LESSONS OF THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCVI, Issue 42, 17 August 1918, Page 4

LESSONS OF THE WAR

GERMANY'S PREPARATIONS

An address which he termed "a few thoughts on the war" was given by Lieu-tenant-Colonel M. M. Gardner, D.5.0., at the Wellington Officers' Institute last night.

It was early yet to draw lessons from the war, said Colonel Gardner. The'/ would probably not be able to judge these correctly till the history written from both sides was available. But what they did know appeared to confirm the principles which they had been taught years ago. Take, the way in which the importance af preparation for war' had been accentuated. Germany had a policy of expansion, and it was that which led to the war. She had prepared with a standing army for years beforehand, and the nation had constantly been thinking of war, whereas Great Britain had always been loth to think of war in peace time. Germany's railways had been built on strategic lines, and consequently she was able to mobilise quickly and attempt her great plan of a dash on Paris and the smashing of the French army before the British could intervene. She nearly succeeded, in that, and she did succeed in gaining the advantage of fighting outside her own boundaries for four years and having an additional area to draw supplies from. Another point of the German preparations was the discipline of the nation, which had enabled it to stand reverses which in a less disciplined country would have led to revolution. The co-ordination of German diplomacy and military organisation was another strong point. Germany had studied wai's well in peace, and her training had been on sound lines, particularly in the high command, and in .the handling of large bodies of men. Another advantage possessed by the enemy was the fact that she had been enabled to study the actual theatre, of operations while Great i Britain had always to study very many theatres in which she might be engaged.- She had, moreover, sowed spies years beforehand, so that she mjs^ reaP the result when war came. The fact that the "Old Contemptibles" did the impossible thing, "each battaJion being stretched out to its utmost limits in holding the enemy, probably accounted for the failure of the initial German stroke made with all these advantages. When that stroke was stopped.the rest of the world had time to make preparations which had not been made beforehand and thus to rob Germany of victory. If the British authorities anticipated the war and the nature it would take they were unable to make preparations, as Parliament had not voted the money. France was able to make some preparation, as it was a question of defending her own territory. They knew now that Germany must have pushed many more troops through Belgium than would have been thought possible according to the normal capacity of the roads. That indicated very careful training, particularly of the Army Service Corps and transport units. The great changes made''in the methods of killing and defence had enormously increased the needs of the armies per man. Colonel Gardner illustrated how important the question of transport and roading had become. This war, he proceeded, had become very largely .a war of organisation and administration. To compensate for the lack of flank attacks they had to have increased artillery support for frontal attacks. This meant great organisation of munition supplies, new guns of all calibres, railways and railhead foT their supplies, and alternative means of transport in every case. The emergency arrangements for the repairs of roads damaged by shellfire were particularly elaborate, as it was necessary to ensure that the traffic should be impeded as little aff possible. The conditions of the war had put a much greater trial upon the physical and moral endurance of the men than had before been thought possible for them to stand.. More elaborate attention to the physical needs of the men had been called for, and a higher standard of discipline. Colonel Gnrd'ner mentioned also the increase" in the complexity of organisation, particularly in the number and variety of new units attached to an army corps.'

On the conclusion of the address Colonel G. F. C. Campbell (president) conveyed the hearty thanks of the officers to Colonel Gardner. In doing so he remarked that the lecturer had directed their attention to some questions of which the importance was even now more marked than formerly—for example, the question fit roads, since they read of the great work being done by the air forces in harassing the retreating enemy by bombing the roads and railways.