TREATY-MAKING.

Evening Star, Issue 15915, 22 September 1915, Page 6

TREATY-MAKING.

| YET ANOTHER REPORT. NAPOLEON'S LINE. RUSSIANS IN TROUBLE. AUTUMN AT GALLIPOLI. i [By Criticds.] Once again we have precise statements both from Bulgaria and from Athens that an agreement has been reached between Bulgaria and Turkey. Bulgarian journals assert that the treaty assigns Bulgaria 2,000 square miles of territory as a reward of neutrality hitherto maintained, but without political engagements; while Athens announces that the transfer of the Turkish territory in Thraco lo Bulgaria was completed yesterday. The greater part of the province of Thrace is already held by Greece and Bulgaria, and the portion remaining to Turkey is a mere fragment. Tire demands hitherto put forward by Bulgaria have been for the whole of the territory lying to the north of a line drawn from Eno6, on the coast of the Mediterranean, to Midia, on the coast of the Black Sea. Such a line, however, would have given to the Bulgarians the better half of European Turkey, and Turkey offered instead the territory lying to the west of the Maritza River and its tributary, the Tunja. This would give the Bulgarians control of the whole of the Dedeagatch railway. We have received so many definite statements that such a treaty" has been concluded, which have been'almost immediately denied, that it will be well to wait for complete confirmation before accepting the story. it seems incredible that Turkey would consent to cede the Enos-Midia line until at her last gasp. On the other hand, it is still more incredible that Bulgaria should be content with tho modest stretch of territory to tile west of the Maritza, particularly when she has no guarantee that she will be" allowed to keep it in the event of the Allies being victorious. Diplomacy has probably not said its last word in this matter. Th o Allies will be able to offer the greater part of European Turkey, a large section of Macedonia inhabited by a people of Bulgarian race, and perhaps the port of Kavalla. It would admirably suit British policy to see Bulgaria in charge of Constantinople, but at present Russia's ambitions block the way. If, however, Russia should become too hard pressed by the Austro-Germans she might consent to modify her demands to a claim for the opening of the strait. CERTAIN .MODIFICATIONS. In consequence of the treaty, we are told, the plans of the German General Staff have undergone certain modifications. It the story of the conclusion of the treaty be true, this is net improbable. But what can the modifications be? It has been already pointed out here that an invasion of Serbia by the AustroGermans would be nothing" but a dangerous gamble without a previous understanding with Bulgaria. But the agreement with Bulgaria does away with" the necessity of such an invasion. There is no evidence deserving of confidence that the Turks are in desperate straits for ammunition, and there can be little doubt of their ability to hold out for many months. What the Austro-Germans require is the neutrality of the Balkan States in order that their right flank may not lie turned by Rumania. But ' The "Times's' correspondent at Bucharest says that the Germanic Powers are well aware of Rumania's determination to intervene if Serbia is attacked, and, therefore, all offensive intentions against, that country have been dropped. All this is very probable, as the AustroGerman strategy demands a free hand for I their great effort to cripple Russia, and to invade Serbia would be to run the risk of losing it. Yesterday's announcement from Beriin of a successful attack upon the Serbians is .supplemented to-day bv an announcement from Vienna that Serbian detachments were surprised and destroyed intheDrina estuary. Evidently the attack was merely one of those frontier skirmishes with which the monotony of 'the long truce has been beguiled. Some Serbians must have been caught napiing that time. Generally, however, they have had the best of the exchanges. One incident in particular is worth recording. The Austrians had been causing annoyance bv a, futile and malicious bombardment of Belgrade, and it was determined to teach them a lesson. So one night it became known to the Serbians that the Austrians were holding high revels at the Hotel de Ville at Semlin, over the river. In the grand hall a banquet was being given in celebration of a German victory in East Prussia.. Every notable of the neighborhood, both military and civil, was present. All was gay. The Emperor and Hindenburg had been toasted, and merriment was at its height, when suddenly a big highexplosive shell came, crashing through the roof and exploded right in the middle of the banquet hall. Another followed, then a third and ». fourth. Afterwards they sifted out of the debris the bodies of 37 officers, including two generals. NAPOLEON'S LINE. So long as thev can keep the Balkan States neutral, the Austro-Germans will piobably continue to push on towards Petrograd and Moscow, in the hope of crippling Russia, until they arc finally held up by the steadily-increasing defensive power of the Russians. If they should be hurled back, however, they will need to take up some defensive line," and in this connection the one selected by the eye of the great master of war, Napoleon, 'is of peculiar interest- At the end of July, 1812, Napoleon had reached Vitebsk on his march to Moscow. The season was growing old, and as he had no network of railways behind him, and only a few bad roads, iha transport problem'was becoming acute, with the lains of autumn and the snows of winter threatening. He had to decide whether he would halt fertile winter and prepare for an advance in the spring, or risk all in the attempt to seize Moscow and bring the war to a triumphant conclusion before the winter came on. Unlike the Germans, who are fighting against time, Napoleon had time on his side. He had the resources of Europe behind him, and could have utilised the winter in preparing in security an overwhelming force for his advance in the spring. Moreover, he might have hoped by his diplomatic combinations to bring in the Swedes and the Turks to his assistance. Russia., on the other hand, had to rely entirely on her own ill-organ-ised resources, except for tho subsidies in money that England could send her. Napoleon's career in that year is one long sequence of blunders in strategy and policy, due to the fact that his head was swollen with egotism and self-admiration to the point of bursting. He had one brief lucid interval, however, when he decided to halt at Vitebsk and go into winter quarters. He proposed to seize Riga, and traced a line from that plaoe along the Duna to Dvinsk, and from there to Polotsk and Vitebsk, also on the Duna. Thus, the line was to follow that river for nearly 300 miles. From Vitebsk, whose wooded hills are casv to fortify and defend, the line was to swing across to the Beresina, and follow that river through the marsh as far as the fortified town of j Bobruisk. It had been well for Napoleon | had he kept to his decision to defend this ' line, but he was impatient for further triumphs, and had scarcely designed it than he abandoned it in order to rush on to his destruction. As the Germans may have to tako np a similar defensive line before many months .ore- over, it wiil be interesting to see how their choice squares with Napoleon' 6.

A CRITICAL MOMENT. Tho Russian army retiring from Vilna is-in a somewhat critical position, and it will bo touch-and-go for them, even if they succeed in pulling out. The Germans struck with huge bodies of troops at the centro of the Russian line running from Vilna. to DvmsK. and succeeded in breaking through. Then they swung north-east towaiMis ijvinsk to drive kick tne Russians iii that direction, and south-east with the object of enveloping the troops defending Vilna, Through the gap thus formed in the Russian line they have poured immense bodies of cavalry, whose mobility they hope will enablo them to complete the encircling movement. Fortunately, they axe now handicapped by heavy rains and roads deep in mud, though this will also hamper to a considerable extent the retreating Russians. The Russians also have large bodies of cavalry engaged, and some instructive lessons in cavalry tactics should be obtained from the continual combats on the flanks of the armies. It is feared that if tho enemy fail in their purpose of cutting off the Russian forces they may undertake a dash upon Minsk. But a march upon Minsk would be the surest way of surrounding the Russian army retreating from Vilna, and will be undertaken by tho enemy in any ease ere long. Fighting eontirues for tlie possession of the Vilia fords, north-west of Molodechna. where the Russians are endeavoring to hold back tho German flanking forces. What is needed is a bold counter-stroke from the Riga-Dvinsk sector, but apparently General Russky has not sufficient forces at his dispcia-1 to undertake it. There is no sign yet'of on effective Russian blow from that suarter, although the Russians have seized tome of their former trenches to the south-west of lllutsk, which is near to tlm Duna river, a few miles north-west of Dvinsk. From the centre there is little news, save a German claim that Von Mackenseu is still pushing the Russians back. In the south an unofficial message announces that General Iyanoff has prudently suspended his offensive along tho Sereth, on account of the enemy having been reinforced from Von Mackensen's armies, which is very doubtful. But a communique announces that the Russian cavalry are pursuing the retreating enemy in the Lutsk region, sabring many and capturing a large supply column. From this it would seem that General Ivanoff's right wing is not only holding its own, but pursuing a successful offensive. The Russians have captured 70.000 prisoners to the south of Polesne during the last three or four weeks, from which it is evident that they are giving as good as they receive. AUTUMN AT GALLIPOLI. The ' Lokal Anzeiger' is of opinion that the approach of the Equinox and the autumn storms will compel the Allies at the Dardanelles to bring matters to a crisis, therefore the Turks expect a general offensive immediately. The strongest ships, it points out, "can only stay in the Gulf of Saros during storms, while lighters will be out of the question for days and weeks. The condition of the Anglo-French camp after days of storms will be terrible to contemplate, therefore one great attack is expected, then the finish. All this is largely imaginary. Winter campaigning always involves hardships, but these will be reduced to a minimum at Gallipoli by an efficient system of drainage," to which the slopes will readily lend themselves. If the ships cannot remain in the Gulf of Saros during storms, they must leave and return when the storms are over. Lightering will no doubt be stopped during storms, but that will merely mean extra work during the fine spells. There will be little difficulty in maintaining our ground at Gallipoli during the winter. Fighting has been proceeding for some days on the front at Mesopotamia. Who has taken the offensive? We may hope to see our forces in Bagdad before the end of this war. When last heard of they were at Amnra, 150 miles up the Tyris f,. om the Persian Gulf and 200 miles from Bagdad. They are handicapped by the fact that the Mesopotamian Plain-is practically one huge marsh. Bagdad is about 600 'miles from the terminus of the Anatolian-Bagdad railway, so that with thn 'River Tigris behind them, which is navigable for shallow-draught steamers right up to Bagdad, our forces have distinctly the advantage in the matter of communications.