COAL AND CONCILIATION.

Evening Star, Issue 12883, 4 August 1906, Page 8

COAL AND CONCILIATION.

JUDGMENT IN THE BANNOCKBURN CASE. His Honor Mr Justice Cooper delivered judgment this morning in the case of the Cromwell and Bannockburn Colliery Company v. the Conciliation Board and the Otago Coal Miners' Union:— The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act defines an industrial dispute to mean any dispute arising between one or more employers or industrial unions or associations of employers and one or more industrial unions or associations of workers in relation to industrial matters. " Industrial matters " mean all matters affecting or relating to work done or to be done by workers, or the privileges, rights, and duties of employers of workers in any industry, and include, inter alia, the wages and remuneration of workers, and the hours, mode, terms, and conditions of employment, and the claim of members of an industrial union of workers to preference of employment over non-members. No individual worker, nor any association of workers which is not a " trade union," " an industrial union," or "an industrial association," can be a party or parties to any industrial dispute. Although it is, therefore, essential before a dispute can be the proper subject for inquiry under the Arbitration Act that the workers must be represented by a trade or industrial union or an industrial association, it is not essential that any member of an industrial union or association shall be in the employment of any employer party to the dispute or be personally concerned in the dispute (section 105 of the Act of 1905). There is no provision corresponding to this section in the New South Wales Arbitration Act, and the decision of the Federal High Court in the Pelaw-Main colliery case (December 22f, 1905), upon which Mr Hosking relies, is distinguishable from the present case upon this ground, the main ground of the decision of the High Court in that case beina; that the union there had no legal interest in the subject matter of the alleged dispute, as the men employed in the mine were all non-unionists. Under our statute the fact that no unionists were employ.*! would not of itself oust the jurisdiction of the Board of Conciliation in a particular dispute. Mr Hosking's main contention is, however, that before there can be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Arbitration Act there must be a condition approximating to an industrial warfare, and which may result in a strike. He says that the use of the term " dispute" connotes strife. • He lias suggested that the Legislature did not intend to invest the Arbitration Court with jurisdiction to regulate industrial conditions unless there was existing a serious condition of hostility between employers and workers in a particular trade. If this view is correct, then for many years past the Arbitration Court have been exercising powers beyond their jurisdiction, for in many references to them the relations between the employers and workers were very far removed from anything which could be properly termed industrial warfare. But although the genesis of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts was the desire to devise some means to prevent strikes and the evils resulting therefrom, the jurisdiction of the tribunals set up under these Acts is very much wider than that suggested by Mr Hosking. The Legislature have provided a means by which any dispute between competent parties concerning the conditions of employment in any industry may be defined and regulated, first by the process of conciliation before the Boards of Conciliation, and, failing this, by the process of compulsory arbitration by the Court of Arbitration. The only condition precedent to the application of these processes is that there must be a "dispute,-' and this term used in the statute has a verv much wider meaning than that contended for by Mr Hosking, and is I not limited to a dispute having as one of its essentials the condition of actual or 1 probable strife. In ord-r to found the ! jurisdiction contained in the statute, it is, in my opinion, only necessary that there I should be a difference concerning the con--1 ditions of employment between a trade ■union or an industrial union or industrial : association, through whom only tne workers j can voice their proposals, and the employers in a particular industry. It is not j necessary that that difference should have ; arrived at an' acute stage. And whether : there is such a difference or dispute is | entirely a question of fact, li there is such a difference or dispute, then this Court has no concern with the merits or extent of the difference or dispute. That is a matter for the tribunals to which the Legislature has entrusted the settlement of the dispute. Now, what are the undisputed facts in the present case? In August, 1905, a branch of the defendant union was formed at Bannockburn. The promoters of the branch do not appear to have been in the service of the company at the time the branch was formed, but a number of men who were then, and who still appear to be, in the service of the company, joined the branch, and were members of the union at the commencement of and during the period covered by the correspondence between the secretary of the union and the company's offices, and this correspondence was with the knowledge and at the instance of the Bannockburn branch of the union. In this respect, also, the present case is distinguishable from the Pelaw Main Colliery case. On the 28th October, 1905, the secretary to the Bannockburn branch of tne defendant union forwarded to the secretary of the defendant union a document called a " reference," which contains conditions of employment which the Barmockburn branch desired to be adopted by the plaintiff company in their mines. These conditions were in reference to balloting for places, hewing rates, trucking, deficient and wet places, shift wages, hours of work, tools, and preference. The defendant union, through their Executive, approved of these conditions, and their secretary forwarded a copy to the company's mine manager on the 15th December, 1905, with a letter stating: "My Committee would be pleased to enter into an industrial agreement upon the lines as laid down in the reference." On the 29th December the company's mine manager wrote to the secretary of the defendant union stating that he had referred the matter to the general manager of the company, "who will no doubt discuss the matter with you, and to whom I have to refer to in this matter." No further correspondence passed between the company's officers and the secretary of the defendant union until the 2nd March, 1906. In the interval'the secretary of the branch union wrote to the secretary of the defendant

union intimating that the members wew getting impatient-at -the delay -which had taken place. On March 2 the secretary of the defendant union wrote to the company's mine manager requesting a reply to the "reference,",' and intimated that if the reply was unsatisfactory the union intended to refer the dispute to the Board of Conciliation for settlement. The inirio manager wrote in answer to this letter-on the 6th March, 1906, stating that he had forwarded the letter of the 2nd March to the general manager. On the 12th March the secretary of the defendant union Wrote to the general manager requesting-a reply by the end of the week. On the 15th March the general manager wrote to the secretary of the defendant union a letter, in which he said: "I am directed to say that the company cannot see their way to enter into the agreement you desire." This correspondence shows (1) dissatisfaction among the workers in the plaintiff companv's mines with the conditions prevailing "in October, 1905; (2) the adoption by the defendant union of proposed conditions of employment which the branch union, the dissatisfied workers being members, desired to see introduced; (3) the forwarding by the defendant union to the plaintiff company of these proposed conditions ; and (4) the refusal of the plaintiff company to agree to them. There was, therefore, a demand by the union for a higher rate of remuneration and more advantageous conditions than those existing in the plaintiff company's mines, a demand which was made at the instance of members of the union working in the plaintiff company's mines; the communication of the demand to the plaintiff company; sufficient time given to the plaintiff company to consider the demand; and a refusal by the plaintiff company to agree to the proposals. Clearly, therefore, there was a dispute or difference between the union and the company in reference to the industrial conditions prevailing in the mines, and although it may be that there are ri'o indications that that dispute, if unsettled, is likely to result in a strike, it cannot, in my opinion, be said that it is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. The Court has, as I have said, nothing to do with the merits of the dispute. The parties have not adjusted these differences; conditions have been proposed by one side and rejected by the other. The opportunity for adjusting them before the Board exists. If that fails, then the merits of the dispute will be determined by the Court of Arbitration, and that Court have ample power, if the employers can establish that the dispute is frivolous or trivial, to dismiss the reference and condemn the union in costs. On the other hand, if the union can establish that the prevailing conditions ought to be improved and that the dispute is a meritorious one, they will in due course obtain an award. In my opinion, therefore, the Board of Conciliation have jurisdiction to hear the refprence, and this motion for prohibition must be dismissed and there must be judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs must pay the costs of the union, which I assess at £lO 10s, and j court fees, to be ascertained by the registrar.

Mr Garrow received judgment for Mr Hosking (plaintiffs) and Mr Maoassey for Mr Barclay (defendants).