NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 51, 1 March 1941, Page 10

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

NAZI OFFENSIVE

POSSIBLE COURSES

PRESSURE OF TIME

With the coming of March zero hour in Europe is obviously near, and within weeks, perhaps within days, Nazi intentions should be made clear. March is likely to be the time of Hitler's offensive because of the pressure of time.

With the situation as it is, a survey of the general position and of strategic factors may be useful,at this time. The first thing to be noted is that there is no general agreement on what Hitler will do. Events point to a move' in the Balkans, but it is still uncertain whether this will be a major attack or a diversion or again whether it wili be an offensive with strictly limited objectives. ■ The Five Courses. . There are five courses which the Nazis might follow, with various mutations,' in their effort to win success in the spring and summer of 1941. (1) They might make a, direct assault on Britain, seeking to reach her shores under cover of night, or of -,-' artificial fog, to land troops by gliders, and to bomb the way across the Channel at the nearest point. This is" a course which would offer the most ,i direct results, but would demand the heaviest price and which has the odds against it unless command of the air J can be gained and retained. ; ; . (2) The Germans might strike ,at Ireland. In sortie ways .this isan t easier, in some ways a harder task than the attack on Britain itself. The poverty of Irish defences makes it easier, but the closeness pf British.' bases in Northern Ireland1 and the relative distance from: which the Germans would have to operate weigh., the scales against the Nazis in a struggle of any length. It would be Norway in reverse, without the Germans possessing British sea power. ■ A Blow at Spain? (3) The Nazis might strike down through Spain at Gibraltar. This is a possibility because if undertaken it would mean that the German guns across the bay at Algeciras might neutralise the'power of Gibraltar and close the entrance to the Mediterranean to the British Fleet. On the other hand it would create a new battle front and might not prove; favourable to Germany in the long run, especially as its influence on the .final decision would not be swift. (4) The expected move through Bui' garia against Greece, and possibly Turkey,' 'might be undertaken. This would create an upset in the Balkans, on which Germany depends for essen-~ tial, supplies, but might be held worth while if a fewift victory were seen. Moreover, there are various factors making for some German move in the. Mediterranean—the perilous position of / Italy, the threat to the Rumanian oil wells from British bombers, which shortly will be released from Africa, and (if Italy collapsesV the possibility of a route being opened up to' the Allies for the invasion of the Reich by land. Germany could lose the war in .the Mediterranean, though cho might not be able to win it there. Use of the "Blockade." (5) There is the certain course of intensification of the sea and air "blockade" of Britain. This, the weapon most mentioned by the Nazis'in recent months, is undoubtedly their most effective. It is not denied that the result of the Nazi campaign has been to inflict heavy losses on British shipping. But recently figures of sinkings have fallen; and there is the further fact that this weapon is rendered less effective by the certainty of American aid in convoying goods to Britain if the situation warrants it. Consequently Germany has been attempting _to goad Japan into war, a course which, would certainly be disastrous for Japan. Whatever else is undertaken it is certain that this sea "blockade" will be 'intensified by every means in the power of the Reich. It will be backed by bombing attacks in which Germany still has the edge. But this advantage is passing; in December last,, for example, the combined. American and British output of aeroplanes for the first time eclipsed that of Germany. The Initiative Lost. In the Mediterranean area the Axis has lost the initiative since the war with Greece began. The security of this region means so much" to the Reich, • and the conquest of Greece would free Italy from so much pressure and open the way to such attractive possibilities, that despite the disorganisation involved it seems likely that the Nazis will attempt it. ' By this means they would be a step nearer the Irakian oil which would help them towards self-sufficiency in fuel, and also they would advance their plans to the point where they might contemplate an attack on the Suez Canal. Only thus could the Mediterranean be made safe for the Axis, but such a campaign would be monumental in conception and. terrible in cost.

The main, the decisive, theatre thus remains the British Isles. Whatever may be attempted elsewhere it is on the cards that Hitler will try to win. the war by the only short route; which will need a terrific effort and will cost Germany the flower of her army-' Otherwise, he can only settle down to . a: war of attrition, using weapons which are two-edged, suffering the ruin of a Hamburg and a Cologne for every Coventry and Birmingham and feeling his enemy's blows grow in weight aw 3 power. Air Warfare First. For such a campaign air superiority is needed, and it is certain that the British fighter strength which won the Battle of- Dunkirk.and the Battle for Britain last year is greater than ever, both-in quantity and in quality. So the first sign of the spring is likely to . be an intensification of the air war, made possible by the recuperation of both sides during the winter months, and European skies will again be a battlefield of colossal size on which forces will clash at dizzy speeds. ' There is another reason why Hitler is likely to make a great effort to win the war this year: 1941 is the last year . . in which he will possess the initiative. Next year Britain's strength will, make possible a military assault on Europe which everyone knows is still not practicable today. Even this autumn such .•. a possibility, may face the Nazis; if ' • they are to act before their 250 divi- ■ - sions are spread out defensively over/-* <-... an intolerably long'front it must be ■>}', \ soon. ," V • '/' ' ' V'^'^i