THE WAR—AND AFTER

Evening Post, Volume XCII, Issue 41, 17 August 1916, Page 6

THE WAR—AND AFTER

Prisoners' evidence always requires critical examination, and by the time that the statements of enemy officers captured on the Russian front have filtered through a press correspondent to London their acceptance must be strictly qualified. Mr. Hamilton Fyfe's despatch, cabled to-day, suffers from this drawback, and from the additional one that it is not quite clear how much of the statement belongs to the prisoners and how much to Mr. Hamilton Fyi'e. No doubt it was the prisoners who spoke of the possible offer of a German indemnity—the first suggestion .of such a thing from the enemy side—but it may be Mr. Fyfe himself who adds the further suggestion that if the offer were accepted and made the basis of a, compromise peace, then Germany would use that peace, to prepare./ for another war. But whether this second war is the idea of the prisoners or of the coa'espondent matters little; the main thing is that it is a possibility to bo faced, and no discussion of peace proposals is complete unless it comprehends a future conflict under a new grouping of the nations. At the present time the German mind, insofar as it accepts at all the possibility of failure, attributes the blame purely to\Berlin diplomacy. Germany is checked becauso she essayed to fight too many foes at once; the failure is not military but diplomatic. Imbued with this idea, the War Lords may be disposed to accept peace terms —even drastic peace terms— that will provide them with a respite in which they can arm themselves anew and reset the pieces on the diplomatic chessboard. In the halcyon days of 1914, the Cologne Gazette jingoistically shouted,

"The more enemies, the more honour." That principle, it is now seen, was a mistake; "but," insists Germany, "the only mistake. Let us now seek peace in order that our diplomacy may break up the Entente. That done, our armies are irresistible. Divide, and we conquer." That is the German mind, and its vision is practicable. To make it impracticable, the Entente's victory must be decisive, and it must also be military. Germany will not be disillusioned and her militarists dethroned by anything less than a military overthrow.

This danger of a half-peace followed by a second war is specially a matter of concern to Britain; and Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, whether his evidence concerning the indemnity, etc., be good or bad, has done good service in emphasising before the British public the danger that the future still holds. It is not too much to say that Britain alone prevented a German victory, and therefore it follows that the detachment of Britain from her allies will be the prime object of German diplomacy i£ the war leaves Prussian militarism scotched but not killed. When diplomacy has brought about detachment, under-water or aerial warfare will be depended on to overcome Britain's insularity. In the present conflict neither of these forms of offence lias proved decisive against the island Power : but on neither has the last word been said. At times the attrition warfare by German" submarines against British merchantmen has reached a very high rate of loss—not such a rate as to make it practicable to starve Britain within the unexpended balance of time that this war is likely to occupy, yet a rate sufficient to encourage the Germans to hope for decisive success could they at a future time make a truce with the Continent and fight with improved weapons the Island alone. It may be that such a hope would prove to be without foundation ;we believe it would, relying on the courage and brains of the British Navy and its talent for improvisation. But is it not much better to settle, the question now by pursuing the war to such a conclusion as will knock the kink out of the German mind, in which it has been implanted by Prussian warlords and Hun professors? There is only one convincing piece of evidence that the professorate will not

explain away, and that is a complete military overthrow. ..The main idea- in Mr. Hamilton Fyfe's message is that Germany's price will fall much lower in the spring of 1917. It will, however, be lower still in the autumn. If 1916 eliminates Austria, 1917 will see the crushing of German militarism, and that is well worth paying for and fighting for. The alternative is an even greater cost in blood and treasure in the years to come.