THE LOW COUNTRIES

Evening Post, Volume CXXII, Issue 68, 17 September 1936, Page 9

THE LOW COUNTRIES

EFFECT ON STRATEGY

AIR SHIELD FOR GERMANY ?

A BELIEF ATTACKED

The commander of a nation's destinies today is faced with the problem of making decisions with no historical background on which to place reliance, writes Captain Norman MacMillan in the "Daily Mail." The emergence of the aeroplane as a supreme engine of war has changed considerations of defence. Premises based on past wars (the favourite teaching ground for strategists) lack the fundamental factor oi the modern air weapon. He who does not know the technicalities of aviation, who is ignorant of the new powers that wings have given to war, is a danger to his own people. Why does the British Government continually affirm that it regards the inviolability of Belgium and Holland as essential for the protection of Great Britain? • The occupation of Belgium by the German forces in 1914 was part of a definite plan of campaign laid down long before the Air Arm had emerged from the chrysalis stage. It formed an essential element of ground warfare. A sweeping movement through' Belgium was a tactical necessity to strike at France and at the Channel ports. NOT APPLICABLE. Does the same consideration apply in aerial warfare? Ido not believe it does! I believe that certain countries—of which Great Britain is one—could be, forced to capitulate through air war alone, if they themselves were inadequately armed in the air. But I do not subscribe to the thesis that German possession of coastal aerodromes in Belgium and Holland would make Germany a stronger air Power against this country. How often in the past few years has it been, asserted that there is urgent need to move our aircraft factories and base aerodromes away from our east and south-east areas, a requirement so patently logical that one is left astounded that the precept has not become practice already? Can those who agree that we must move back suggest that Germany would wish to move forward? , Tactically, it would be bad policy for either Germany or Britain to place air forces in Holland or Belgium. Such an advanced position would render them open to swift destruction. The traditional British conception of a forward Teutonic sweep into the Low Countries has vanished with the coming of the aeroplane's supremacy. The inviolability of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is of greater adr vantage to Germany than to ourselves. It would form a bulwark for her to the west, for it is a principle of international law that the sovereignty of a State extends to the air above its territory. BREACH OF NEUTRALITY. . The passage of war aircraft above the territory of .another nation without permission is at any time a violation of international law. In time of waf> it would become a violation of neutrality and constitute an act of-war, even though no bombs were cjrdpped. Thus British aeroplanes could not fly over Belgium or Holland without transgressing their neutrality. If the neutrality of these two countries were respected by" us, Germany's geographical position would be strengthened against air attack far more than if she were to occupy the intervening territory. Air attack on Germany/ from the west could then be waged only through restricted corridors of entry—one in North-eastern France (from the frontiers of Switzerland to Luxembourg), and the other between the north of Holland and the south of Denmark. Germany, on the other hand, from her narrow northern corridor of seaboard lying opposite our Grimsby to Newcastle coastline, could raid every important city in the United Kingdom, except perhaps in the extreme southwest. Her attacks could be made on any part of our seaboard. Ours could enter German territory only through that one narrow strip—unless (and until) we had squadrons based in France. We could not blockade Germany's aircraft as we blockaded her fleet before. And in the centre of that narrow strip stands refortified Heligoland. . ' ANOTHER PROBLEM. Take another theoretical aspect. If German squadrons flew across Holland and Belgium to attack Great Britain, would the Low Countries declare this an act of war, even though no bombs were dropped? Would our statesmen retaliate by sending British squadrons across the same neutral territories - before these States had made some declaration? Delay would give a time advantage to Germany, in air war all important. It is a pretty problem, but, whichever way., the answer lies, one thing' is certain. If Germany were to decide that a plan of campaign would necessitate flying over neutral territory—as in 1914 it meant marching through it— that plan can be prepared within her own frontier at the present time with as great effect as if she possessed the intervening land. Aerodromes that lie within the western frontier of Germany—such as Sylt, Kiel, Hanover. Munster, Colognearc both near enough to Britain and far enough away to provide- the best strategic situation under nil conditions.

There is no important city in Groat Britain that cannot be reached by German bombers operating from within their own frontiers.

Liverpool, for example, lies within the radius of nntion of aeroplanes able to carry 30001b of bombs. Even a boad wind of 30 miles an hour in both direction;;—an unlikely circumstance— would not nrevent them from reaching th»ir target.

From Aberdeen to Plymouth, the story is th° snrno.