USE OF THE NAVY

Evening Post, Volume CXXII, Issue 121, 18 November 1936, Page 11

USE OF THE NAVY

TACTICS OF JAPANESE

RECENT EVENTS IN CHINA

FEAR OF THE RUSSIANS

While the Japanese Navy was initiating the new menace to China which has stirred the world recenly, the best divisions of the army were holding manoeuvres in North Japan, with the Emperor in attendance, writes Eugene Young in the "San Francisco Chronicle." > At the same time, across the comparativley narrow Sea of Japan, the Eastern Russian Army was holding its own impressive, wide-flung manoeuvres with big guns, tanks, and hundreds of .aeroplanes giving an impressive lesson in the might of the Soviets. These circumstances are to be kept in mind as the development of the aggression is watched. They throw a peculiar light on some of the proceedings of the Japanese- and will explain an unusual caution on the part of the leaders entrusted with them. The fact is that the aggressors have been very carefully watching their step as they have gone along—at least in the initial moves. Taking a broad view of the situation, here are some of the prime factors in it: — 1 For months, ever since the cleanup of the Japanese army following the March rebellion in Tokio, that part of the armed forces has been strictly restrained in its attitude towards China. Its leaders had been ordered to make no move without the consent of the Emperor, and the Emperor backed Premier Hirota in a policy of moderation. 2. Home financial and economic strains, which, forbade entrance into a great war, combined with a belief that China and Russia had an agreement to unite in resistance to Japan, gave reasons for this moderate attitude. CHINESE ENCOURAGED. 3. But various Chinese elements were encouraged by this circumstance to believe they could act with impunity against their neighbours across the water. The Southern factions demanded war to redeem the North and to retake Manchuria and Jehol. The Northern civilian and military officials showed a stiffer front to Jaoanese demands. Even Chiang Kai-shek, the dictator at Nanking, made warlike preparations. Terrorists felt free to kill Japanese and advocates of the boycott renewed their campaign. 4. When the Nineteenth Army refused to let Jaoanese land at Pakhoi and Chinese troops at Fengtai, near Peking, contested their rieht to use the military centre there, they were confronted with that most fatal of conditions in the East—''loss of face." They simply had to do something to save their prestige. 5. So they took the Fengtai barracks and, after many consultations in Tokio, the navy was authorised to send "police forces" into the Hongkew district of Shanghai and some others up the Yangtse, especially to Hankow. Choice of the navy as the instrument of force hold's the highest significance, for these reasons:— 1. In the March crisis the then army leaders tried to compel the Emperor to give way to their foreign and domestic programme and to "accept them as his counsellors; and they permitted the rebels to remain in Tokio's centre while they brought this pressure to bear. The affair was ended only when the navy landed forces that threatened to subdue the revolt with force and also upheld the Emperor's right to rule without restrictions. 2. After that the navy stood by the Emperor when he insisted on a civilian Government headed by Premier Hirota and when he cleaned out the militarists who had tried to coerce him. The Navy also joined Hirota in discountenancing the aggressive continental policy of the army and in opposing war. A SMOOTHER ROAD. 3. Furthermore the sea forces could establish "police forces" in China without endangering international relations. There were plentiful precedents. Britain, France, America, and others had frequently landed men to project their nationals and their vital interests. These Powers, along with Japan, maintained a naval patrol of the Yangtse River for such purposes. Each had claimed the right to -decide just how it should act and what forces it should use in case of aggression or danger. 4. Hence the use of the navy could not be considered a warlike act either by China or the Western Powers, no matter if it might mean the establishment of garrisons that remain a long time. The propagandists made the most of what the navy did as it opened its campaign. The occupation in force of the Hongkew district and the sending of more sailors to Hankow, on the Yangtse, were represented as coups of the most aggressive sort. The Japanese were perfectly willing to permit such an interpretation, for the stronger the actions were made to seem the more Japan "saved face" abroad and at home. In reality Hongkew had been in Japanese possession ever since the incident of 1932 and China had virtualy acquiesced in that fact. The right of Japan to keep a policing force in its concession in Hankow was established as far back as 1926. CHANGE IN METHOD. Except for the naval "sword-rattling" there was nothing new in these proceedings. Accompanying them was a distinct change in Japanese method;;. In former crises the army spokesmen had shown contempt for the diplomats and civilian statesmen in Tokio and had rudely pushed them aside when they tried to impose a policy of negotiation. In this case it was the army that was pushed aside while the doplomats and the navy acted in harmony to try to bring China to terms. Suasion went hand in hand with cautious display of force. Meanwhile the Emperor, taking personal command of the army, was restraining its commanders from any action likely to complicate matters. There is, of course, a possibility that the aggressive military leaders will liave their way. Even though the most dangerous ones have been eliminated from high positions a powerful section of the High Command believes that Japan must act against both China and Russia before it is too late.

They use their propaganda agencies to show the danger of waiting until China has equipped its army and air force and Eussia has completed its plans for sustaining its Eastern army by munitions works in its rear.

They are entirely logical in pointing out that within another five year?, perhaps within three years, these two Powers, acting together, might be strong enough to drive Japan off the mainland and endanger its home position. If they were left free to prepare the limited resources of Japan would not permit it to keep pace.

So they draw the conclusion thai it. Is "now or never" lor their country.

Their obvious course would be to keep China quiet by the use of the fleet in menacing its chief harbours while they undertook to drive Russia off the Eastern shore of Asia and as far back into the mainland as possible. The army manoeuvres were based on such a movement.

The time to strike would be some time in the next few months, after Vladivostok and other harbours were frozen over. Then the Russians could not effectively use their fleet of sixty or more submarines and their great air fleet would be hampered by cold.

Japanese troops have been especially trained in winter fighting and they could be poured through Korea and Manchukuo to the front around Vladivostok.

There is a factor, hoWever, which militates against any such adventure. The Russian army in the East—totalling from 300,000 to 500,000, with large reserves—is already highly equipped and has rolled up huge reserves of supplies. It boasts that it is ready to carry on a campaign for more than a year. It has been well trained and might prove even more efficient than the Japanese forces. To tackle it would involve a gigantic military and financial effort. It has been evident that in the last two years the Japanese adventurers have turned their eyes expectantly on Germany, hoping that nation would make an attack on Russia in the West and thus weaken it in the East. But there has been a great disillusionment on this score. Berlin has been ready to form a vague entente against the Soviets, but could not be pinned.down to definite pledges. The most it has done is to try to form closer relations in trade, whereby it might supply Japan with arms in exchange for certain Manchurian and other produce. Tokio has had to realise that Germany is far from ready for a war with Russia. It must have greater armament, with vast reserves, before it can hope to hold off France, and, perhaps Britain, in the' West while it first advances through Poland—not an easy task—to get at the Russian army. And then it must overcome a really great military machine, highly equipped with modern arms. If Japan should strike m the immediate future it would have to proceed alone. Hence the caution it is showing in China, lest it arouse a dangerous coalition against it.