FLUSHING FORTIFICATIONS.

Evening Post, Volume LXXXI, Issue 41, 18 February 1911, Page 5

FLUSHING FORTIFICATIONS.

«a»' — SIR E. GREY REPLIES TO A QUESTION. By Telegraph.— Press Association.— Copyright LONDON, 17th February. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in replying to a question in the House of Cornmous, said the fortifications of Flushing by Belgium did not call for a statement in regard to the measures taken by a foreign country on its own frontier for defensive purposes. GERMAN ACTIVITY AND AIMS. Mr. William Maxwell, special correspondent of the London Daily Mail, in a series of articles in September last year dealing with German activity and aims in the North Sea,- wrote in retard to Holland :— When the German Emperor insisted on Holland strengthening her defences, he had in mind the case- of war between Holland and Great Britain. If Holland stood alone in this improbable event her danger undoubtedly would come from the sea. But it is certain that the. Dutch would have the support of Germany from the land sidej and, a successful landing being impossible, the war would be limited to a blockade of the Dutch ports. We are not interested in Holland os a potential enemy. We are- interested in her only as a neutral or as an ally. It is not imperative for the operations i' of our navy that we should have harbours on the coast oi' Holland. Flushing would 'bring us only 100 miles nearer. I to the German. North Sea coast, and this small advantage would not compensate us for any breach of Dutch neutrality. As an ally only would Holland be useful to Great Britaiu and France. Her coast has many landing I places and harbours where the largest ! ships can disembark troops and material I for invading Germany and seizing the German naval ports. To France especially would such an alliance be of strategic value, for the distance between her naval 'base at Brest and the nearest German base at Emclen is 643 miles, whereas the distance between Flushing and Emden is 240 miles.. To Germany, on the other hand, tho advantages to be gained by breach of Dutch neutrality are immensely great. Possession of the Dutch coast would greatly extend the German base of naval operations, for its harbours and roadsteads, of which no fewer than nine are navigable at low water at depths varying from 16ft to 26ft, form a continuation of the German coast towards the I south-west. These strategic advantages would undoubtedly be a great temptation to Germany in the event of war with ureat Britain. And the temptation is increased by the fact that the land frontiers of Holland are open to Germany. It j is true that direct approach from Ger- | many on the east is barred by two lines of defences; but although Holland can put into the field 200.000 trained solI diers, these land defences are dependent on inundations, and it is quesi tionable whether the Dutch would make I the necessary sacrifice with the promptitude demanded by the mere threat of invasion by Germany. The utmost that could be expected from Holland # would be to delay and harass an army advancing from the east. The West Scheldt, is of the greatest importance. At its entrance is situated Flushing, with its fine hurbour and excellent dockyard. Flushing-road is accessible to the largest battleships, and the position is unquestionably attractive as a naval base in the North Sea. The Dutch Government recognises the necessity of removing this temptation from a hostile Power, and has adopted meaI snres that will, in the judgment of its naval experts, eventually prevent any attempt to violate the neutrality of Holland in this quarter.