ARTERIAL ROADS

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 56, 8 March 1937, Page 10

ARTERIAL ROADS

DESIGN AND SAFETY

EXPERIENCE IN BRITAIN

ACCIDENT FACTOR

The question is raised seriously in an article by G.B. in the "Manchester Guardian" whether the design of arterial roads in Britain has not contributed to the accident rate. Accord-

ing to the writer: The closing months of 1936 once again stimulated public anxiety about road accidents. It was not only the appalling total of casualties which disturbed us but also a conviction that we had failed to discover the logical preventive methods. This half-instinctive conclusion has been reinforced from two sides during the last few weeks. On the one hand, a great mass of testimony, somewhat angrily furnished by road-users, suggests that the construction of some of the new arteries and by-passes has served to increase danger rather than reduce it. On the other hand, a closely reasoned statement by a county surveyor, supported by impressive evidence, challenges one of the main doctrines of the Ministry of Transport, a doctrine based largely on police evidence. Both these opinions merit close analysis.

During the last ten years an increasing tale of accidents in every part of the country inspired loud public complaints that our road system wad grotesquely ill-suited to modern motor traffic, and especially to the dense motor traffic of a country which, has more motor-vehicles to the square mile than any country in the world. These protests led to wide schemes of road construction, expensive indeed, but. far less radical than other nations adopted. Existing roads were widened, new roads were cut, by-passes were constructed to-switch traffic round towns, and so forth. The road authorities then sat back and congratulated us on having modernised our road system. But the road casualties continued to show a sharp upward tendency. ' It is now suggested that the majority of these' road alterations, so far from safeguarding the public, have; actually intensified risks. The majority of them have become lined by shops, schools, private houses, cinemas, inns, and other places of public resort, while their great width and the speed of the traffic which they carry create perils which existed in a much milder form on the older and narrower roads. ' - CONFUSION OF TRAFFIC. Many of these new roads now include 'sections on "which speed is'restricted to 30 mlp.h., but even thus their width renders them exceptionally-dangerous for pedestrians;,it is further urged,that a wide road—for example, of' sixvehicle width—unless split' into separate traffic lanes,' creates exceptional confusion for wheeled traffic and, increases the risks for motorists and cyclists. Anyhow, at the moment there is an urgent demand for the reconstruction of some, of these expensive roads and for the erection of footbridges as pedestrian crossings. A moment's thought will indicate that this sequence of events must automatically occur whenever building is permitted alongside such new roads. If building were forbidden there would be no perceptible pedestrian traffic; if building is allowed pedestrian traffic follows in strict proportion to the building and pedestrians must then be protected—by bridges or by subways or by guardrails and controlled; crossings. ' The system in use is to permit building, to encourage pedestrians, and to make no provision for the safety of pedestrians, whereas pedestrians require very special safeguarding wherever the car-, riageways are unusually 'wide. Any proposals for the control of pedestrians raise cries of protest, but since these new roads are not bound by any historical or traditional privileges they offer~the most rational opportunity 1o experiment with control of pedestrian traffic. Such control might take one of two forms, either to prohibit all walking in the carriageway as ■ a penal offence or to limit pedestrian traffic exclusively to certain controlled points. The second critical sidelight on our road policy comes1 from the Oxfordshire county surveyor, Mr. G. T. Bennett. He stands almost alone amongst the road authorities of England in having effected a substantial reduction in accidents over the area for which he is responsible (of course, a surveyor's responsibility is only partial). The number of fatal accidents on his roads during 1936 was approximately half the number registered during 1935. If Mr. Hore-Belisha had attained a 50 per cent, drop for the whole country during 1936 he wouia have been acclaimed a national benefactor.' It must be admitted that Oxfordshire is a largely agricultural county, threaded by' few main roads of importance, attracting little tourist traffic, and almost devoid of important manufacturing centres. Still, it contains the University and Jth'e Morris works, is on the direct route from London to many places of interest, and accommodates traffic of substantial weight and frequency.

THE OXFORDSHIRE EXPERIMENT.

Mr. Bennett decided some years ago that many, accidents were caused by inferior road layout, deceptive corners, narrow carriageways, lack of footpaths, blind junctions, and the like. He proceeded to modify such dangerpoints as funds permitted, wherever experience showed.that the defects in design did, in fact, create a special liability to accident. It is by this policy, and by this policy alone, that he has succeeded in halving the annual tale of fatalities in his area over a period when all other road authorities register either a positive increase or at least a failure to secure greater safety. As the result of this conI'tinued experience he now teaches that about 60 per cent, of road accidents are caused by bad road layout that 60 per cent, of the accidents could be eliminated by patching up such obvious defects in the existing main roads, and that a further 20 per cent, could be cut out by reconstructing main roads to the theoretically ideal system with twin carriage-ways and other modern improvements. This brines us to the really startling aspect of Mr Bennett's theories. The Ministry of Transport has examined -- the problem from precisely the same angle, and suggests that bad road layou l is to blame for precisely 3 per cent, of the accidents. The contrast between Mr. Bennett's 60 per cent, and the Ministry's 3 per cent, is fantastic. One of these contradictory authorities is obviously flagrantly in error. Mr. Bennett, with ruthless logic, supports his reasoning with dates and places, and exhibits a substantial increase in public safety throughout his area to prove his doctrine. The Ministry of Transport divides his figure by twenty on the authority of various witnesses, most of whom are local chiefs of police and most' of whom lay the onus on a failure of the human, element. This alternative explanation is immediately suspicious. A fatal accident occurs in Xshire. The Ministry receives a report from the chief of. police at X. In a majority of instances this report states that a driver or a pedestrian was guilty of an error oC judgment which was not so serious as tj be criminal. In other words, the local road conditions proved too much for the human faculties involved. The difference between Mr.. Bennett and^