THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 42, 17 August 1918, Page 6

THE WAR

Some curious things have been happening in connection tath the German navy lately, and have so far passed without any authoritative comment in the cable news. The series of incidents as reported began a fortnight ago, when it was announced from Berlin that Admiral yon Holtzendorff, Chief of the Staff of the German Admiralty, had resigned on account of ill-health, and had been succeeded by Admiral yon Scheer, previously Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet. Yon Holtzendorff, who had held the office since September, 1915, is a white-haired veteran, and his resignation, had it stood alone, might have been accepted as sufficiently explained by the state of his health but for the further reports a few days later of an alleged mutiny on the part of submarine crews. To this was attached a tag -to the effect that the scandal of the mutiny caused a violent scene between the Kaiser (who had hurriedly to postpone a visit to Wilhelmshafen, the centre of the disturbance) and yon Holtzendorff.

Incidentally the story of the mutiny, with its assertion that the crews were alarmed by the large number of submarines which had never come back, was nicely timed to accompany Mr. Lloyd George's statement on the'same subject. Simultaneously came the report that a princely member of the Reichstag had recalled an unwise statement by yon Holtzendorff in February, 191£, when, it was alleged, he had told the Chancellor (yon Bethmann Hollweg) that submarines would force England to seek peace in six months. And another inconvenient scribe, interviewing yon Holtzendorff shortly before he resigned, learned from him that one could not expect American transports to be sunk as had been promised so often, because of the effective way in which they were guarded. The resignation of yon Holtzendorff. with so much told and so little revealed, thus remains unexplained.

Yon Holtzendbrff was not alone in holding the "six months" idea. Yon Tirpitz, who was' Secretary (Minister) for the Ifavy when the war began, was its arch-priest; but Yon BethmannHpllweg made a show of distaste for the idea of ruthlessness at sea, and Tirpitz, the father of the submarine campaign, left the Admiralty to become a great propagandist for the pan-Germans. Yon Capelle put on his uniform and adopted his policy. Under Hollweg and Capelle ( the agitation for ruthless submarining took the tortuous course of "diplomacy" ■which culminated in February, 1917, and; created the Frankenstein monster which has led Germany not only into a mass of crimes but to inevitable defeat.

While the resignation of Yon Holtzendorff from the Staff still awaits explanation, news comes that Yon Gapelle is also dismissed, and is succeeded' as Ministerial head of the navy by Admiral yon Behncke, who has not lately been prominent but who in 1915 was ViceChief of the Naval Staff. There is. no explanation at present of this change of personnel, which, is said to have been decided upon at the current conference of enemy royalties at the German headquarters. In the absence of information it may reasonably be suggested that the war lords are dissatisfied generally with the conduct of the naval side of the war and are trying a new set of leaders. Whatever j>he theoretical duties of the Chief of Staff at the Marineamt may be, it is* probable that the long retention of an aged man like Iloltzendorfi in that post has meant that the conduct of the operations, mainly with an entirely new weapon and in a set of conditions not foreseen lay the pre-war designers of the naval policy, has left the officer far behind._ Hojtzendorff is replaced by a fighting chief, fresh from the quarterdeck ; which suggests a revolution in staff methods. Of Behncke, the new Minister, little is required probably than that he shall do as he is told. The question which naturally arises is whether this change in personnel implies a change in policy, or whether it is • designed to restore waning confidence in the old policy, by giving it a semblance of new life. To suppose that the change of heads means that the German navy is intended to become aggressive is probably to suppose too much; for it is npfc easy to imagine a probable set of circumstances is which, an offensive policy by the fleet proper would bring any profit to the Central Powers.

In the foregoing sketch mention is made of the famous mutiny at Wilhelmshafen in August last year, and of the reported mutiny among the submarines a few weeks .ago. These incidents look as if they had a close connection 1 with the changes in the Admiralty; but the wary reader will do well to pay no attention whatever to these and similar incidents. According to the London Times and The Times History of the War, the great mutiny at Wilhelmshafen never happened. Incredible as it may seem at first, the story was a pure invention, either originating from or adopted by the German Government. According to the History, there was a little disturbance which resulted in one man—a Socialist—being shot for mutiny, and another being imprisoned for inciting to mutiny. But the most lurid detailed stories, padded out with tales of horror inspired by the Bolshevik naval cxceeaos, were sent broadcpwt>.~aQd - tho<Geriqa4 Government

used them to engineer a charge against the Independent Socialists ("Minority" Party) in the Reichstag, of having organised the mutiny.

There was a great storm in the Reichstag, but the "bluff" seems to have been too transparent, and the Independent Socialists, who would have deserved the most severe punishment had they been guilty, were not molested. It was announced by the Chancellor (Miehaelis) that Capelle (who made the report of the mutiny after the question had been raised by a Socialist Deputy) had exceeded his instructions; and it was expected that Capelle would resign. However, it was not Capella but Michaelis who went out of office, and Hertling took his place. The manoeuvring which centred .(about the "mutiny" had this much success : the Reichstag majority in effect pledged itself in return for harmless concessions in domestic poftcy to be of good behaviour for the duration of the war, to "prevent all serious debate on foreign or domestic affairs, to confine itself to brief statements in. support of Hertting's policy, to vote supplies promptly, and to vote down any parties "which attempted to gc outside the policy. In short, "to display to foreign countries und to Germany a picture of national unity."

Perhaps the <most curious feature of the mutiny story is that in spite of the falsity of the whole thing, the world was allowed to go on enjoying the horrible details of the outbreak for several days after the first announcement (itself six weeks or so after the alleged occurrences at Wilhelmshafen). A reputed German naval officer supplied from Switzerland an "inside story" of the affair, \n which he declared he had .taken part as an organiser, and which he Ascribed is "only one of the early incidents of the genera] discontent in the ranks of the German navy"; and in which he said 12,000 men had taken part in a bloody conflict that lasted all day. Mutinies tame into fashion. Insubordinate outbreaks on a large scale were reported \o have occurred at Pola, and at various V-boat stations. Yet the farce had been exposed in London within four or five iHays of Capelle's speech; but so far as New Zealand was concerned the exposure was not made a cable-news item at all. The affair illustrates in a remarkable way how little dependence is to be placed in stories of the internal condition of Germany.