Evening Post THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1916. THE KAISER'S RUINED HOPES

Evening Post, Volume XCII, Issue 41, 17 August 1916, Page 6

Evening Post THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1916. THE KAISER'S RUINED HOPES

That sadly misunderstood and cruelly • maligned Kaiser has again been endeavouring to shift the burden of in■famy which contemporary ignorance has placed upon him. He marvels at the way in'which "the British theory that I am responsible for- the war seems to fascinate my enemies," but all that glit-"ters-is' not gold, and all the falsehoods that the perfidy and ingenuity of Britain have palmed off upon a credulous world-' must not be mistaken for gospel. In any ordinary war the judgment of •neutral-nations—the judgment, that is to say, not of their xulers, but of: the people themselves —represents the nearest approach to the impartiality of pos-,-terity that contemporaries-can hope to get. "For my name and memory," 'said Bacon, "I leave it to man's charitable speeches, to foreign nations, and'to *the next ages." The thought that was in Bacon's mind was made explicit by a smaller man in tho statement- that a "foreign nation is a kind of contemporaneous posterity." The Kaiser of ■course professes the utmost confidence regarding the vei-dict of that posterity .which none of this generation will live to see, and the only surprising thing .about an appeal which for that reason he-can make with confidence is that he does not claim full marks. "History," says the Kaiser, "will clear me of the charge, ftlthough I do not suppose that history will hold me. faultless." History will surely approach her task with less diffidence after this gracious admission. But why is it that the Kaiser disputes the jurisdiction of the contemporary posterity to which we have referred—the judgment of the neutral nations, which are as free from bias as the real posterity of the future? The reason is that judgment has already passed against him in this tribunal, and tho only course open to him is to dispute its competence and to lodge an appeal of which none of his contemporaries will be able to see the result. "I strove hard for peace," says tho Kaiser, " even though war was- inevitable. Why do the neutrals talk German militarism, and never Prussian despotism, French craving for revenge, and English treachery? Why. indeed, except that they see in the first of these influences and not in any of the other , jjUrgs.^the^rjea^ | cauafej?f a .tlie,_ ..-wffi^-, ?-PiS '

Kaiser tells us that he lias striven hard

for. pence, but what potentate has been more consistent or more aggressive in his glorification of military power and his incitement of his subjects to -use it? At the very outset of his reign the Kaiser thought of liis army first and delayed his greetings to the nation at large till some days afterwards. Military metaphors and military threats have formed the staple of his rhetoric, even when he has been dealing with the' most critical situations of international politics. Calk about the mailed first and shining armour has been one of his most powerful diplomatic instruments, and as everybody knew that years of the most scientific preparation for war that the world has ever seen lay at the'back of this tall talk, he was often able to carry his point in a peace-loving Europe.

But the end came in July and August, 1914j when other European nations realised that they must either abandon their rights altogether before the rattling of the Prussian sabre or fight for them. They elected to fight, and a combination for the purposes of self-defence is represented by the Kaiser as a conspiracy against the liberties of Germany. Why do not the neutrals blame "Russian despotism, the French craving for revenge, and English treachery" for the result? Because Russia, though like. Germany despotically governed, was obviously both reluctant and unprepared to fight; because France, though she had never forgotten Alsace and Lorraine, was equally unready and still more unwilling; because England, with all her "treachery," was manifestly the.most unready and the most unwilling of the three. The 'pith and substance of England's treachery from the German standpoint is that she seemed degenerate and effete, but at the call of danger has been a-ble, in addition to ruling the seas with an invincible Navy, to put millions of firstclass fighting men into the field. On no point have the German calculations miscarried more grievously than here, and instead of being ruffled by the charge of treachery the British people should take it as a compliment to the valour and the efficiency in which Germany can clearly read the ruin of her hopes.