DUAL CONTROL

Evening Post, Volume CV, Issue 109, 9 May 1923, Page 14

DUAL CONTROL

A DIFFICULT EGYPTIAN

SITUATION

THAT MUST BE FACED

ZAGHLUL'S EXILE AND MARTIAL

LAW.

Although the Nessim Cabinet only oame into office some few months ago, it has been clear for some time that its position was untenable. When tho Cabinet came into office it had no doubt secured the support of the Wafd or Nationalist party in . return for some sori of promise with regard to Zaghlul, the other v exiles, tha political prisoners, and the lifting of martial law. Still, the Cabinet must have felt some doubt on these points itself, as it published no programme and.. has during its short term of office made no declaration of policy on these matters, which are of the most pressing moment in Egyptian opinion today.

The fall of the Sarwat Ministry, which led to tha constitution of the Nessim Cabinet, must have been a great disappointment to the Residency, declares the Cairo 'correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian," although it had for a' long time been evident that thore was no hope of its securing the confidence of the country or being able to assure a reasonable attitude on the reserved points. Popular hope in the Nessim Ministry based upon its apparent support by the Nationalist elements vanished in a few weeks, and it is difficult to see how a Cabinet can be formed on the lines usual in the past which will be at all representative and therefore have some chance of a stable existence.

The truth is that the dual control in Egypt has got to be faced, and, on the one hand, the reality of the Declaration of Independence in February, 1952, has to be _ confirmed, while, on the other hand, it is impossible to lose sight of the British position in the Egypt of the future, which will depend entirely upon the agreement which must be reached on the reserved points—that is, the Sudan, the Suez Canal, the protection of foreign interests, and the Army of Occupation. An absolutely independent and sovereign State of Egypt is not yet to be. Egyptian independence will be sui generis, and the arrangements for the Suez Canal and the Army of Occupation and foreign interests will make impracticable absolute sovereignty by an independent National Government over the whole of Egypt. The British Government has already gone very far in "proclaiming the independence of Egypt and in abolishing the Protectorate without anjr guarantees on these reserved,points, which fundamentally affect British interests. The only hold that Great Britain has over Egypt is martial law, and it is a great pity that we should be found at this moment with that weapo/1 in our hands, because there are the gravest possible doubts as to the legality of the control of a friendly country like Egypt by martial law; but the Residency is unwilling to remove the most visible and potent evidence of the British share in the dual government of Egypt unless things are at least in a fair way of progress towards a definite understanding between the two countries.

It is this deep concern with the reserved points which must account for the persistent maintenance of martial law and the possibility, which flows therefrom, of keeping Zaghlul and his friends out of the country and of prosecuting political offenders from time to time before military courts. There is undoubted room for grave concern on these matters. The possibility of moderate views prevailing in Egypt on these questions becomes daily more remote, although there can be no doubt that the moderate views must ultimately prevail. The time has come and the opportunity is offered to constitute a really representative Egyptian Ministry which shall proclaim the Constitution which has been hanging fire now for some time, and to set to work seriously to reach an agreement on the reserved points. We tried the experiment of excluding Zaghlu' from a Cabinet which had our confidence: I refer to the Sarwat Ministry. The experiment has been tried of setting up a Ministry with Zaghlulist support, but which" could giye no satisfaction to immediate Zaghlulist demands. ■. This was the Nessim Ministry. Both experiments have failed, and it is really difficult to see how any step forward can be made unless a Cabinet be set up which has the confidence of the Residency, the support of "the Zaghlulists, and the possibility of giving satisfaction to their . pressing demands, which are the return of-Zaghlul Pasha and . his friends, the release of the political prisoners, and the abolition of martial law. If an attempt is not made to-day to secure a Cabinet on tfiese lines it will have to be made some day, and the prospect of an entente between all the interests involved will become more and more remote Ido not see how a Cabinet formed on any other lines in Egypt to-day can survive.

We have still some cards to play in Ejypt. We have Zaghlul's exile and martial law. TKe promise to bring bacV Zaphlul and to abolish martial law would probably pave the way for the acceptance of office.by a really representative group in Egypt, but unless some preliminary agreement is reached with them on the reserved points there is certainly trouble ahead. It would be, in my opinion, safer to face the whole position now and to reach an agreement with the Cabinet to be formed rather than lay up a store of future trouble. Tlus_ certainly means a long period of negotiation, and there are great difficulties in the way, but they should not be insurmountable.