The Daily Southern Cross.

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XIX, Issue 1965, 3 November 1863, Page 3

The Daily Southern Cross.

IUCEO NON UEO. " If I bar* been extinguished, yet tlitre rise A thouiand be*cons from the ipark I bore."

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 18C3.

Mek are too apt to measure success in war by one standard alone. They seldom trouble themselves about the causes which produced pertain results, and estimate the extent of a victory by the numbers of killed and n ounded. A great general, to the public mind, is one ■who has slain his tens of thousands. Aud there is much to justify thii hero worship by the multitude ; but it should not be overlooked that sanguinary battles do not always produce beneficial results, or tend to hasten the termination of a war. Decisive battles may and have been fought; but many brilliant A T ictories are on record which were barren of solid advantage to the victors. On the other hand, inoro frequent instances are on record where Btrategy has aooomplished, without slaughter, more than the most telling battles. We are led to make these general remarks owing to events which have recently taken place in Auckland. For months past the attention of this colony, and of the empire at large, has been fi\-ed on one spot on the right Ijauk of the Waikato. There the rebel natives had entrenched themselves. There they hoisted the King flag, in defiance of our troops, who held a fortified post about a mile and a half from the Maori position. There they had planted .the only heavy ordnance they possessed ; and there, in short, it was thought the deoiaive battle for the sovereignty of New Zealand would be fought. Delays occurred in advancing to the attack on Mereniere; the river transport was not pomplete, and even when steam vessels were procured, ft series of small mishaps provokingly delayed the forward movement of the troops, At length, by a-porsonal reconnaissance in the ' Pioneer' gunboat, on the Waikato river, and an experimental shelling of the Meremere works, General Cameron was satisfied that he had the means within his reach of accomplishing the long wished for object of carrying the war into the enemy's country. How this was to be done now became the question, and it is not difficult tq determine what were the considerations which, in a great measure, influenced General Cameron. He held a position, with an extended front of about fifty miles, haying a great distplct within tys lines to defend from predatory attacks, which the nature of the country so greatly favoured. Opposed to him was tlie enemy, whose whole strength seemed to be concentrated on ono point, *nd whose defensive works were by no means of an insignia* character. There were two Trays by either of which the enemy could be dislodged, One was by landing in front of the enemy's position, unde» PW rf ft? ™ <c » om the flotilla, and rushing the rifle-pits. The other was to decline the front attack, and by landing in force above Meremere, cut off communication with the southern supports of the enemy and turn his flank, attacking at greater advantage to the aiiailants on the proper left of the works. By the former plan the fall of Meremere would have been as certain as by the latter, but there would necessarily have been a greater loss of life, and the victory would have been shorn of several substantial advantages which the adoption of the latter plan mado certain. Driven from their rifle-pits by the onslaught of our troops in front, the natives would have made good their escape across the country towards Paparata, or on their right in the direction of the Upper Waikato. A few might have fallen in the pursuit, but from the nature of the country, the want of cavalry, and the well-known swiftness of the Maoris, we are justified in stating that the great bulk of the enemy would have made good their escape. By the plan of landing above Meremere, and attacking on the left flank and rear, escape became next to impossible for any considerable body of men, seeing that the gun - boats commanded the Waikato and Whangamarino. Escape by way of Bangiriri also became impossible. Manifestly these reasons weighed with the General, and led to the skilful manoeuvre by which Meremere was isolated from the chain of Maori posts, and which caused its evacuation by the garrison without striking a blow. We have stated already that General Cameron, having satisfied himielf of the moans of transport, and reconnoitred both banks o 'df the Waikato to Eangiriri, gare immediate orders for the embarkation of the troops. A column of over 600 men and officers, with three Armstrong guns, camp, equipage and baggage, was sent on board the gunboats, and landed early on Saturday morning on the right bank of the Waikato, near 'Takapau. This column took up a commanding position, menacing Rangiriri on the one hand, andoutflanking Meremere on the other. Supplies were cut off from the enemy by land and the river. Preparations were made to strengthen this column, by about an equal number of officers and men, and it was in general orders the hour at which they were to embark on' Sunday night. But in the meantime the enemy, became conscious of the weakness of their position. What they had bestowed so much labour and pains upon to make impreg-

become aliourco of .weakness — nay,, a PSV" a P> f rom escape must be sudden ifirc' nllt-by the skilful disposition 7 of tbo troops. They never cnlculated on Meremero being passed, and saw themselves • thoroughly checkmated. Onlookers from Whangamarino on Saturday, and thosl on board the gunboats the same evening, observed a great diminution in the numbers of men visible about the rifle pits; but the natives manned their works', and treated the steamers to several shots from their heavy guns on their return trip.* On Sunduy, about two o'clock, it was intimated to the Goneral that the natives wore evacuating Meremoro, and crossing in canoes towards the Thames. This caused an alteration of the entire plan of attack. Instead of increasing the column at the advanced post to 1,200 men, and at once marching to attack Moromere at daylight on Monday morning, General Cameron gave orders for the immediate embarkation of 250 officers and men at Koheroa, while he went in advance in the ' Avon,' to reconnoitre. The place was found abandoned when a landing was effected, the enemy leaving behind him the whole of his ordnance. And so Meremero was occupied without striking a blow, and the enemy as much discomfited as if he had lost 100 men. He fled from his chosen battle-field, abandoning his cannon, which are most precious in Maori eyes, and his cultivations, lleally this is a great victory, although in common with our fellow-colonists of every class, we should have been better pleased if the troops could have been let slip upon them. The day of reckoning is coming, however ; meantime wo should be thankful for what has taken place. We have obtained possession of the enemy's country on the right bank from Ngaruawahia to the Heads, for the natives cannot make a stand at Itangiriri, and if they could, it can be isolated in the same way as Meremere was. The Paparata bugbear will also be seen lo disappear on closer inspection, for by establishing a line of posts, and keeping up a strong mounted patrol between our recently acquired line on the Waikato and the Thames, which can easily be done, Paparata will become useless to the enemy as a base of opei'ations, because his communication will be cut off, and the position rendered of no earthly value in a strategicpoint of view. Having the command of the navigation of the Thames (which we aro glad to find is strictly blockaded) and the Waikato, the extirpation of any natives lurking within our lines is only a work of time, which will be more or less short in proportion to the number of men employed in their pursuit. For these reasons, therefore, and with the knowledge that our success will be followed up by vigorous action, we think the neck of the rebellion is broken. In our opinion, we shall never again see the natives take up an exposed position, and challenge battle. For a time they will wage a desultory warfare, — possibly appear suddenly in Tavanaki, or Hawke's Bay, or at Wanganui, or Wellington ; but defensivo measures have been taken, and we expect their successes will be trifling. The army will advance steadily in the meantime, and if tho Government act wisely, they will at once set about the occupation of the acquired land. It may be that the natives imagine they do not sustain a reverse unless they lose many men in action ; but this opinion will be greatly modified when they find we are in earnest in occuP3'ing their land. As matters stand, the Waikatos, and their blustering allies from tho south and east, must cut a sorry figure in Maoriclom. Their want of courage has been proved to be about equal to their self-conceit ; and their barbarous murders ought to create censors even amongst the savage race of which they presume to take the lead. In conclusion, it may be asked, why were the natives permitted to escape while wo had gunboats at command ? The question is natural and the auswor simple. Owing to*the overflew of the rivers, which has submerged all but the high land from Meremere to the ranges by the East and South, rendering navigation by canoes, easy over many miles of country that in ordinary seasons aue clry, the natives were enabled to steal away for the most part unobserved. Those who had an opportunity of inspecting Meremere, after its occupation, soon satisfied themselvei pn th«vt point, an,4 on hopelessness of preventing a retreat by water with the limited force and appliances that could be spared for that purpose. The flooded state of the country afforded them the sole chance of escape, and they availed themselves of the I opportunity.

If from the general principles that seem to have influenced the late head of the Ministry in constructing his scheme of military roads and settlements, we turn to tho consideration of the various parts of the scheme itself, we can scarcely be otherwise than struck by the perfect nature of the details of that scheme. The first thing that naturally attracks attention in considering tho scheme is the greatness of its parts. There is no attempt at small pottering expedients to save a littlo money now, at the cost of vast sums of money and vast quantities of blood possibly, hereafter. A few men are evidently of no use for the purpose of holding a conquered country ; therefore in Mr. Domett's scheme, a/ew men had no place. Large numbers of men, to occupylarge tracts of country, and brought here and provided for at vast expense, were the things which he faced, and the conditions on which he worked out his problem of military settlements. That scheme may be briefly described as being the connexion of all tho main natural channels of commerce and population between Auckland and Wellington, by means of continuous lines of posts in the shapo of populous, yet easily defended villages, containing not less than one hundred men each. These villages, each with its redoubt or block house on the most commanding point at hand, like the old castles whose ruins are the ornament now, as they were once the defence of half \he p. 14 villages in England and nearly every one of them in France and Germany, would extend from the neighbourhood of Koheroa in an unbroken line along the valley of the Waikato and Waipa, not more than a mile apart ; thence across into the Thames valley ; thence again to Taranaki and to Hawke's Bay, and along the coast, through the Ngatimanui country down to the Wanganui. Wherever the native population is now large, there tho military settler population was to go in yet larger numbers. Wherever the value of tho locality, the fertility of the ground, or the proximity of good water communications, have rendered the country a centre of native population, there the Domett scheme would place the centre of a vastly greater European, population. The scheme did not, as was the case with the old pensioner villiages, look merely to making an inner line of country safe ; but by outtlng' through, and spreading over the great

lines 6f; communication, of 'making!/the wlioie country safe and ' civilizod/ v the two difficulties that presented 'themselves at this stage to the, prime minister's mind, as those that must be overcome, scorn to have been, the place whence enough men wero to be obtained for the gigantic scheme, and the money with which tho colony was to pay for their introduction. In tho memorandum before us",' tho question of the place whence these men should be got, and the conditions on which they should be taken, are very fully discussed. Tho conclusion como to is, that these men can and ough^ for the most part, to be brought from England, that they should be nearly all married men ; and that a certain number of tho families might be taken who had at least one child. With regard to tho second and more intricate question of how the money expondit\iro should bo met and adjusted, the proposal is to borrow about four millions of money in the course of three years, and by a system of land sales, advancing in exact proportion with tho advancement of the actual settlements, gradually to pay off the whole debt within fifteen years with tho exception of that part of it, tho interest of which would be considerable, covered by the actual increase in customs revenue from the number of men, women, and children introduced. The introduction of the settlers, however, is not the only care of tho originator of the plan. He provides work for tho men during a considerable share of their time in the construction of roads, which are to traverse the country, making it as accessible then as it is inaccessible now to commerce. The scheme provides for the construction of some eight hundred miles of road, to bo formed by the military settlers, while the lands along these linGS of road would be sold year by year and would be sure^to yield vastly more money than is allowed for ""them in the calculation. Tho scheme provides for the introduction into this Province of about 31,000 souls within three years, to occupy and render valuable the valleys of the Waikato and Thames and thence to the borders of Taranaki, and from tho elaborate, and studiously sober calculations of expenditure and receipts appended to the scheme, it is evident that in every respect tho Province, totally independant of the vast increase of population which the opening of the Waikato lands would ensure, and tho commercial activity whioh would be created by a feeling of order and security in the country, would be an actual gainer of thousands a year of revenue. On thing, however, seems to us defective, not so much in tho Bcheme of the late Prime Minister, as in the relations between him and tho Governor, and the results of those relations. We want the men now. Not perhaps absolutely all tho men, but a great part of them certainly. At this moment the General may be said to have theabsolule command of all the valley of Waikato and Waipa. How is ho to hold it, however, without the aid of the settlers ? And how soon can wo hope for the arrival of these settlers here ? We agree entirely with the view that the greater part of the military settlers must be got from England ; but why not get what we could near at hand P ;Why say 2,000 men instead of 5,000 ? Two thousand men can do little in the present emergency to hold the country ; five thousand could do much. We confess to a great difficulty in comprehending by what right the Governor interfered at all with the numbers to be sent for, and wo think it high time it were fully understood that in cases of this sort, he' has no say whatever, as tho number of men can hardly be called an imperial matter. Meantime, we do sincerely hope that, while giving full effect to the idea of getting a largo population from England of the sort, and in someTlegree at all eventsunder the conditions, and for thepurposes mentioned in Mr. Domett's memorandum, the present Ministry will so far \tse its own judgmont and meet the needs that are so urgently self-evident, as to make every effort to get as many more men from the neighbouring colonies as can bo induced to come. Scarcely under eight months from this date could we hope to see a single shipload of English Waikato settlers in our harbour, even supposing not one moment were lost, and no difficulties had to be encountered. By that time we hope tho great need of military force will for the present be at an end in the Province. Two months, we cannot but believe, might give us another regiment of men from these colonies, who would help to occupy tho country and at the same tim,e prevent tho neoessity, so much deplored by all, "of breaking up so many houses of business, and taking so many men from their families, and from their" proper work to use as garrisons for our redoubts and camps between Auckland and JDrnvy,