A GERMAN PLOT

Evening Post, Volume XCIV, Issue 58, 6 September 1917, Page 7

A GERMAN PLOT

HAND OF THE KAISER

BIRTH OF THE ENTENTE DIPLOMACY AND THE JAPANESE WAR The Kaiser-Tsar correspondence published by the New York Herald (and summarised in recent cablegrams) has the ring of truth; and, if it is, true, is an- important 1 contribution to history. To be clearly understood, this correspondence must be set in the framework of the Russo-Japanese War and the' budding Anglo-French Entente; and, again, the whole picture should be set in the larger' frame-work of European diplomacy, from the declining days of the Bismarck period.

BISMARCK'S AIM AND METHODS.

The Triple Alliance was- signed in May, 1882. It detached Ita^ty from France, and added her to the GermanAustrian Alliance. Henceforth Bismarck's main anxiety was to prevent Russia joining France. The League of Three Emperors -was revived in 1884 ..by the Treaty of Skiernevice, between Germany, Russia, a.nd Austria-Hungary. This was Bismarck's insurance against Russia drifting to France. "Without any modification of the Triple Alliance, which was directed against Russia, the old Three Emperors' League, which included Eussia, was reyived. ' . ■ France was thereby

completely isolated." " Russian suspicion of German doubledealing with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans having later revived,- the. Tsar Alexander in 1887 refused to renew the Three Emperors' League; but Bismarck j again postponed the Russo-French rapprochement by inducing the Tsar to make, without the of Aus-tria-Hungary, a secret treaty of alliance with Germany for three years. j On the expiry of the above treaty in IS9O, Bfissia would not renew it. Thus Bismarck's last treaty obstacle to the Ruseo-French rapprochement was swept away. But before that he had been dismissed from office by the young and ambitious Kaiser. THE KAISER'S POLICY. Released from German _jjapar bonds, Russia nevertheless gravitated only glowly towards France, and the Dual Alliance (Russia, and France) was not made public till 1895. The Dual Alliance did not at once improve France's relations with Britain. Colonial rivalry, culminating at Fashoda in 1898, nearly brought the two countries to war. Then came the South African War (October, 1899, to May, 1902), and a plot was set afoot to unite Germany, Russia (anxious"' about Port Arthur), and France (still smarting over I Fashoda) to attack embarrassed Britain ; but Alsace-Lorraine, the legacy of 1870-71, was at that time a sufficient bar to Franco-German co-operation. Next came the Russo-Japanese War [ (February, 1904, r U> September, • 1905) and with it the embarrassment of Russia, both without and within. 1\ was the weakening of her Russian ally in this war that at last impelled France definitely towards an entente with Britain. The Kaiser, filled with alarm -at the prospect of France" not only conciliating Britain but aligning her with Russia in a- dangerous three-Power Ei> tente, tried to-counter this danger with a, German-Russian-French ■ alignment. Thus Germany, being already allied with Austria-Hungary and Italy, would have become the diplomatic dictator of Europe; and Britain would have been isolated*

It will be seen, that -while endeavoured, and for a time succeeded, in keeping Austria-Hungary and Italy, as well as Russia, under .contract to Gerr roa-ny, the Kaiser's vaulting ambition was to place the whole of the Continent in diplomatic leading-strings. One of his chief opponents (the French Foreign Minister, M. Delcasse) he-succeeded in driving from office (June, 1905), and he meanwhile worked on the fears ■ enter*tained by the Tsar * Nicholas q£ Japan and of revolution. It is on this phase of his machinations that the cabled correspondence throws a valuable light. SUGGESTIVE CHRONOLOGY. In reading 1 the documents exchanged between the Kaiser and the Tsar, it is well to bear in mind the.following events and dates :■ — February, 1804.—Russo-Japanese war began, ■ . ' April, 1904,.- —Anglo-French agreement, | dealing particularly with Egypt and Morocco, negotiated by M. Delcasso I (King Edward'spersonal friend),and paving the wa.y for the Anglo-French Entente. October, 21-22, 1904.—Dogger Bank incident ; Russian fleet bound 'for Japan fired on British fishing craft. May, 27-28, 1905.—Russian fleet destroyed by Admiral Togo at Battle

of Tsu-shima. June 6, 1905,—M. Delcasse, French

Foreign Minister, finally resigned,

under.'German pressure. „ July 14, IGos.—British fleet visited Brest, and officers attended French national fete in Paris. : July-August,. 1905.-^Kaiser and Tsar met at Bjorko, on the German Imperil Yacht Hohenzollern, whose cruise included Copenhagen. August 19, 1905.^Tsar promised Russia a Duma with' limited powers. This

promise followed months of grave internal disorder and disastrous war. August 28-September 8, 1905.—British fleet visited German Baltic ports

(where it was cordially welcomed)

and Copenhagen. ■ October- 14, 1905.—Tear and Mikado

signed Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty. October 30, 1905.—Tsar signed a constitution, to include a legislative

' Duma and Ministerial responsibility. January; 1906.—A.lgecirae Conference of Powers concerning Morocco, in which

German designs against France failed. May, 1906.—Russian Duma met, and the constitutional struggle was con-

tinued. June-July, 1908.— Tsar met King Edward, and "later the French President, at

Reval. October, 1908.—Russia was punished by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria"Hungary, at German instigation. Petrograd opposition was, paralysed by the Kaiser's threat of war. Meanwhile the great German naval construction programme ("the Dreadnought race") was being pushed on. A TURNING-POINT.

It is safe to say that onward from this point (the Bosnian seizure) the Bismarckian policy of keeping-in with Russia absolutely . ' failed. Despite renewed flirtations of Kaiser with Tsar in 1.913-14, Germany's double' game of forwarding German-Austrian ambition ,in the T3aJkanc, while professing false friendship to Russia, had at last been played out. Th» struggle between Teuton ajid Slav had became inevitable, and in August, 1914, Germany entered upon a war- with the Russo-Frerjch. combination dreaded by

(The cable news in this issue accredited to "The Tirass" him unpearad la-Mat journal, bud only wlierc titpruely st^U't t* eucii uewa till ♦itorUJ opinion of "The Tlmoi."!

Bismarck, plus Britain and Japan; and plus, ultimately,,ltaly and the United States. It was a contract which Bismarck would never have undertaken.

Fitted in with the abpve dates, the significance of the Kaiser-Tsar correspondence is readily seen. In the first telegram to the Tsar, the Kaiser defines his aim as "a powerful combination of three of the strongest Continental Powers . . . ' about which the Anglo-Saxon group- will think twice before it attacks." To incite the Tsar, the Kaiser remarks that "English newspapers threaten Germany if she gives coal to the Baltic fleet going to Japan. Russia and Germans must face this new danger together." ' DOGGER BANK AND DELCASSE. If this telegram, as published by the New York Herald,, bears its correct date (22nd October, 1904), it synchronises with the Dogger Bank incident, and is timed to strike_ the ears of the Tsar at the moment when his nervous sailors had precipitated a Ruaso-British crisis. Thus the pilgrimage of the Russian Baltic Fleet was, even at the outset, ■to be coined into German capital. Equally interesting is the French portion of the same telegram. In it the I Kaiser frankly relies on the Russian autocrat to suborn his Republican ally. At the time of Fashoda that might have been done, but in October, 1904, there were at leaEt two obstacles: the weakening of Russia's authority in France, because of the Japanese victories; and M. Deleasse. Of the latter the Kaiser writes —"Though M. Deleasse is an Anglophile, he will understand that the British Fleet is utterly unable to save Paris." Because M. Delcasse did not sufficiently understand, he was driven from office in the following year, as noted above. The Tsar was at first' charmed with the idea of an anti-British and anti-Jap-anese union by Germany, Russia:, and France, but his simple soul aspired to consult Francs' in advance. The Kaiser, with an eye on M. Deleasse and other anti-German factors in France, immediately objected, knowing that information of the plot would leak from France to Britain, and fearing from the latter a naval attack. What higher tribute could there be to the importance of sea-power' The Kaiser had-to hold the hand of the Tsar in a French affair, because of —the British fleet! , No wonder that; foiled in his diplomacy, he presently got busy with his Navy Acts and started thegreat competition in Dreadnought-building. THE TSAR'S TIMIDITY. j The correspondence indicates that, tied down to a policy of signing the treaty with Germany without first consulting France, the Tsar became timid. The Romanoffs are hardly fitted to follow a Hohenzollern policy, and the desire of Nicholas to' show 1 his cards halted the whole game. ' Still, the Kaiser persevered, and the cojTespondehce was continued in 1905. At the end of July or beginning of August the two Emperors-met at Bjorko. The echoes of the Russian naval disaster at Tsu-Shjma, of the German diplomatic victory at Paris (the fall of M. Deleasse}, and of the- British Fleet's visit to France, were still ringing in their ears. _ Apprehensions of the approaching Baltic cruise of the British' Fleet were also shaping, and the Tsar at least must have been very perturbed by internal as- well as external affairs in R-ussia,. According to German psychological analysis, now was the time to drive the bargain; and the Kaiser seems to have secured the Tsave personal consent to the treaty. ■ He conr firmed it later by the following-declarat-ory communication addressed to the T<w: "We have joined hands and signed before God- The treaty can now well come into existence." ■ That message appears:- to 'have been dated 20th September, 1905; that is, after the' British . Fleet't Baltic cruise, and in the middle of the Tsar's attempts to conciliate his subjects by internal concessions. But the Tsar still hesitated, and the Kaiser's insistence did not cause the treaty to "come into existence. HOHENZOLLERN, -DEMOCRACY, About this stage, or somewhat earlier, occurs a- delightful passage illustrating i the true attitude of the Hohenzollerns to democracy. It occurred to the Kaiser that the new Russian Duma, roight.be made useful as a stalkipg-horse »nd perhaps ac a scapegoat. Useful, also, to relieve the timidity of Nicholas,, the reluctant reformer. -",So the Kaiser sapientlv suggested that "the Tsar should ask the Duma to vote on the Russo-Ger-man treaty after its formulation, thus enabling ham to throw on its shoulders the responsibility for failures. The Tsar ought also to throw upon the Duma the responsibility for stopping or continuing: the Japanese War." Will the German Tsar presently try the effect of his own advice upon the Reichstag? . The correspondence is useful as revealing the method of German diplomatic love-making. When the Algeciras^ Conference (January, 1906) revealed Russia on the'side of France against Germany, the German method changed, and the Bosnian' seizure and the - "shining armour" policy of 1908 were the logical consequence. Thus.Germany is revealed as an alternate coaler and bully, with a bribe in one found and a bomb in the other, ever mining and counter-mining, and ever working along lines which could lead—and have led—to but one result, the present world.wide . conflagration. ■