NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 143, 13 December 1940, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

THE NIGHT BARRAGE

VALUE OVER LONDON

A CURTAIN OF FIRE

The first check given the Nazi night raiders was supplied by a special barrage, the noise of which was sweet music to the Londoners.

In this development of anti-aircraft defence the greatest reliance was put on the "predictor," the sensitive instrument which digests data as to the height, speed, and direction of the raider, as well as time factors and atmospheric influences, pnd then proceeds to "point the gun." Raiders find themselves boxed in squares of fire and explosion over above 20,000 feet, and they are throttled up to the ceiling. . Thousands of shells are thrown up by guns of different calibre, up to the 4.5 inch, the most deadly of all A.A. weapons. The heavy group takes the top section, but if the enemy raider decides to come lower there is a stratum of violence laid by the lighter guns. In addition to the 4.5 gun, the heavy group includes the 3.7 inch, which is comparatively silent owing to the length of its barrel. This gun can reach many miles into the sky. Searchlights Not Used. In the light group is the Bofors quick-firer, with a peculiar cup-shaped muzzle. The chief assets of this gun are its mobility, lightness, and accuracy, apart from its high rate of fire. For the lower levels there are the Brens on anti-aircraft mountings, and the Lewis guns. The last-named have already claimed. more than 20 planes in the London region. ■

Searchlights are not used with the barrage. The flashes of guns from below tell the Germans nothing of the direction of fire, and no tracer bullets, are used which might help them to discover where the guns are situated. All the German raiders know as they approach the metropolitan area is that a curtain of fire seems to hang in the sky, which is alive with exploding shells. Enemy Left Guessing. They may weave their way in and out of the clouds to find cover,' but the guns find them just the same, for the ears of the defence are the most delicate in the world. A hit will mean that the machine will be blown into a hundred pieces, while an explosion may damage the plane beyond the safety limits. It is the uncertainty of the barrage which is so threatening ■ for the bombers. They cannot be sure of'the power of the shell and cannot judge when they might be too near an exploding chain, of fire until it is too late. Many of the raiders, finding themselves caught, in the heavier fire, have dived down, but they run into even more vital danger, for the rapid-ly-firing guns of smaller calibre are even more threatening.

The man who organised and perfected the plan is Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Pile, who commands the Anti-aircraft Ccrps. Before the outbreak of war in 1939 London had two divisions of Territorials devoted to' A.A. work. This force has been expanded tremendously.. It demands an enormous artillery assemblage, and one of the problems associated with the extension of it has been the supply of guns, ammunition, mechanical equipment, and, of course, the skilled personnel to operate the great machinery of the barrage. The blitzkrieg on London gave proof of the effectiveness of the night barrage, and its extension is checking the raiders at other points in Britain. The Dodecanese. The severe blows which have been dealt to Italy in Albania and Egypt, on top of the naval raid, at Taranto, may not exhaust the bad tidings in store for the Fascists. One of the things which is possible in the fairly near future is a blow at the Dodecanese Islands/ and the conquest of this group. " • The situation in the Dodecanese is bad. It was bad before Greece entered the war, and it has obviously not improved since, as the military Governor has thought it necessary to tender his resignation. At the end of October the "New York Times" published a telephone message from its Athens correspondent stating that considerable hardships were being undergone by both the garrisons and the civil population in the various islands owing to the British blockade, and that it was believed that "capitulation would follow upon the sorry state of affairs unless adequate relief can be obtained." More Difficult1. Since then the entry of Greece has rendered the Italian position in the Dodecanese even more difficult and if Italian successes in the war are as few as hitherto it is likely that the archipelago may be in a desperate situation before long, as the garrisons will receive little encouragement from the news of the military conduct, of their countrymen. ,

The capture of the Dodecanese may, of course, be attempted by Britain when the Egyptian campaign has been pushed to a satisfactory conclusion though at the moment the possibilities there are obviously so great that a force for the island expedition is not likely to be spared. In addition the bloodless occupation of the Dodecanese becomes daily more possible, and a military assault may be judged unnecessary.

The transfer of ownership of the islands would represent still another improvement in the general strategic situation in the Mediterranean, as it would bring all Axis military operations in this region within reach of British bombers operating from Italian air bases. '