 1918, Page 6

THE IRON GATES

TURNED BY THE ALLIES

BULGARIAN FRONT PIERCED. CUNNING COMBINATIONS. PALESTINE. [By Ckixicu*.} Tho situation in the Balkans is developing rapidly, and although not promising quite such decisive results as the Palestine operations, is becoming so promising and interesting that it merits a fuller explanation and consideration. The key of the strategical situation is to bo found in the fact that General Guillaumat, the French generalissimo who succeeded General Sarrail, is delivering his main thrust on the loft centre, botween the Cerna and the Vardar. This thrust has been completely successful, and the enemy's centre has been pierced. The Frenoh and Serbians, pushing rapidly northward, have reached O-rodsko, on the Vardar, just to the north of its junction with ; the Cerna. They have lined the west bank of the VarfJar from Groclsko to Demir Kapu, a distance of 20 miles, and have actually crossed the Vardar between Demir Kapu and Krivolak, the latter place being about midway between Demir Kapu and Grodsko. By this move they turn the famous Demir Kapu defile, otherwise known as the Iron Gates—a favorite name for rocky defiles. This defile lies about 15 miles north of Ghevgheli, nearly opposite to the mouth of tho Sthimnitza \ alley, and through it runs the Vardar River and the SalonikaUskub Railway. By crossing the Vardar south of Krivolak the Allies have descended upon the rear of tho enemy forces in the Lake Doiran region. These are now in full retreat, and the British and Greek forces havo advanced, captured Ghevgheli, and functioned with the French and Serbs to the north of Lake Doiran. The enemy are destroying masses of stores and ammunition, and they have no alternative but to fall back into the Strnmitza Valley, or they will be caught between the Allies advancing down the Vardar Valley from Krivolak and up that valley from Ghevgheli. This will render the Allies masters of the Vardar Valley and the railway as far north as Grodsko, ami this again, gives opportunities for further brilliant combinations. But, before sketching out these it, will be advisable to glance at the situation on the allied left wing. THE ADVANCE ON PRILEP. Tho early fall of Prilep. the most important road centre north of Monastir, is almost certain. A French communique reports that the enemy are in headlong retreat in the Cerna bend, severely harassed by the Allies, who, pressing on in hot pursuit, ha.ve reached tho Kaljani lino, 10 miles south of Prilep. Our left wing still appears to rest on the lakes; but that for the present is a matter of minor importance. The Allies between the Cerna and tho Vardar having in the meantime, passed Kavadar. and reached Grodsko, are swinging round to the left. and have cros;>ed the Cerna towards Prilep, cutting the Veles-Prilep Railway, the enemy's chief lino of communication in this region, and capturing Yozarci, on the Kava-dar-Pritep road, about 20 miles from Prilep. The Ailies are thus advancing upon Prilep from the south and north-east, and the news of its fall mav come at any time.

But about four miles north of Prilep is the southern opening of the famous Babouna, Pass, a defile about 10 miles long, running through the rugged Babouna Range. It rivals the Khyher Pass as to size and forbidding character. The enemy propose to fail back upon the Babouna Range, and make their stand along that line, and hero dev'Sbps (he significance and importance of our successful thrust on the left centre, towards Grodsko, on the Vardar. TURNING THE BABOUNA RANGE.

The. enemy, realising the critical character of the situation, are rushing up Austrian, German, and Bulgarian reinforcements; but if the Allies a.ro quick enough it is possible that we may succeed in turnins the Babouna Pass and Range before sufficient- enemy reinforcements ean reach the threatened sectors to hold us. Such a turning movement must be based upon Grodsko. on the Vardar, and there are two directions which it may take. Our troops may attempt to cut straight across tho angle of rugged country between Vardar and Babouna Rivers, the latter stream joining the Vardar just south of Velcs. Tt is somewhat, doubtful, however, if tho character of tho country—terribly rugged and all but roadless—will render this move practicable ; while the flanking column would bo exposed to a counter-stroke from tho neighborhood of Veles. The second alternative is to advance up the Vardar Valley upon Veles itself, thus arriving on tho rear of tho Babouna Pass and cutting tho roads leading to it from the north. If Veles were seized, the enemy would be compelled to evacuate the Babouna Pass, and the force advancing up the Vardar Valley would bo well placed to face counter-strokes from the north. It would also Ire necessary to guard carefully against counter-attacks from the direction of Ishtip and from tho Strumnitza Valley. But if the French and Serbs advanco upon Veles, the British and Greeks in the Vardar Valley should be able to look alter counter-attacks. WEST OF MONASTIR..

At present the enemy appear to be clinging to the northern end of Lakes Orhrida and Presba. This is important to them, because tho chief road to Southern Albania, runs through Struga, at the northern end of Lake Ochrida. If tho enemy can hold tho Babouna line they may still clingy to the lakes, and cover their commtmicAtioiis with Southern Albania, this enabling them to maintain their positions in that region. Their Front would be badlv dented, but by no means untenable. If, however, the Veles and the Babouna Range were cap-ture-el, tho whole of the onemv's line to the ■west and in Southern Albania would almost certainly have to go. A tremendour; wedge would have been driven into the enemy's front, and, with the inner line and greatly superior communications within that line, General Guillammat would be in a position to crumple up the enemy's right wing easily if it still rested on the lakes. Velee is 25 miles north of Grodsko. and the question of tho practicability of its capture resolves it-self into a race against timo and the arrival of Austro-German reinforcements. If we succeed, and force back tho enemy's right wing north of the Babouna Range, we shall have seized a strategical position which should enablo us to secure decisive victory in the Balkans next year by a grand offensive northward and north-eastward across the Vardar. But Germany realises that the situation is critical. She does not trust Bulgaria, and. in spito of being so hard pressed in the west, mav sea-ape together a body of reinforcements to send ; while Austria, having dropped her offensive against Italy, will bo in a position to heavily reinforce her Balkan front.

THE PALESTINE POSITION. There is not a great deal of additional news from the Palestine front at the moment of writing; but a, London cable puts the Turkish strength west of the Jordan at 60,000, the combatants numbering 35,0C0 ; while east of tho Jordan the enemy total .30,000, of whom between 6,000 and 8,000 are fighting men. If this estimate is correct there should be no difficult in clearing the eastern bank of the Jordan and cutting off the enemy by an advance upon the railway junction at Dorat. 30 miles east of the river. It is uncertain whether or not the figures given for the enemy's strength on the western bank are. exclusive of the forces aheadv captured by us. If this was the enemy's strength before the present operations began they must be very weak now. Such estimates, however, are usually little more than guesswork. It is highly probable that one of General Allenbv's"first moves, after the roundup on the' western bank of the Jordan is completed, will b© to cross the river and

I advanco along tho railway towards Damascus. It may be recalled that on Monday we received nows that the Arabs had defeated the Turks at El Tafileh, which lies I about 18 miles south-east of the Dead Sea. There must be considerable bodies of Turks scattered along the Hedjuz. Railway, and the&e would all be cut off by our advanco towards Damascus. Moreover, there is no railway line north of Nazareth, west of the Jordan, so the Damascus route offers the best line of communication ; while a powerful force operating along that line would be able to make wide flanking movements out into the flat country, and would automatically turn as it advanced all the Turkish positions among the rugged hills west of the Jordan.

Since the above was written the news has oome that the Turks east of the Jordan are retreating towards Amman, on the Hedjaz Railway, closely pursued by the Australians, New Zealanders, and other troops, who have reached Es Salt. The first question people wdll naturally ask on reading this message is whether it means that the Turkish main body has crossed the Jordan and is retreating eastward. This question may be answered in the negative with some confidence, because Amman lies east and a little to the north of Jericho. It is altogether too far south to offer a line of retreat for the Turkish forces west of the Jordan. The Turks fleeing towards Amman will be those who were guarding the Jordan fords near Jericho. In the north our cavalry have already seized the ports of Haifa and Aero. That part of our cavalry should bo pushed so rapidly in this direction indicates that General Allenby feels very secure as regards the position in the south. It is, in fact, almost impossible for the Turkish main body to escape.