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Evening Star, Issue 16625, 7 January 1918, Page 6

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THE BOLSHEVIKS' ' AWAKENING. CAN RUSSIA GOME BACK? SEPARATE POWERS. PALESTINE. [By Criticcs^] _ The breaking; off of the peace negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers immensely brightens the military prospects of the Allies, and its effect upon future developments is the absorbing question of the moment. It should put an immediate stop to the transfer of troops by the Central Powers from the eastern to the western and Italian fronts; while our hopes of a decisive victory within a reasonable length of time are vastly improved. It was pointed out in the review of the yoar given in these notes last Monday that the rapid development of America's military power will enable us,' within a few months, to put so titanio a pressure on tho western front as to drain away practically all tho efficient Austro-German forces from the eastern front, leaving only a skeleton force of inferior quality. It is obvious that when this result ia achieved even a partial Russian recovery will lead to the complete smashing up of the enemy's eastern lines. They will then be faced with the,alternatives of witnessing a rapid Russian advance upon Berlin and into Hungary, or of reinforcing their eastern front from the west. But they will not be able to adopt tho latter course without weakening their western line to an extent which will bring danger of a complete collapse under the tremendous pressure which will be put upon it, and a general debacle may follow. With the failure of the peace negotiations this possibility becomes something more than a vague hope. It becomes a practicable objective, towards the realisation of which the Allies should direct all their energies. It is true that the condition of the Russian armies is described as " appalling," but this is due to incompetent administration and indiscipline. Russia has the resources in men. When discipline is restored the officers who have been driven from their positions can be reinstated; we must romember that present conditions represent only a passing phase. No nation can live in a condition of anai'chy indefinitely. The people soon tire of the hardships and misery which result, and the common sense of the best elements of the population is bound to assert itself in time. The- Allies can provide munitions and experienced administrators to reorganise the railways; while even a partial recovery will suffice to smash the enemy's front when America's strength is developed in the west. A striking power sufficient to enable Russia to deliver a blow similar to that of Brusiloff in Galicia in 1917 would cany all before it, and we may remember the rapidity of Russia's recovery from the reverses of" 1916. THE MAIN OBSTACLE. Probably these considerations have something to do with the rumors that the Bolsheviks are about to be recognised by tho Allies. This is a delicate problem, because, while the Bolsheviks undoubtedly control the situation for the time being, they are liable to be overthrown at any moment. The main point of interest for the Allies is whether these people are capable of facing the facts of the situation, and of setting to work to reorganise the army in order to crush the enemy.. Thenpast record is not reassuring. It has been chiefly notable for an utter lack of sanitv and practical ability. Still, we may remember that Robespierre commenced his career as a well-meaning peace : at-any-prico man, and ended as a terrorist; while Danton and his colleagues of the Committee of Public Safety, who accomplished such prodigies of energy in organising revolutionary France to resist her invaders, all set out as idealists of the most impracticable tvpe. The logic of facts proved too much" for their idealism, and under compulsion they showed themselves capable of facing some of the hard necessities of life. '

Unfortunately, there is no reason as yet to hope that Lenin and Trotskv are gifted with tho energy and practical ability of Danton .and Carnot. Our best hope* lies in the possibility that the discredit w.liich will fail upon them as the result of thenfailure to fulfil their promises of an early general peace and the establishment of k Utopia may lead to their overthrow and tho rise of more practical men to power. They .have accomplished nothing towards social reorganisation, but have plunged the nation into the deepest misery. They have accomplished nothing towards peace, but have ensured' the prolongation of the war for at least another year. GERMANY UNCOMPROMISING.

Considering the supreme importance to Germany of a separate peace with Russia, her attitude is astonishingly uncompromising. Tho most that she appears willing to do to gain her ends is to manufacture a number of plausible and superficial phrases for the purpose of soothing Russia's feelings. Thus, the German Chancellor declares that the present constitutional bodies of Courland, Poland, and Lithuania aro fully entitled to express their people's will as regards the destiny of these territories. But those constitutional bodies are German tools, of her own creation, and what Poland; desires is, not union with Germany, but independence. Would Germany accept the result of a plebiscite in which Polaua declared for independence? There is not the slightest prospect that she would accept anything but a carefully-cooked declaration ing her own desires. Indeed, the Chancellor has flatly declared in the Reichstag that Germany cannot accept Russia's terms regarding the evacuation of the occupied territories and a plebiscite of the peoples to decide their future destinies. Moreover, Germany has .rejected tho Russian proposal to transfer tho negotiations to Stockholm. One would liave, expected mvtvk more energetic efforts to secure a separate peace. Probably several factors account for thia apparent recklessness. Thare is the swelled head which led to tho breach with America, and also the great political pressure of the Pan-German party; while the Petrograd correspondent of the ' Daily Ghlomde' declares: " Members of the German delegation here admit that they realised tho state of affairs only on their arrival. They imagined, that the Bolsheviks were the real Government. When they found that all the educated l Russians in the whole of tho territories were opposed- to the Bolsheviks, they declared that it was impossible to conclude peace with these people." A peace with tho Bolsheviks might be repudiated to-morrow. i FOUR SEPARATE POWERS. ! Both tho Allien and the Central Powers are faced with peculiar difficulties in dealing with Russia, bat it is probable that those of the Central Powers are more era barrassing, owing to their wish to secure a separate peace. There are no le3s than four distinct powers in Russia to-day. The Bolsheviks control the greater part of Russia proper ; but Finland has declared herself an independent Republic. Ukrainia repudiates the Bolsheviks, and is now practically independent; while GeneralKalcdin seems to control the greater part of the Cossacks. Obviously a peace negotiated with the Bolsheviks alone might not be worth tho paper it was written on, and this, accounts for the lukewarmness of the Central Powers. A Petrograd cable declares that reports from Southern Russia show that the Bolsheviks have entirely failed, and that the Ufirainians and Cossacks continue to advance. On the other hand, the Bolshevik-s claim to have conquered tho Kharkoff district. Meanwhile Sweden has recognised Finland as an independent State. The other Powers decline to do this without the approval of Russia, but Finland once belonged to Sweden, and that country naturally desires to see a buffer State between herself and Russia. A later cable contains a report that France has recognised Finland's independence.

THE PALESTINE POSITION. The Palestine campaign alone supplies news of any interest. There we continue to make a series of small advances along the line to the north of Jerusalem; but tho enemy still rest their left flank on the northern end of the Dead Sea, and hold a continuous line from that point to the Mediterranean. What is the reason for the_delay in our advance? Ts there some danger that the campaign will degenerate into a war of fortified positions similar to that on the west fjont? This is not at all likely. Most probably General Allenby is busy improving his communications and preparing for another big advance. Jn the meantime he is feeling the Turkish positions and by local attacks all along the line is puzzling tho enemy as to the point of Jus next stroke. If there is any danger of a deadlock owing to the strength of the enemy's positions, this can be obviated, tf necessary, by a turning movement right round the Dead Sea. A powerful flanking force could advance along the eastern shore without any great risk. This method is not to bo recommended, but the possibility is thero in case of necessity.