THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XCIII, Issue 27, 31 January 1917, Page 6

THE WAR

A brief message yesterday reported that the ground on the Western front is now frozen so deep that the transport of heavy guns, checked by the mud period, is now possible. A statement of that sort, coupled with the recent reports' of the unusually severe winter which is being experienced in parfc of Europe, notably Switzerland, is sufficient to explain why this is a period of slackness. No big fighting is possible while the ground is very wet and soft; nor is it advisable even when the frosts have been severe, because the advent o£ spring may rapidly convert the hardened ground into a mire upon which heavy transport .would be crippled, and catch the attackers in an awkward moment. Ths mention o£-heavy gun transport should not, therefore, encourage hopes of a big offensive promising large movements, though it might well indicate a shortlived violence having local advantages in view. Very much depends, of course, upon the nature of the ground, that complicated and varying factor which constantly enters into every military problem. The great German offensive at Verdun, for instance, began eleven months ago, practically at the end of winter, when tlie ground generally speaking was in a, critical state; and during the operations sudden thaws w«-e experienced.

But the climatic conditions atf Verdun played a certain part in the German scheme. The Meuse was in heavy flood, and in the first battle on the east side of the river the enemy's, plan was, if possible, to drive the French back upon the stream in such a way that the whole or part of the army there would be cut off, and, being unable to cross, would be captured. But in- executing the plan, the Germans operated almost wholly upon the narrow plateau, of Douaumont, which was hard and good notwithstanding that the spongy plain of the Woevre immediately below it on the east was simply a morass, upon which, only minor movements could be effected. There are, of course, numerous other parts of the West era front where winter conditions would not prevent large offensive actions; but there are others where they as rigidly forbid them; and it is to be noted that the whole of the front from the sea to the high ground which flanks the basin of the Somme upon the north comes within this category. That is to say, the .main part of the British front, which is the most strongly manned and strategically the most important portion of the Western theatre, seems doomed to comparative quiescence till the plains are dry again.

These considerations ,muat be kept in mind when reading the statement made by Lieutenant Puaux, which, appears today. This French officer) who derives authority. from his having/been editor of the Paris Temps (Times) rather than from his being attached to. General Foch's staff, asserts that Germany will attempt a great offensive soon, and will direct ct against the West front, and probably at the junction of the British and French armies, that is, from the region of Peronne, It was pointed out in these notes on Monday that Germany has strong inducements to forestall' the inevitable Alliedl offensive by an attack of diversion (which may be described as an anticipatory counter-offensive, and which the French call " the application of a_ leech.") Such a plan; would tend to disorganise the still fluid movements of the Allied forces, not only on the front, but ,in the depots and the sea. transports, and even in the factories. The blow: ought to be struck very soon (for reasons which will bp discussed later), and that being so, it is.reason-, able to suppose that the Somme area is likely to be chosen. The -Flanders plains are out of the question on the score, of bad ground, not to mention the tremendous manning of the British front. From the Somme southward to the Aisne it might be possible, even easy, to break the comparatively thinly-held French line; but the Germans would be exposing themselves to the risk of a British counter-offensive in the Somme region, which would be at least as feasible as a German move say at Noyon, and which would offer a very important menace to the communications of such an offensive. The Aisne line is essentially strong; Germany has no liking for the Champagne j and Verdun has lost it* charm. The Lorraine and Alsace fronts, if they could be moved at all by a German offensive, offer to the enemy only a rising barrier of hill and mountain, largely of extreme formidability. The Somme region, however, while it is necessarily formidable, is sufficiently near the centre of strategic gravity to enable the Germans to execute, if necessary, movements in reply to a diversion by the British, to be prepared to take the defensive in case of need; it is dry compared to the Flanders plains; it has no great geographical barrier; and it represents a "joint, which in spite of the extraordinarily good understanding between French and British, must greatly appeal to the psychological understanding, good or bad, of the German command. A second strong psychological inducement exists in the fact that the Somme is a name of evil sound in German ears, and any recovery of ground there would be most welcome.

jiiere are three principal .reasons why Germany must strike, and strike quick* ly. The first ,is the general and unavoidable yule that the weaker belligerent must maintain the offensive up to the latest possible moment. Voluntary idleness on the front, even if it represents activity in preparation in .the rear, means that the move powerful opponent is being allowed to devote his wiole effort to adding to his already too greaß strength, whereas by being aggressive some sdvantage cap.vUe of reducing the ultimate disaster may be gained; consider, for instance, the conquest- of Rumania. The second is that the Germans know that if they do not forestall the Allied general offensive, which they know will not be long delayed, their day is over once for all. The third, and perhaps '.he most powerful reason, is that Germany is at test being forced into a position when"the wajr must be shortened.

Mere or less completely a -levy-m-mass is in operation. The whole nation is in arms or supplying aims, agriculture is en. the wane and decreasing' in efficiency; tlie prospects of securing farther supplies by conquest are too taint to be worth considering. The civilian population, particularly tho vast, uninstriicted host whose patriotic instinct for sacrifice as drowned under, the miseries induced by prolongation of the sacrifice, is becoming restive and dangerous. Germany is already committed to a, uaiional effort, without which sho cannot- evade defeat, but which can only be continued at the expense of' the action's vitality and fighting strength.

j' In the meantime, the Germans, and the world at iarge, do not know whether even an. immediate attack cm the- .Entente •with all the available power, will do much good- They do not know how far the Allies' preparations have gone.; what defensive or offensive OT'angfiroeiita tbe French have snado oa, thm? front; what is being hatched in l?etrograd. Very satisfactory -news comes from Greece. The blockade has had its inevitable effect- upon a small nation which produces far less food than it needs; the Kaiser is reported to have advised Coustantine to.surrender because j^ffi Tt" a n -a.iTm>-«is -jivaita.l-|lq;.-+n Tn arc h .

into Greece; and the surr-ender, whether the Kaiser advised it or not, is an accomplished fact. Greece has ceremoniously eaten humble pie to signalise the deed; and the general impression is that the' danger of effective machinations isover.