DULL TIMES

Evening Star, Issue 16627, 9 January 1918, Page 6

DULL TIMES

-. PROSPECTS m FRANCE. ■ HINDENBURS'S PROBLEM. A'LOST OPPORTUNITY. OTHER ITEMS. [By Critichs.] Deadly dullness continues to bo. the chief •Aature of the war news. Apart from tho talk about tho peace negotiations, there is scarcely r iln jt em worthy of discussion. The correspondents on the west front are reduced to speculation as to Hindonburg's expected offensive. Mr Philip Gibbs reports that tho frost is breaking, and that there are signs of a great thaw, which will soon transform Flanders • into a qrogmiro. " There are indications that January may fass without big battles, and, with luck, ebraary also. Probably in March we may-look for the- opening of tho enemy's offensive." Mr Gibbs indicates that the enemy's .preparations include hospital accommodation for scores of thousands of men. But he adds: "By tho Ides of March other counsels may prevail, for it is only on the last hazard that the enemy - will order this new sacrifice of German manhood, and the German nation may refuse to ' countersign the order -for that blood." The provision of hospital accommodation, it may he remarked, will in any case be necessary, in view of the possibility of an Anglo-French offensive. We should, indeed, not be too hasty in assuming that a German offensive in tho wost is certain, especially in view of the failure of the peace negotiations with Russia. By March, about the earliest time by which conditions are likely to be favorable for an offensive, tho failure of the negotiations may be final, and in that caso the Central Powers wilt'have to face Russian preparations to renew the war. That will compel them to again reinforce their eastern front. Even now they have no superiority in the west which would give them a eerions chance of a decisive victory. Hindenbnrg has shown himself very cautious in grand -strategy, and far too fond of cheap bet sensational tactical successes gained over inefficient or weak opponents. When he comes to contemplate the effusion ■ of blood which will be necessary to gain a decisive victory over tho Angfo-French, and the probability that the most reckless expenditure of blood would merely end in failure and the exhaustion of his reserves to no puqxfee, he mav fail to screw up his courage to the task. Mcst likely he will look for some field where victories may be more cheaply won. WHO WAS TO BLAME? H=)ly offers by far the moßt promising theatre .or an Austro-Germau offensive, both because of the creat length of the Italian line and tho fact that the salient of the Italian position in Venetia provides an excellent chance of decisive results in the event of success. So it is to Italy that Hinden burg's attentions are most likely to be directed. In .this connection considerable interest attaches to the mutual Austro-Ge.rman recriminations reported from Rome regarding the incomplete success of the offensive against Italy. Had it not been for half-measures Italy might by now have been out of the war for good A smashing blow delivered from tho Trentino simultaneouslv with the of- . ■fensivo along the Isonzo would have probably brought about the most titanic military disaster in history- It was pointed out here at the opening of the Austro-Ger-man offensive that one of the great problems confronting Hindenburg's future biographers will be to explain why this blow was not delivered. The discussion is already commencing, and it is natural that Austria and Germany should each be trvfctLr° Principal blame upon the ■ ; The Austrians are blaming the Germans lor delaying-assistance in order to carry on their offensive at Riga ; while the Germans are said to blame the Austrians for entrusting the defence of the Bainsizza Plateau to Czechs, not realising that they intended to surrender at tho first opp'ortuy" -i T-, e latter char ge, however, is a mere detail even if true. It is upon Hindenburg and Ludendorff and their weakness for half-measures—the result-, no doubt of. an imperfect grasp of grand strategy—that the blame for wasted opportunities must he. I t 1S an un deniable fact that ,iney spent the summer in partial offensives on Riga front and south of the Pripet, and then attacked on the Isonzo at the ■ •v£i em i °l the season > when thev were liable to be checked at any time" by the advent of winter. Moreover, their plans were once again nothing but half-measures and when an unexpectedly great oDportumty suddenly arose they were in no position to take full advantage of it. All these mistakes were pointed out here as soon as their offensive commenced. Thou"-h Hindenburg then tried to retrieve his m?stake by rushing troops to the Trentino W' A- Was to ° kte < and winter has checked his operations exactly as was anticipated. These facts are 'so clear and notorious that it is idle for the Germans to attempt to lay the blame on the 'lnstrians. _ • .FINLAND RECOGNISED. Yesterday a cable from Stockholm suggested that Germany was delaying the recognition of Finland's independence because she desired to use that couutrv as a base for operations against Petr'ograd. J.nis is rather a singular reason. many were contemplating an advance upon I'ctrograd, her most sensible course would be to recognise the independence of the JLHnns, in order to gain their support Today an Amsterdam cable declares that Germany has formally recognised Finland's independence. This is much more likelv to be true. The only reason why Germany might refrain from such a course is ■ that she may wish to avoid antagonising v Russia while there is still some prospect of a separate peace with that country. From the allied point of view the matter is probably not one of great moment. Finland represents but a minute fraction of Russia's military power, and is likely to be too much .preoccupied with internal difficulties to attack the Russians; while, in the event of the final failure of the negotiations between Russia and the Central -PoWers, it is probable that we shall be able to put on too much pressure in the west to enable the Germans to attempt an ■ advance upon Petrograd through Finland. SWELLED HEAD IN EVIDENCE. A struggle is being waged in Germany between the military party and the PahGermans, headed by Hindenburg and Ludendorff on the one hand, and the Mo- ' derates led by Baron Yon Hertling and Von Kuhimann, on the other. The former party demand largo annexations; while the latter party attach more importance ' t0 Pf 3 ** It is a case of historv Tepeatincr itself. _ Just &* success made Napoleon af most insane with swelled head until overwhelming disaster sobered him, so the .Pan-Germans and the military party are indulging in the wildest dreams of dominion. They blind themselves to the _ fact that the whole world is against them, that their present course of action is admirably calculated to . provoko Russia to action, and that if Russia comes back they will have no fores capable of standing up against her when America s military strength is developed in the west. Still, it is to our interest that the Pan-Gsrmans ehould win, and a separate peace with Russia be thus prevented. JAPAN AND RUSSIA. Tokio semi-officially announces that Japan is willing to protect the interests of the Allies at Vladivoslock. but does not intend to conduct an offensive against the Bolsheviks. It is strange that the latter statement should bo necessary. Those rumors that Japan intends to attack the Bolsheviks are merely insane. What useful: purpose would be served by, such a course? We do .not wish to see Russia make a separate peace; but wo desire still less to have her as an open enemy. For Japan to seize the eastern portion of "Siberia—which is about all she could do ( 'in the way of offensive operations again>t •,-i-'the. Bolsheviks—would be merely to facili,'tAte a settlement between Russia and Gev-

many, and produce an additional enemy for the Allies. It would ruin our hopes of seeing Russia,renew tho -war oh our side. TEE ANGLO-FRENCH BAG.

It is announced bv the British .Embassy at Washington that the Anglo-French forces captured 231,000 prisoners and 1,560 guns during igr? ; Against this is to Be set the fact that the Austro-Germans captured an approximately similar number of men and guns in tho Italian theatre alone. '.I he War Office gives aomo details of the British captures. On the west'' trout we bagged 73.131 prisoners and 531 "guns, and lost 27,200 prisoners and 166 guns. The guns were all lost in the reverse near Cambrai. In Palestine we captured 17,646 prisoners and. 108 guns, and lost only 610 in prisoners. In Mesopotamia we captured 15 944 prisoners and, 124 guns, and lost only 267 in prisoners. In East .Africa we took 6,728 prisoners and 18 garni, losing only 100 m prisoners. While in Macedonia wo captured 1,095 prisoners'and lest 202. Our total captures amount to 114,544 prisoners and 781 guns; onr'.total'lojaea to .40,379 prisoners and 166 guns. ■