NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXII, Issue 42, 18 August 1941, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

THE TIME FACTOR

WINTER CAMPAIGNS

PROSPECT IN EUROPE

While at one stage in the last few weeks of the German campaign in Russia it looked as If the war might possibly be over before Christmas with the defeat of Hitler, the prospect now is for a continuance of the fighting through the winter at least into next year. This is the result of the German push into the southern Ukraine,

Japanese action in the Far East,

an the swing-over of Vichy to-

wards the Axis.

That the highest authorities do not expect an early end to the war is clear from the message sent to Stalin from the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting in the, Atlantic, particularly the passage:

We must now turn our minds to the consideration of a more longterm policy, since there is still a long and hard path to be traversed before there can be won that complete victory without which our war efforts and sacrifice would be wasted.

The war goes on upon many fronts, and before it is over there may yet be further fighting on fronts that will be developed.

This seems to preclude any early measures on a large scale designed to hasten the end. While, from a strictly military point of view, the opportunity for intervention in the West to aid Russia in the East and work the double front on Hitler would appear ss favourable as it is ever likely to .be, the question of ways and means, no doubt discussed by the President and the Prime Minister, must be paramount. Britain has had a bitter enough experience in the present war, as she has had in almost every other war

she has fought, of attempting big jobs „ with entirely insufficient means.

Though the weather in the European theatre of war is likely to favour operations for another couple of months at least, unless intervention could be made effective by preparation to the last detail, with .means adequate in every respect, it would be far better to wait than to risk any premature venture with a big chance of failure. This is apparently the conclusion to which the President and the.

Prime Minister came in their consultation. -

Distress in Europe

This will mean helping Russia by- yll sother measures short of a Western intervention. The problems involved even by such limitations will .be difficult enough in proportion to the difficulties of access to Russia. The Japanese have already expressed resentment unofficially at'the dispatch of American help to Russia via Vladivostok, and there is a possibility of trouble here. In the long run it becomes a question of sea power and the freedom of sea communications. Meanwhile Europe seems doomed to a winter of grave suffering and discontent under the Nazi yoke. There are signs of this already everywhere. As the Germans get involved 7 More and more deeply in Russia; Without prospect of early decision, and food shortages are accentuated by the,supply of huge armies on the Eastern Front, operating over "scorched earth," the starving populations of occupied Europe will rise in sporadic revolt against intolerable conditions. Whether they can succeed anywhere will depend on the strength of control the Germans can still impose with their depleted garrisons and the assistance the rebellious people can get from the outside. In any event the immediate outlook of these subject populations is dark.

Ukraine as a Prize,

Whatever the military result of the German advance into the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, it is clear that, the Soviet has suffered a serious blow-to its industrial resources, and one which will have no small effect on its war effort. The river Dnieper flows southeast from Kiev to Dnepropetrovsk (formerly called Ekateririoslav, ancLso shown on many maps, and also calledDnieprostroy) and then south-wesf to Kerson, just west of the Crimean peninsula. Roughly, the river cuts .the Ukraine into two halves; but its very pronounced eastward bend embraces a highly important section of the country. The river is so large that, the Germans may find it impossible to cross it; but they will, if they reach it along its length, acquire very valuable assets. . '.'•..■■

The Ukraine has long been regarded as mainly a grain-growing area; but agriculture now covers only about onethird of the industrial activity. Ukrainian heavy industry is a product of Soviet policy. The grain production of the Ukraine amounts to about onefifth of the whole Russian output. But immensely more important is the wealth of metal production—threefifths of the iron and of the coal, three-quarters of the aluminium, half the superphosphates, and nearly all.the soda. But it must not be assumed ;hat this colossal wealth is concen'a ed west of the river: it extends all over the eastern half of the country. Details are not easily obtainable, but it appears that the most important mineral centre in the threatened area is the iron field of Krivoy-Rog, which is about 80 miles south-east of Dnepropetrovsk. The loss of this to the Russians is more important than, the gain to the Germans.

Dnieper, Power Source.

! • Dnepropetrovsk is a key point in the Soviet industrial system,, and. is liable to be gravely injured even if it is not captured, for it is one of the largest of the Russian hydroelectric installations. A huge dam across the Dnieper feeds the generating station which, in its initial lay-out—probably now greatly exceeded —was designed to produce about as much power as Arapuni and Waikaremoana combined. The whole Russian electi-ie power system, which has been among ;the great engineering developments of the Soviet, is tied together in a "grid" system (as the New Zealand stations are).

It is a point of interest that so far the Germans have not been reported as having made, any air attack on; this great power plant It is a prize whose value will depreciate very rapidly if it is knocked about; but if the enemy lose hope of taking and keeping it, it will certainly become a target