A PEACE DRIVE: AUSTRIA'S ROLE

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 43, 19 August 1918, Page 6

A PEACE DRIVE: AUSTRIA'S ROLE

In order to preserve the military alignment of Germany and' Austria-Hungary, a great conference has been held of Emperors, generals, and politicians'; and, in tribute to Germany's military leadership, it has been held at the German Headquarters. So long as the deliberations of the Central Empires are held in this way —so long as the Austro-Hungaria-ns make pilgrimages to the shrine of Prussian militarism—any resultant agreement must necessariby be biased in advance, and in character pre-determined. Nevertheless, it is a sign of the times that the temporising spirit of Vienna is reported to have gained a few more points at the expense of Prussian audacity. The actual decisions, it is true, have not yet been disclosed, but the messages foreshadow autonomy for the Austrian Slavs, and a Hapsburg King for Poland. Hitherto the Harpsburg' Government has been restrained from improving tho political conditions of the Czechs and South Slavs, because of German opposition. The Gorman element in Austria, and the Magyar element in Hungary, have clung to their master position, in which they have baen supported bjy Germany, who has controlled and curbed every inclination of the Hapsburgs to ease tlieir own situation :by concessions to the Slavs. Therefore, it has always been recognised that the enforcement of a genuine scheme of Slavic concessions would represent a big step towards the undermining of G-erman power within the Central Empires. The important question now is this: Does the German-controlled con : ference really intend to grant Slavic autonomy, or is it all a mak-e-.believe to fool the worldl—an .^assumption by the wolf of the sheep's attire? Badly smitten as the German is, it is still gravely doubtful whether his pride has been reduced to the level of a genuine liberality to subject races. Probably he is merely in the position of being willing to offset the Czech, demand for independence with a Hapsburg offer of autonomy—an offer which, if it selves its purpose, will thereafter amount to one more scrap- of paper.

The new pose, as foreshadowed in present advices, is to be somewhat as follows: Austria-Hungary is to tickle the ears of Allied pacifists with Slavic autonomy, presented as a, counter to independence, thus playing exactly the same game as the ex-Tsar of Russia tried to , apply to the Russian Poles. Insofar as his Slavs believe him, the position of the Austrian Emperor will be alleviated; and insofar as the Allied pacifists believe him. the German peace drive will be promoted. Another little push for the peace drive is seen in the declaration that Austria-Hungary is inducing Germany to make "a fresh and more modest peace offer," but that in return she will, if the Allies still prove obdurate, send Austro-Hungariaii fighting forces to the Western front. Both the bait and the threat are quite on tho German model, and to that extent the interests of Berlin and Vienna lie together. But all accounts so far agree that Berlin 'has refused to sanction an Austrian absorption of Russian Poland; instead, Berlin will graciously permit an Austrian Archduke to sit on the Polish throne. Such a compromise will aggravate both tEe Poles and the pan-Germans, yet it may prove a useful stop-gap in the. present crisis, tho nature of which demands that Germany must concede to her Austrian ally neither too much nor too little.

For the Allies, the chief moral is to bowaro a peace drive which has been so carefully stage-managed, and which has now become more potent for harm than Ludendorff's strategy. General Humbert's warning against peace feelers proves that this French soldier has a statesman's eye, and a strong perception of the ponding danger. Though the alternation of field drives and peace drives has become a settled feature of enemy policy, and though his combination of bully-and-coo ha-s been defeated in- the past, it is yet necessary to be nerved against the new temptation. War-weari-ness is natural, but is it cither wise or just to surrender a good cause for a cheap settlement, on the eve of victory"? Is it fair to the 900,000 British dead o* whom Lord Northcliffe speaks., and to tho maimed and the wounded? To those questions the Western democracies, having analysed: the enemy's-pose, can find b«& one ftiww,