AIR AND SEA CRAFT

Evening Post, Volume CXXI, Issue 141, 16 June 1936, Page 9

AIR AND SEA CRAFT

THE CHANGING VIEW "BOMBER RULES THE WAVES" AIRMAN'S CONVICTIONS Major J. G. Struthers. one of the best known and successful of British war-time airmen, wrote recently in the "Daily Mail" of his convictions of the vital part which aircraft must play in sea warfare in the future. Major Struthers was decorated in 1917 after * 2000 hours' flying, a great part of which was in sea patrolling and in the location and destruction of enemy submarines. , . , That one of the most wonderful creations of science, manned by the finest personnel in the world, the battleship, should be doomed is a tragedy, he wrote. The fact, however, must be faced and our losses cut at once. She has had her day, and a glorious one it has been, but the decline that began in 1914 has been rapid, and now the battleship is one of our greatest liabilities. All surface vessels are vulnerable to attack from, three dimensions: the air; below the surface; and on the surface —-the danger being in the order given. The larger the vessel the more vulnerable to attack, and the mere venturing forth in war time of such a vast and costly fortress as a battleship is attended by such varied dangers as to be a nightmare to those responsible for her safety. Once the battleship was supreme, now relays of aircraft carrying tons of bombs and aerial torpedoes, superspeed skiffs capable of 75 knots and carrying torpedoes, and submarines, would be on her track, each ofMhem capable of sending the £7,000,000 masterpiece to the bottom. Escape from them all would be impossible. We continue to spend many millions on big ships while starving our vital defence, the air arm. This squanderin' 7 of our resources must cease, and what is retrieved must be used to build the weapon designed to fight the enemy in the element he will attack in: that is the air.

air escort of convoys. During the late war I served for most of the time in the Aerial Antisubmarine Patrol round the coasts of Britain from the Scillies to the Shetlands, and in the Mediterranean. The duties were principally the escorting of convoys in and out of the danger zones and the hunting of submarines; and here I would point out that no cafes of successful submarine attack occurred when the convoy was under airship escort. Flying often from dawn to dusk, and sometimes all night, with convoys, ample time was available to observe and consider all types of craft from battleship to submarine, from ocean liner to coastal tramp; and the thousand and one incidents relative to every conceivable situation, afloat, sinking, or sunk. What impressed me most was the extreme vulnerability of surface vessels and the chances the submarine then had that were not taken. Although I bombed a few submarines my experience was that some carelessness on the part of the submarine contributed' largely in cach case, and that the submarine was the most dangerous weapon of the Great War. Had Germany built submarines instead of battleships before 1914, she would have forced us to conclude peaci? before Jutland. But we were given time to evolve a reply to the few submarines she-, hurriedly built later, and although embryonic our aircraft served its purpose.

SUBMARINE BOMBED. One morning, when escorting a convoy down the English Channel, a recall to base owing .to gale warning necessitated leaving the convoy. When we were only ten miles away, a large verticil explosion was seen, so our coune was altered at full speed. It waf then found that a waiting submarine had taken advantage of the air patrol's departure to torpedo the largest vessel in the convoy—and under the very bows of the escorting surface craft. The submarine was bombed, but the damage had been done, and the ship, an Italian, sank. On another occasion on patrol about 5 a.m.. an explosion was seen on the horizon. This turned out to be the torpedoing of a large French merchantmen. Search was made at once for the submarine, and five hours later it was seen taking up a position for another attack and was bombed. But for the air patrol it would have delivered its second and fatal blow, in spite of the presence of some seventeen surface vessels which were by this time escorting the stricken vessel to port. These little incidents occurred more tfean 20 years ago, with aviation in its infancy. How much more could be accomplished now with the air weapon so greatly developed? The submarine problem, then a terrible menace, is reduced to within reasonable limits if we have aircraft in sufficient numbers.

IDEAL TARGET. Our ideas on the convoy system will need to be amended in view of the tremendous developments in aviation. Convoys present an ideal target from the air, and I often think of my impressions one spring morning in 1918, when after an all-night vigil off the Orkneys with an east-bound Norwegian convoy, daybreak arrived revealing a wonderful scene beneath. A west-bound convoy was approaching, and as each threaded its way through the other's formation a panorama of some 200 vessels could be seen. . * To the north was the Battle Fleet, to the south the Battle and Light Cruisers steamed; numerous destroyers attended the various units, while on the southern horizon dots were visible representing the trawlers on mine barrage patrol. How extremely vulnerable, I thought, would such an armada be from the air if and when the developments in aviation—which we then only visualised—matured. Those developments have now taken place, and such a concourse of ships, protected by a mighty fleet and by minefields, would be at the mercy of modern squadrons of bombers. Just imagine an Atlantic food convoy'now approaching our shores. It would be perfectly feasible for a Continental Power to launch a series of attacks by air bombers supported by fighters. The convoy would be greeted not by dozens but by hundreds of aeroplanes loaded with bombs, and a good many would reach their objectives. This aerial force might be attended by fast submarines, equipped with super-speed torpedo skiffs for use in favourable weather. The chaos and destruction resulting from such an attack would be appalling, and at the present moment we could do little to prevent it because we have not sufficient adequate warplanes.

THE WRITING IN THE SKY. The writing is in the sky and one should add: "You have been warned." In February, 1909. Lord Northclifte watched the demonstrations of the Wright aeroplane at Fau, in the south of France, and wrote to Mr. Haldane, War Minister (as he then was), urging tha need for some British official to ba present, as French and German military representatives were In attendance. Mr. Haldane's reply was

that naval and military experts had demonstrated that dirigibles and, still more, aeroplanes were a very long way off being of the slightest practical use in war! About that time the brothers Wright offered to sell the patents in their heavier-than-air machine to the British Government, who refused on the plea that it was of ,no use to the Navy. Today one may say, wuth surely more chance of being right: "We do not want big ships; they are of no use to the Air Force. . . . The danger lies in the air and the air bomber rules the waves!" Let us concentrate while we have breathing space and put our house in order. Let us stop building monstrous, archaic ships and divert the bulk of the money, after providing for the naval requirements in light cruisers, probably submersible, destroyers, and I submarines, to bringing our air arm t.o its proper strength relative to the forces of Europe.