THE FORM OF ATTACK

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 60, 8 September 1914, Page 2

THE FORM OF ATTACK

THIN OR DENSE LINES? THE GERMAN VIEWPOINT. Repeatedly reference has been made ih the cabled war news to the close-order tactics of the German troops when they are advancing. As was to be expected, it has b«en usual for the Allies to meet the heavy onslaughts with troops fairly closely placed, but to-day's news contains a statement that General Joffre has advised the adoption of more open formations. One of the most-disputed questions in infantry tactics is the comparative density which the attacking line ought to possess. Thin lines were used in the South African War, and also in th? Russo-Japanese War. Much of the most expert German opinion is, however, in favour of denser unei The passages which follow are from the text-book on Tactics, by Colonel Balck, of th-\ German army (translated by Lieutenani Walter Knieger, U.S. army). Cohesion and order are best maintained, and the least time is lost in action, if efficient, dense firing lines are led forward as units up to the moment of opening fire But on open terrain such dense firing lines would begin to suffer too great a loss at ranges at which they could not reply 'to the fire. Nothing r/imains, then, but to cover the available front with a very thin firing line, followed at irregular distances by thin skirmish lines which ploy for the purpose of utilising rovnr or for opening fire Skirmish lines of this description will hardly justify the opponent's expenditure of ammunition, as he can only cover broad spaces with volley fire. On the other hand, these skirmish lines are in themselves too weak to facilitate the approach of tiie following echelons by their tire. B?s»des, it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by a. considerable interval from his comrades in line during the advance, and withdrawn from the influence of his officers, succumbs more easily to temporary spella of weakness and is more apt to remain behind than the skirmisher in a dense fifing line. The advance itt t several successive, thin skirmish lines is therpfore only_ an expedient. In each case the leaders will have to decide whether, in view of the close proximity of the enemy, a united advance witii dense, powerful skirmish lines is possible oi advisable (for instance, when entering at once upon the decisive stage of the action). Before opening fire the firing lines must be sufficiently reinforced. PUSHING ATTACK HOME. This advance in thin skirmish lines stood the test both in the Boer War and in the Ruseo-Japaneee War, but we must not forget that thin skirmish lines are only manoeuvre formations in an, attack that is to be pushed home, and that the mistake made by the British of attempting to make an attack with such weak skirmish lines should not me imitated. The Japanese ako used this formation after they had once opened fire with a dense skirmish line. It might be well to mention here that thin and dense skirmish lines, when under fire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their strength, provided the front occupied by them is the same. The aupeTior effect of fire on .the dense skirmish line, as expressed by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof by the gradually growing number of figures hit, iis apparent. It is worthy of note and at first glanco strange that, presupposing the two lines considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is the Bfcmo. The explanation of this lies in the fa«t that in correctly distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures hit whether an equal number of figures is removed or added. While, however, the dense skirmish line still' has 131 effectives, the weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties are, therefore, far more perceptible in the smaller force.