The Origin of the Difficulty.

Evening Post, Volume XLVI, Issue 22, 26 July 1893, Page 2

The Origin of the Difficulty.

AH news leading up to tho struggle which is now evidently impending, and which may Borioußly involve our own nation with its Gall c neighbour, has been bo fragmentary, and haß extended over such a long period, that it will bo useful to gather up tho threads of information into a connected form :—: — The difficulty in tho ■first place arises from disputes as to the boundary between Siam and the France -protected State of Annum, which lies on its eastern side. In that part of Asia thoro had never been any exactness in matters of boundary, and the tribesmen had not troubled themselves much on the point, till after tho introduction of European civilisation. Annam is a long strip of territory separated from Sinm by a range of mountains, between which and the rivc-r Mekong is an extensive tract of country until lately in the undisputed possession of the Siamose. It is inhabited by Laotian tribes, who chorish inherited feudß against their Annameso neighbours Two years ago M. Ribot, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, claimed for France, throngh Annam. tho whole of the country on the left bank of tho Mekong — practically tho samo territory as was demanded in last week's ultimatum — and announced to the Chamber of Deputies that this constituted the minimum of his demands. At this the Siamese were naturally startled, but they thought it advisable to make no formal protest until the French protensions wero brought to their official cognizance, which has only lately been done. From this point The Times states the case as follows: — " Early in the present year the disputes as to the alleged infringements of the frontier induced tho Siamese authorities to make fresh proposals for a modus Vivendi. It is said that they proposed to avoid all futuro difficulties between the Siamese and Annameso outposts, by marking off a bolt of cojntry over 30 miles wide and 300 miles long on the west or Siamcso Bide of tho watershed between tho'two countries. From the whole of this belt, running between the 13th and 19th degrees of north latitude, and lying, according to the Siamese view, entirely within Siamese territory, they suggested that all Siamese and Aunameeo garrisons, with certain specified oxceptions, should bo withdrawn, and that both States should agree to create no new military posts within it pending a definite settlement. Tho civil administration was to remain, as heretofore, in Siamese hands. About the same time the Siameso aro understood to have informed tho French that they wero anxious to settlo the frontior question definitely upon tho basis of actual occupation. They declared, however, that Siam was prepared to relinquish any tracts which could be proved to belong to Annam, and that she was ready to accept international arbitration on the validity of any Annanioso claims. The French have since put in their counter - claim. On tho ground, it is surmised, of some alleged exercise of suzerain rights by Annum— whioh rights, if they ever existed, have been dormant for at least a oentury — tboy claim the whole of the left bank of the Mekong, a territory considerably moro oxtensive than the entire kingdom of Annam as at present constituted. Naturally the Siamese refuse to discuss the proposal, or even to bolievo that it is seriously pnt forward by a great European Power. They say, with much truth, that the French proposition is not a scheme for the rectification of frontiers, bnt a project of annexation, and they profess themselves confident tbat such a proposition must ' bo based npon some claim of right which they aro now asking to see produced." An expedition of Annaraites sent by France amongst tho hiameso — their traditional foes —not many months ago, did not tend to promote good feeling, or to assist the negotiations that were in progress, and various atrocities committed upon Fronoh snbjects in a moro or lobs unsettled country have given pretexts for increased demands as to indemnity, until we heard last week of an imperative demand upon Siam for the cession of 95, C00 square milos of territory, a portion of which was only acquired by Siam from Burmah on an express condition that it was never to bo handed over to any othor Power. Next came an offer from Siam to compromise by yielding up a less area of tho trans-Mekong country, and this being unsatisfactory to France, diplomatic relations were suspended, and a blookado of tho Siamese ports wan proclaimed. Great Britain's interest in the country — suporadded to the fact that Siam acts as a convenient "buffer" S'ato between British Bui mail and tho French possessions— arises ftom commercial enterprise. The great bulk of tho shipping trado and throe-fourths of the foroign trade — which amounts to several millions sterling — aro in British hands. Much of tho rice, fish, and fruit consumed in Hongkong and Singapore come from Siam. Other exports aro teak, rosewood, and various valuable timbers, sugar, pepper, cattle, and skins. The imports are chiefly woollen and cotton goods, hardware, and of late materials for railway construction, a vast trunk lino from Bangkok up the valley of the Menain being projooted, and a British firm having the contract for its first section. An English company runs a line of steamers on the Menara river, and o'her companies are engaged in mining operations, while there are numerons English and Scotch firms established in Bangkok, not to speak of Chinese, Burmese, and Indian follow subjects scattered about the country. Another important point is, that through Siam a serviceable trado - route is being oponed up between India and the southern provinces of China. Bangkok is so situated as to be easily bombarded, but evon the capture of the city with its half million inhabitants — putting aside for tho moment the troublcsomo questions it would raise with more than ono groat Power — would not even bo a first step to tho coercion of Siam. The southern part of tho country is infested by deadly fevers ; the northern regions aro imperfeotly explored, inaccessible, and very mountainons. France may therefore find that her evidont desiro to conquer the country is one that cannot easily bo givon effect to.