THE LANDING PLACE

Evening Star, Issue 15914, 21 September 1915, Page 6

THE LANDING PLACE

DID HAMILTON BLUNDER? A KING OF MELODRAMA. ADANA. CAVALRY COMBATS. [By Criticus.] Another despatch from Sir lan Hamilton has been published, containing a continuance of the narrative from May 5. There is practically nothing in the instalments received thus far which is not already known. Apropos of the Dardanelles campaign, however, an interesting letter is to hand from Mr E. Kerr, suggesting some criticisms on the minor strategy which governed the landing. After describing the strenuous opposition with which the landing was met—opposition only overcome by the matchless determination of our troops after terrible losses—he points out that nearly four months after a landing was effected at Snvla Bay, a few miles up the coast, and no opposition was met with until the troops had penetrated 2j miles inland. He suggests that had the original advance been made there while thei fleet demonstrated against the positions prepared by the Turks at Sedd-el-Bahr and Gaba Tepe, the Dardanelles might have been forced by now, with comparatively small loss. He adds that the affair reflects but little credit upon our Intelligence Department.

Whether or not the course suggested would have enabled our forces to reach the Narrows more rapidly than the lines of attack actually adopted is a debatable question. _ The fact that no opposition was met with on the night of August 6 at vSuvla Bay does not prove that none would have been experienced four months earlier. At that time the Turks would be in doubt as to the points of attack, and would have their _ troops scattered in detachments watching all possible landing places. It was probably the pressure from the south and from Gaba Tepe which led them to draw away the greater part of their forces from Suvla B;y, leaving only a few weak parties to watch the coast." There is no evidence that a prepared position was encountered at Gaba Tepe. Sir lan Hamilton says clearly in his report that the point was selected because, owing) to its ruggedness, no opposition was considered likely. This was sound enough strategy. General Wolfe succeeded in capturing Quebec by scaling the Heights of Abraham at a point so steep that the enemy, thinking it quite safe, had left the place unguarded. As a matter of fact the Turks had only about a battalion on the spot to resist a landing. SUVLA BAY AND GABA TEPE. But the place was within six miles of Maidns, and the landing of a large force from transports on to an open beach takes time, as we found to our cost four months later at Suvla Bay. Maidos is the heart of the Turkish position on Gallipoli Peninsula, and the enemy doubtless had strong reserves there. To signal or to telephone to Maidos for reinforcements would be the work of a few minutes, and there was no reason why the Turkish supports should not have begun to arrive within a. couple of hours—far less time than it would take to land the bulk of the force and the guns from the ships. But exactly the sa.mo result occurred at Suvla Bay. 'lhe enemy’s reserves were within a few miles, and were able to get up before the mass of the troops could be landed. This would almost certainly have been the case four months earlier, and there are defensive positions between Suvla Bay and the Narrows quite as strong as those confronting our forces at Gaba Tepe. Finally, while the troops ai Gaba Tepe are only about six miles from their objective, those at Suvla Bay have about 10 miles to accomplish. Therefore no sound case can be made out for the view' that the original landing ought to have been at Suvla Bay. As for the policy of landing St such places as Sedd-el-Bahr, which the Turks had prepared, and which we knew that they had prepared, it was imperative to land at several points in order to give our troops room to deploy. There is no evidence that the Intelligence Department was seriously at fault. The prepared positions were known, while the fact that Suvla Bay was unprepared did l not give it a prior claim over Gaba Tepe, which, by all accounts, was also unprepared. The average man, however, is apt to expect too much from an intelligence organisation. The best system of organisation may be baffled by thorough precautions under favorable conditions. The ablest generals, who were thoroughly well served, have, from Napoleon downwards, known what it is to be unable to ascertain the dispositions and intentions of their enemies. The Japanese Intelli gence Department was supposed to be particularly good during the Russo-Japanese War, but Sir lan Hamilton himself mentions, in his work ‘ A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book,’ that ho was informed by an important Japanese Staff officer that the Japanese maps did not cover the northern half of Manchuria. A small peninsula, like that of Gallipoli, difficult of access, is very favorable to secrecy, and the enemy would only have their own. slackness to blame if they did not make things very difficult for onr intelligence, agents. TO EGYPT. The latest scare to be elaborately worked up is a report that the Turks are planning a campaign against Egypt. German deserters are alleged to be saying that they were recently ordered to prepare for a new campaign, Egypt being the objective. This, of course, is obvious nonsense. More plausible is the story that the Turks are accumulating a force" at Adana, with the possible object of another Egyptian campaign. Adana stands on the Ana-tolian-Bagdad Railway, within about 3-0 miles of its present terminus. It lies to the east of the Tamms' Mountains, about 20 miles from the coast, with which it is connected by a branch line. The reports about an intended attack on Egypt may be disregarded. No large Turkish army will be despatched in that direction so long as the Dardanelles are threatened. Yet it may be true that a substantial Turkisn force is located at Adana, since the Turks have some reason to fear an attack by the Allies there. A powerful allied force landed at Adana could isolate Palestine and Syria from the rest of the Turkish Empire. Not that there is any immediate prospect of such an operation, hut the possibility is there, and the Turks are bound to take note of it. A MODERN MACHIAVELLI. King Eerdinand of Bulgaria has received in audience the leaders of the five political parties forming the Bulgarian Opposition, who urged that it would be fatal to adopt a neutral attitude, and recommended the formation of a coalition Cabinet and the summoning of the Sobranje, or Bulgarian Parliament, in order to safeguard the country against a policy which would be contrary to the interests and sentiments of the nation. The reception of the deputation is said to have relieved public opinion, while the more optimistic believe that the lung has been converted by the eloquence and arguments of the deputation. Ferdinand, however, is only likely to be converted by two things. One is the assurance that the Allies are going to win; the other a belief that he can get more from them than from the Austro-Germans. He is himself an ex-Austrian officer, and his sympathies will naturally incline towards the enemy. Indeed, he has been at but little pains to conceal those sympathies. But he is the Machiavelli of Balkan politics, and it is doubtful if his sympathies will count for much if his interests pull in an opposite direction. He is said to have been discovered by the Bulgarian deputation which was looking for a kinoin a Viennese beer garden. Ferdinand yva i a Coburg-Orieanist looking fo? a

throne, so an arrangement was readily made. _ Unfortunately, when Ferdinand came into .his kingdom he found that the real ruler of Bulgaria was one Stambuioff, the son of an innkeeper, who played the part of Mayor of the Palace, while Ferdinand found that he'was cast for the role of puppet monarch, which was not to his vvr® Stambuioff was a man of immense ability, but of overbearing temper, and as unscrupulous as Ferdinand himself. He was not easy to get rid of. But one day, when the Minister was abroad, Ferdinand wrote _to him and denounced his conduct as infamous. Stambuioff resigned, and herdmand was King in Bulgaria. Stambuioff, however, was a dangerous man, so he was surrounded by spies, and when r? to ,he allowed to go abroad for ™ health this was refused. He protested that he was being kept 'at Sofia in order to be murdered, a prospect in no way rendered more attractive to him bv the lact that he had been under the necessity ot murdering some of his own political opponents from time to time. Be that as • 00- ! Stambuioff was murdered in Sofia in 1890 with the police looking on, and no one was punished or even arrested. The King sent a telegram of condolence to the widow which was left unanswered, while the more uncharitable roundly declared that Ferdinand was responsible for the murder. In Stambuloff’s old home is said to be preserved the hand of the murdered man, which is to be buried onlv when his murder shall have been avenged. This fact is said to cause Ferdinand many sleepless nights. '

CAVALRY COMBATS. Huge bodies of cavalry are taking part m the fighting on the Russian front m the north, both on the German and on Russian side, particularly in the lake region, to the east of the Vilna-Dvinsk railway. Russia has huge bodies of Cossacks and should do well in such fighting, provided that the right tactics are adopted. The Cossacks are more suitable ™ .mounted infantry than for cavalry, their horses are small—too small to stand up to heavy cavalry horses in shock tactics. They are, in fact, little more than ponies, being very similar to the £oer mounts, which proved so serviceable during the South African War. these Cossack horses are also marvellously hardy and enduring, and make excellent mounts for mounted infantry. Used as such, and fighting from cover, the Cossacks would hold their own with the German cavalry, but if it were attempted to use them as regular cavalry they would probably be ridden down. Russia, although a country full of horses, is nob a great producer of horses suitable for cavalry. She has one famous breed, the. Orloff, and, like all the other Continental countries, she has made extensive purchases of thoroughbred stallions in England to improve the breed of horses generally, and thus provide cavalry mounts. Little is known as to what progress has been made. VILNA.

Little fresh news is to hand regarding the capture of Yilna, and its fall has not been admitted by the Russians at the moment of writing. Indeed, the cables from Petrograd speak as if the place were still in Russian hands. The Germans are said to have cut off all the } ilna railways except that towards Lida, in the south, where a great battle is expected. But the fall of Vilna turns the flank of the Russians to the south, and will leave them no alternative save to retreat. Five weeks have now elapsed since the fall of Ivovno, and the distance between that place to Vilna is less than 60 miles, so that the enemy have progressed over the intervening ground at a rate of less than two miles per day. If the Russians can hold back the enemy ?o that their progress is no greater in the future, ail will probablv go well. Napoleon, following the route by way of "Vitebsk and Smolensk, reached Moscow within little more than three months aitcx leaving Vilna, but the Russians on that occasion declined to fight. Not onlv has the Germans’ progress from Kovno to Vilna been slow, but in the Riga district they have been practically at a standstill for many weeks. \Vo mav now, however, expert a big attempt to force the passage of the Duna and capture Riga.