INDIA'S SHAKE

Evening Post, Volume C, Issue 23, 27 July 1920, Page 8

INDIA'S SHAKE

IN IMPERIAL DUTIES TWO COURSES OPEN CHOICE MUST NOW BE MADE. 111. In the Great War the only actual naval attack on India was that carried out by the Emden when she bombarded Madras. Further raids against the exposed coastal towns of India were prevented by the destruction of the Emden by H.M.A:S. Sydney, a ship-of-war built, manned, and maintained solely at the expense of the Australian taxpayer. This fact is not without significance at the present time; The policy of Parliament declared in the preamble of the Government of India- Act, 1919, is "i . . the progressive realisation oi'.re^ sponsiblo government in British India, as nn integral part of the Empire." The most advanced of Indian leaders ask for the grant of full dominion status-—e.g., the status of Australia—for their country without delay. Do they accept the corollary? Are they prepared to spend upon the defence of their country as much per head of her population ns Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have actually paid in time of peace? Are they prepared in time of war to bear their just snare of the burden as these Dominions have done, or do they wish the greater part of that burden—as it has hitherto done—to fall upon tho shoulders oE tho taxpayers nf the United Kingdom? Ir the- naval protection of tho shores of India, to depend upon nrovision made by the taxDoyera of tho United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand?

There are indeed tyro courses cmly open fco India: either to remain within 1 the British Commonwealth and to show without delay that she is prepared not only to talk about her rights as a nation, but that she- is ready also to show by her acts that she accepts the full obligations of citizenship and nationhood, or boldly to face the alternative o£ independence. Let her leaders be under no delusion: the Dominions, who have in the Great War borne their full share of the burden, are not prepared to admit her to full sisterhood till she shows plainly by deeds, and not by mero words, that sho is fully conscious of the duties, that she must discharge. INDIA'S VALUE TO THE EMPIRE.* To the British Commonwealth she is at present not a source of strength in any respect, militarily, ' economically, or otherwise. \ Her leaders must at once clear' thei* minds of the misguided idea that there is any desire to retain the connection with her on the ground that she is a source of wealth. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, 8 per cent, only of the total trade of pre-war days was with India; the exports of the British Isles to India were but 10 per cent, of the total exports. Though total exclusion from Indian markets, which is practically an economic impossibility, would doubtless mean some loss commercially to the United Kingdom, such loss , would not by any means be vital. To Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the loss of Indian trade wonld mean the loss of a mere nothing. It may safely be said of the self-gov-erning nations of the Commonwealth-— the United Kingdom included—that-to them India is no necessity; rather does she tend in vi«w of internal faction and disaffection, together with her disinclination fully to face her responsibilities, to become a positive danger to security of the Commonwealth. It is for her to elect and to show whether she is prepared so to shape her course as to fit her to remain a member of that Commonwealth. • THE COST OF INDEPENDENCE. The alternative is for her to get out. This fact her leaders must face. Independence—if potentially hostile peoples will'permit her .to achieve it—will mean for her the maintenance. of armies fit to strike far beyond her frontiers and a r.avy capable o£ defending her from attack by sea. What this will cost it is for those who would essay to lead her in thin path to conjecture; suifice it to say tKat prior to the Great War the defence of Japan—a homogeneous people—who, alone, of all Eastern peoples, have shown themselves equal to the task of self-government—cost 7s 5d pcr 1 head, or, including the population of her dependencies, Ss 7d. This is more than four times ar much per head as the people of India paid to secure the smallest possible measure of purely land defence, restricted only to the defence, of their land frontiers, frontiers' which have been more frequently crossed by hostile hordes than have any other frontiers in all history. , In 1921 there will assemble in London an Imperial Conference to decide the future constitutional relationship, of the parts of; the British Empire ono to another. It i» not only in. regard 'to the development of constitutional reforms within that India is at the crossroads. She must choose now, and for all time, whether she will or will not remain within the. British Commonwealth, and her representatives must go to the Imperial 1 Conference preparedl to declare without equivocation the path which is to be hers.

In the flush of victory, India registered herself as an original member of the League of' Nations, and thereby ■assumed certain definite responsibilities for the preservation of the peace of the world.

By this act she has> presumably abrogated former law and practice, whereby she was exonerated from any military liability unconnected with self-preser-vation ; for the League is founded on mutual co-operation both in offence and iefence, and not as a philanthropic institution to help those who refuse to help themselves. . ' A country with resources such as India has can no longer play the role of the indigent partner, but must be prepared to give at least as much as she expects to gain.

NOT AN ESSENTIAL PARTNER,

Before the war it was commonly stated that the preservation of. India was essential for the existence of the Empire, in fact, India wa? maintained for the benefit of. the . Empire. Times have changed, and it is a question whether India is not now trading on this indispensibility. It is to the advantage of India that the Commonwealth should continue, but the secession of India ■would not' necessarily cause the disintegration of the Commonwealth. In the former state it was reasonable to expect the British taxpayer to shoulder a large 'portion of the burden of military expenditure ' in connection with India, and he did so without a murmur. Under present conditions is it any longer reasonable to expect him to "do so? The demand for self-determination and selfgovernment carries with it certain obligations, not the least of which is selfpreservation, and India can no longer reckon on a blank cheque from the British taxpayer to meet liabilities, which are peculiarly her own, and she must in future be prepared to make adequate 'provision for her own protection in the wiriest sense of the word.

One of the principal lessons to be. deduced from the war is the interdependence between the army end the nation. •3m »rmy U the nation Midsttof&ation

is the army, and this principle applies equally in peace and in war. Thanks to our bureaucratic system, India is controlled by a number of Departments, each absorbed in its own particular business, and as often as not in open competition with its neighbour. Such a system cannot fail to be detrimental to the common good of the country, extremely wasteful of money, and the antithesis of unity of effort. Under modern conditions no country can hope to maintain an- army in peace of the size, composition, and constitution wheh it will require in war, and unless a country is prepared to organise itself in peace so that it can meet the requirements of its armed forces in war, it must expect to go under. Preparation is the best prevention. The policy of the ostrich, which is so typical of the East, cannot but fail to end in disaster. What we require is to set up machinery -which will produce the maximum force in war with the minimum expenditure in peace, and this can only be achieved by the closest co-operation between all the Departments, of. the State during peace.