GREEK MYSTERY

Evening Post, Volume CV, Issue 25, 30 January 1923, Page 7

GREEK MYSTERY

LETTERS TO LORD CURZON

AN AMAZING SEQIJED

LORD BIRKENHEAD'S MS OLOGY.

(TOOK OUR OWN 'CORUSFONDIMT.)

LONDON, 14th December.

On 3rd December the "Sunday Express" published certain letters purporting to have passed between the late Greek Prime Minister, M. Gounaris and Lord Curzon. The letter from M. Gounaris was received-at the Foreign Office in ■February and foreshadowed the defeat of the Greek Army in Asia Minor unless British assistance was forthcoming. There was time then for the Greek army to retire if a definite statement' had be«n made by Great Britain. Lord Curzon's letter in reply tendered advice which might have been interpreted as Lord Birkenhead affirmed, "Stay,' at least, for-the present."' In the discussion in the House of Lords on the Greek executions the late Lord Chancellor took occasion to read these letters, which, he affirmed, had rot been circulated amongst the Cabinet Mr. Lloyd George also maintained he had never read the letters. This week the Prime Minister, Mr. Bonar Law, in the House of Commons, and Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords, stated the cold official facts, which were few, simple, and direct: M. Gounaris's despairing letter was received at the Foreign Office on 16th February, and circulated to the Cabinet in print on 24th February. Lord Curzon's reply of 6th March was circulated to tlie Cabinet on 9th March. Both documents are in the files of the Cabinet office; both were circulated by the Foreign Office in the ordinary way. Nothing could be more authoritative, and Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Birkenhead "unreservedly accepted" the Foreign Office statement. And yet each is still as confident as ever that he never saw either document, and other ex-Min-isters are in precisely the same position.

AN URGENT APPEAL.

The letter sent by M. Gounaris was I a very clever statement of the position of the army in Asia Minor. The document concludes: ''Over and above this complete financial impssse, it should be recalled that the campaigning season in Asia Minor is approaching. Little more than a month separates us from the date on v,-hich operations were resumed last ! year. Meanwhile, the enemy has been reinforced in men and supplies. Under these circumstances, the Greek command in Asia Minor sta,te that they cannot undertake to give an assurance of their. ability to cope with the contingency of* a Turkish offensive unless they receive— (1) Keinforeements sufficient to raise the units under them to full strength, and thus neutralise the present Turkish superiority in numbers; (2) supplies of fresh war material (especially aeroplanes, machine-guns, and motor-lorries), these being indispensable if the mobility of the army is not to be affected; and (3) financial, assistance, as the present financial j position of the army is desperate. '■ "Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the Command consider that the impending Turkish . offensive will expose the army to very serious dangers, and urgently request that the above^measures be instantly taken, or, should they prove to be impracticably, that an order be instantly given to avoid the dangers foreseen through a withdrawal, while, there is yet time to take the initiative of-a withdrawal before being forced to it by the development of the situation. They consider, further, that such a withdrawal must necessarily amount to a complete evacuation of Asia Minor. since no line more to the west would afford, in the event of withdrawal from the fortified line now held, stronger defensive positions which would enable the army to hold out -without strengthening it by tho measures above indicated. Finally, the Command of the Asia Minor Army add that, should the enemy receive yet further reinforcements, it would become necessary similarly to reinforce our own army by calling up fresh classes to the colours, so as to neutralise the accession of strength to the enemy.

"With regard to the above, the Greek Government is, indeed, in a position to meet the call for more troops in both of the cases contemplated. Clearly, however, the Greek Government is not in a position to furnish the Asia Minor Army with the financial assistance of which it is in such need, or to supply the necessary war. material, least of all, in the event of the calling up of fresh classes, when considerable additional armament will be indispensable."

Lord Birkenhead said he was at that time taking a deep interest in the posi- I tion of the Greeks in Asia Minor and feeling a profound anxiety as to the safety of the troops and the consequences of\# defeat at the hands of the Turkish ArrirjK He was confident that he never saw that letter; he was confident that that most grave letter' was not circulated. If it had been circulated he felt sure that he would have asked the Prime Minister to call a Cabinet meeting in order that the grave question of their responsibility to the Greeks might be discussed. Had he seen that let- j ter, he would have said to the Greeks:'l "We cannot give you financial assistance or military equipment. If that in really your position, carry out your withdrawal at once." LORD CTJRZON'S REPLY. Lord Curzon's reply was also read by Lord Birkenhead, who said he took full responsibility in reading it in Lord Curzon's absence from the Chamber. In the course of the letter, Lord Curzon wrote:—

"I can only express a hope that the military position in Anatolia is less immediately critical than your note would lead me to think, and that the remarkable patriotism and discipline of the Hellenic armies of whioh so many illustrations have been furnished in the campaigns of the last few year* will not fail them in any emergency that may •'conceivably arise. As regards the financial position, your Excellency has yourself detailed the inception of the negotiations by which it is hoped by your Government to raise a substantial loan in the London market. His Majesty's Government have, as you know, endeavoured, witßn the limits of their pub-licly-declared neutrality and of the engagements entered into with their Allies, to lighten the difficulties -by which these negotiations were attended, and if, as I am informed, they have failed to produce the desired result, this would appear to have been due in the main to obstacles connected with the commercial rather than with the. political aspects of the proposed transaction., "In the>se circumstances the wisest course is unquestionably to expedite the diplomatic solution of the anxious position in which all are placed. I deeply regret that, owing to circumstances over which His Majesty's Government have had no control, {.he proposed meeting of the Allied' Ministers in Paris has been so long delayed. An Italian Ministry having, however, now been formed. I have hastened to propose that the Conference should meet in Paris on 13th March, a date which, at the moment of writing, seems likely to be again postponed for a few days to meet the convenience of the new Italian Minister for Foreign Affair*., T i»ve

little doubt that the first subject thai will come under "examination there wil be the Anatolian question, and I earn estly hope that a solution may be found which will be acceptable to both parties, and may relieve you of the more seriouj apprehensions by .which you are as. sailed.

"Your Government has already placed itself, in accordance with the advice which I ventured to tender to you last autumn, in the hands of the Allies, and I doubt not, therefore, that in a similar spirit of confidence and good faith yoi r will be prepared to listen to such coun. sels as may be offered to you from Paris with regard to the immediately existing situation."

If that advice (Lord Birkenhead con: tinued) did not mean " Stay; at least for the present,-" he did not'understand tha meaning of -words, and he most deeply, deplored that the Cabinet were not al* lowed the opportunity of examining this letter for themselves, and forming their opinion upon it, and of seeing whether there might.not have evolved, with the collective gravity of responsibility, .advice which might have -saved, -thesa ghastly tragedies and'the lives..of; thesa Ministers. . .

LOED BmKENHEAD'S APOLOGY.

in his apology and explanation this week, Lord Birkenhead stated: "When I read M, Gounaris's letter T. was so astonished at its contents that I went immediately to the late Prime Minister and said: 'lam sure I did not see that' letter. Did you see it?' He told me ha was quite certain he had never seen it before. He invited me to consult hii private secretaries. They were equally emphatic that they had never seen tha letters before, and that they had not sent them to the Prime Minister.

" I then inquired of Sir L. Worthing-6on-Evans, who was most deeply concerned, and he said: 'It is a letter to which I should have attached the greatest possible importance, as almost certainly modifying the military position al Chanak, but I find no trace of it in the War Office, and my recollection is that I have not seen it at all.' Sir R. Horns was. equally definite that the letter had not been sent round.' Lord Lee, Sir Alfred Mond, and Mr. Fisher were confident they had never seen' the document, and Mr. A. Chamberlain wa3 equally clear on the point. "I should not dream of challenging the statement made now that attention hai been ■ explicitly directed to it by* the Foreign Office, but I should, have been most unwilling to have it supposed that I had made myself responsible for that statement without having , inquired of every one of my colleagues who is not a member-of the present Government, and I should certainly have asked any of mj then colleagues in the present Government had I happened to meet them. In (two or three of those cages the papers in question have been discovered in the boxes of returned papers of the Ministers concerned. I accept unreservedly the statement made bj; the Marquess of Salisbury that these papers were circulated. Whether the explanation is to be found in the fact that the circulation was limited, as the noble Marquess suggested, to Ministers more important than myself, I do not know. It follows that it is niy duty to express my sincere regret, from the highest to the lowest, to every person at the Foreign Office who was concerned for appearing ro reflect on the competence and fidelity with which they discharged their duties. I regret extremely that I should have made.so confidently a statement which has fully proved to ba without foundation."

ME, LLOYD GEORGE'S ADMISSION.

Mr. Lloyd George frankly said that no doubt the papers had been circulated to him as head of the Government, but that at the time he was ill, and went down into the country for about three weeks to recuperate. He also recalled the fact that- he and Lord Curzon had seen M. Gounaris together on 12th January, and that he had told him that there could be no peace in tho Near East unless ,:: the Greeks retired _ from Smyrna, So ha urged him to place himjelf unreservedly in the hands of Lord Curzon, which he promised to do. Thus when M. Gounaris returned to England in February, he did not see him; though he asked for an interview. The whole matter, apparently, was left in Lord Curzon's hands. Mr. Lloyd George was anxious it should be understood that the Greeks had been warned of the British view that they ought^to retire from Smyrna, and ha added^that he had only raised the matter because certain newspapers had suggested that "something happened between himself and M. Gounaris" which he had kept from the knowledge of his colleagues in the Cabinet.

Reviewing this curious episode, it is clear that if there was any' remissnesa last March it was on-the part of certain Cabinet Ministers themselves, who either did not read the circulated papers or were too busy thinking of home politics and the crisis within the ranks of the Coalition to appreciate their high i.l--portance. However, it is much easier, to be wise after the debacle has aken place which M. Gonnaris's doleful prognostications foreshadowed, than when his letter probably seemed but another unwelcome importunity for aid in money, which the British Government.were unwilling, and aid in men, which they; were unable to give.