BLOCKING THE ROADS TO ASIA

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 42, 17 August 1918, Page 6

BLOCKING THE ROADS TO ASIA

When the fighting season in Palestine and Mesopotamia returns, the striking power of Allenby's and Marshall's armies will be proportioned to the military output of India and to the number of white troops detachable from the decisive front in the West. Allenby's last blow at the Hedjaz railway, directed across the Jordan, is adjudged by British critics a defeat j and the obvious moral is that success in this direction will demand heavy reinforcement. Prom the British positions on the Jordan to the railway is a long way; it is further to Damascus, and very much further yet from Palestine to the British forces on the Euphrates. Yet the possibility of Marshall joining hands with Allenby has been, and is, seriously discussed. Then there is the new development at Baku, where the arrival of "British troops" is reported ; which raises many questions as to what has been going on in Persia. If the magnitude of British forces engaged in this part of the world is proportioned to their range and scope, the commitment in man power must be heavy. Whether it is justified depends entirely on whether the Western front is at the same time adequately provided for. Details of the Baku development indicate that the whole Allied force defending the town numbers 8000. But defending Baku is not the main—though an imporant—purpose. The chief objective is to block the enemy's roads into Asia.