PACIFIC POSITION

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 136, 11 June 1942, Page 5

PACIFIC POSITION

CHANCE FOR OFFENSIVE

DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA

(By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright.) i (Special Australian Correspondent.) SYDNEY, June 10. "More aid for General MacI Arthur!" is the chorus by the American war correspondents who arc now in Australia, "The Japanese are wide open to attack from Australia," declares Mr. Joseph C. Harsch, the "Christian Science Monitor's" correspond - ent. "Give General Mac Arthur the planes and he will roll back the enemy faster than they came." I The first need is for a proper realisation by strategists in America and'Engiland of what can be done from Aus- | tralia if the materials are provided. Mr. Harsch says that, at least, until now, General Mac Arthur has been unable to impress upon those1 who are responsible for the flow of' war materials the opportunity which Aus- ! tralia offers for an offensive. "Repeated efforts to convince London and Washington of the offensive potentialities of an Australian front have encountered the unbending conviction that other fronts deserve priority," he writes. OFFENSIVE CHEAPER NOW. The lack of materials is particularly tragic when the present circumstances I renders an offensive cheaper than defensive action, he adds, and says: "If General Mac Arthur had 2000 extra warplanes- today while the Japanese fleet is heavily involved in the north, he could almost certainly retake everything between here and Manila. But if the same planes are doled cut to him under a concept of defensive strategy, that number would be lost in a short time. "The number of planes required to recapture Lac, Salamaua, Rabaul, and the Philippines—even the Netherlands East Indies —would be less today than the air losses in six months of a war of attrition are likely to be." News commentators here are agreed that the opportunity has occurred for at least a limited offensive against the Japanese—though the weapons in quantity are still lacking. Air power is the primary need, and this must be supplemented by substantial naval strength. Lac, Salamaua, Rabaul, and Timor are seen as obvious objectives of an Allied sweep. The danger of making any longer-range attacks until Japan's sea and air power has been much more heavily 'punished is that our forces would come into areas where the enemy shore-based aircraft ~ould play havoc with our extended lines of communication. OVER-GENEROUS. Mr. Harsch's assessment of the scope of an Allied offensive is optimistically generous. While up to half the enemy's aircraft-carrier strength may \ have now been sunk, the Tap; .c have other less vulnerable defen j strategic bases for their planes-—many i of the Pacific Islands are under their control, and naval operations within range of these enemy land and air bases could be made costly. The Japanese discovered that when they attacked Wake Island. Some observers urge that the repulse in the north will cause the Japanese to make stronger efforts in the South-west Pacific. Certainly Australia has anticiiaated an intensification of the Japanese submarine campaign, and surface raiders are also expected to be used. But the intensified Japanese efforts in this area may be met by a defensive which, from being static, now shows signs of becoming dynamic Many of the enemy outposts are lightly garrisoned. Attacks by surprise forces, which would have favourable prospects of success, would be a prelude to the passing of the initiative from the forces of Japan to those of the Allies.

Heavier Allied air attacks on Lac and Salamaua are the first move in this campaign.