CHANNEL DASH

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 41, 18 February 1942, Page 5

CHANNEL DASH

GERMAN DETERMINATION

WHY IT WAS CHOSEN

(Rec. 12.30 ■p.m.) RUGBY, Feb. 17. In March last, the two German warships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau took refuge in Brest harbour where they were joined in May by the Prinz Eugen after the destruction of the Bismarck, Mr. Churchill told the House of Commons. The position of these three ships became a serious preoccupation of the Admiralty. They lay on the flank of our main convoy routes to the East. They could make a sortie at any.time on the Atlantic trade routes, or into the Mediterranean. Accordingly, the Admiralty pressed for a continued attack from the air in the hope of disabling them or preventing them from being repaired. This process was continued for more than 10 months, during which time the ships undoubtedly were hit several times and repair work was made very difficult. No less than 4000 tons of bombs were dropped by bombing sorties on Brest by 3299 aircraft for. the loss of 247 Air Force personnel and 43 aircraft. As we never were in a position to know when some or all of these, ships might put to sea the situation entailed almost continuous naval precautions in the hope of being ready at all times to meet the various threats which these ships constituted. A further serious feature was a very grievous subtrac- j tion from our bombing effort against | | Germany. ! DECIDED TO MOVE THEM. I The bombing of these ships was so t severe that the Germans evidently came !to. the decision that they could not [maintain them, any longer at Brest, and the ships must return to Germany. We did not know whether this was! for the purpose of effecting final re-■ pairs or of enabling them to work up to full efficiency in the shelter of the waters of the Baltic.

However that might be, the Germans resolved to try and bring these ships back to Germany. This was a very hazardous operation. It could be done by sailing round the British Isles and returning via Norway br by a dash up the Channel.

The Germans rejected the plan of returning northabout, and preferred to ran the admittedly serious risks of a Channel passage. '

In the Atlantic they would have run a greater risk of being attacked by air, of extensive reconnaissances from Shore and from aircraft-carriers, of be-

ing slowed down by torpedo attacks, Or being brought to action against overwhelming forces, as was the Bismarck.

The Channel route, on the other hand, was a run of under 24 hours, part of which could be made in darkness, possibly by surprise, and they had the opportunity of choosing the weather which would be most favourable. AIR PROTECTION OBTAINED. The whole way through the Channel and along the Dutch coast they had the advantage of a powerful air umbrella. The danger of; running past the Dover batteries under suitable weather conditions was not great. Our slow convoys repeatedly traverse the Straits of Dover and are repeatedly bombarded by guns -on tlie French coast, but this has not stopped our convoys. . One great danger was mines. This they might hope to avoid by energetic sweeping. There remained, therefore, the action of surface craft and aircraft. Air reconnaissance would show the Germans that neither heavy cruisers nor even light cruisers were in the narrow Straits, and therefore attacks by flotillas of destroyers and small torpedo-boats were all that need be expected apart from the air. Some people seemed to think that heavy forces should have been stationed so as to have been able to intercept the ships in the Channel or the North Sea. Had we done so our ships would have been open to the same scale of attack as the German ships at Brest. WEAKENING OF FORCES. Further, such dispositions woufd have dangerously weakened preventive measures we have taken to safeguard our convoys arid guard the northern passage, and to deal with other Gertoan heavy ships. The Admiralty did not consider the I attempt to run the Channel wpuld be ■ ■''$■''•''■..'

an impossible operation under the conditions which prevailed, but this certainly was much less apprehended than that they should break out on to the trade routes or into the Mediterranean.

No one can doubt the vigour and courage with which the enemy squadron was attacked as soon as its movement, was perceived, and of course everyone was very sorry that thesjc ships were not sunk. A

The only questions which were open were: pirstly, why was their'move-

1 •■.•': .. > ..■;■■■•,• ment, not detected shortly after daylight? Secondly, was the contact and liaison between the Coastal Command and also between the other ' R.A.F. commands and the Admiralty as close as it should have been? SERVICE SUGGESTION. At the suggestion of the Admiralty and Air Ministry he had directed that an inquiry should be held into thesa points.''■*■ The inquiry would be secret, and he doubted very much whether, when completed, its result wOuld hie suitable for publication. He was not prepared to give any information about the inquiry or any undertaking that its result would be made public.

If anyone was found guilty of dereliction of duty, disciplinary action would follow.—B.O.W.