NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 41, 18 February 1942, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

BURMA AND JAVA

JAPAN'S CHIEF AIMS

The pattern of tbe eutem.war is now established for some time to come. Japanese forces can continue to establish new footholds one; after another because it is quite impossible to set up strong defences everywhere and no defensive plans can foretell where the enemy will attack. The Indies offer faaany objectives of importance yet, and many more of them will probably go the way of Palembang. But there are some that cannot be let go, or "scorched,'* and the strategical problems of the area are becoming more and more difficult.

Having secured control of the Malacca Strait by the conquest of Malaya and Singapore,. Japan has cxi tended her possible range of action by sea as well as by land, and has obtained direct access to the Indian Ocean through the Strait. Already their submarines are operating there. The British Navy, which has the duty of guarding the Indian Ocean, must now not only protect commerce in the Indian Ocean, but guard against the possibility of a Japanese naval excursion through the Malacca Strait. ""- Two Chief Objectives. The enemy's main activities are now pointing in two directions—at Java and at Rangoon, the heart of the, Netherlands East Indies and the key of the Burma Road. The Philippines campaign is of secondary importance.' General Mac Arthur's 'army, besieged on the Baton Peninsula, may refuse to be defeated, but it cannot get away; and Manila, though the Japanese would like to use it, is not a Singapore. As/for Burma and-Java, it is impossible to 'say which Japan regards as the field requiring\ first attention; but both will probably be tackled at once while the conditions are favourable; that is, before either can be powerfully reinforced. Rangoon is urgently desirable because of the handicap its capture would place upon Marshal Chiang's operations in China, reflected in the.easing of Japan's burden there. But Java is the real strategic centre in the Western Pacific, for it is the heart of the Allied defence, and its occupation by the Japanese would shatter the defence organisation in the Indies area. Because this defence is supplied in and through the Indian Ocean, it is affected by the opening of the Malacca Strait. \£ir and Sea Power. Japan's* ability to, continue the war along 0 these* lines is due, as has been said so dftenvitd'tjser-control of the seas between the -Istdies^andi Jjpan, and her complete mastery ~*>f 'the air; >and_it will hot be checked .unt&>t;J^ast^one of these advantages is oygrcohife1! A to attain general air superiority vnufi be extremely ■ difficult, because" V-the Japanese have paid special attention to seizing airfields,- Their air force is not very large, and its replacement rate is low compared with that Of their opponents. It has been proved that in air combat- under balanced conditions the Japanese have suffered very heavy losses. But these handicaps are not enough to offset the. advantages they have in base facilities. The naval situation is different. The Japanese navy is a very powerful one; but its rate of replacement or growth is very low compared with what the Allied nations can achieve. Despite great immediate gains Japan, contemplating a long war, can only see the gradual appearance of a naval Power that will finally crush her; for while her own- sea forces will go on being whittled down, those of the Allies are growing and will grow. This is not a case of*one productive.effort endeavouring to overcome which has had a great .start, like the competition between;-,;the Allied and Axis air Powers,.-but of trends in opposite directions, one increasing, the ■ other decreasing. Palemlmng Holocaust. . Another sacrifice to the god. of war has been made at Palembang. The Dutch have had no hesitation in sending millions up in flame and smoke to cheat the enemy of their gains. With this policy of sacrificial destruction firmly established, the Japanese are winning little in the way of prompt supplies compared with the promise of the territories they have invaded, and they have probably recognised that they could not count upon great immediate gains. Tlie Japanese will, in time, be able to restore the oil supplies in some meastrre, if they are allowed time. The loss of these fields has, of course, affected the supplies of oil fuel to the Allied countries, but they produced only a small fraction of the world's total, and the resulting handicap is rather the additional burden upon transport than the loss of the oil.