THE TASK AHEAD

Dominion, Volume 38, Issue 81, 30 December 1944, Page 8

THE TASK AHEAD

Campaigns In Europe OUTLOOK FOR 1945

(By

E.A.A.)

The end of 1944 finds the Germans driven back virtually behind their own boundaries. They have been compelled to disgorge much of thelands which t hey had overrun since 1009. We start another year with a western front, an eastern front and a southern front in Italy. Germany is beset by powerful Allies along her boundaries, which are besieged for a total distance of over 1000 miles. One may look back with some little pride at what has been accomplished. What, then, does the future hold? . . . There are two fronts where a decision may be obtained—the eastern and the western. The Italian front, though important. will eventually besiege southern Germany along the line of the Alps, an area where decisive military results have always been'difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, the Italian area must become increasingly important as an air base, from which parts of Germany, remote from the other fronts may be bombed. As regards the two fronts where a decision may be obtained the, most difficult terrain lies along the 400 miles of 'the western front. In the north it is intersected by canals, wide rivers anil difficult water obstacles. As one goes south along the Rhine the .country becomes more and more mountainous. J here are two roles from which the Germans can make a choice —husbanding all resources for a stubborn defence of the Rhine, or seeking a decision west of the Rhine. If the German armies retire behind the Rhine it means abandoning two of their three vital industrial areas. Nevertheless,'it is probable that the Bhine defences if held in strength would be difficult to assault, and the Allies might be confronted with the task of arduous “inching.” We have seen how slow an attack can be when natural obstacles have assisted, stubborn German resistance. It would appear, however, that the Germans have decided to commit their basket of eggs west of the Rhine. Rundstedt s present attack is a clear indication that the German high command is. prepared to risk a decision while operating in the other fellow’s territory. Riindstedt’s Salient.

The recent sudden German attack ,precipitated a situation which Allied military experts had anticipated. "What was apparently mot anticipated was the early timing of this offensive. The Allies were caught on the wrong foot, in weather unsuitable for air operations, and Tin country unsuitable for quick retailiation. Nevertheless, the German armies have come into the open. Obviously the first task in France is to deal with the deep salient which Rundstedt’s armies have made into Belgium. . . In view of the fact that British and American armies, turned the German armies out of Africa, out of Italy, out o£ Normandy, out of France, out of Belgium, and out of a large part of Holland, it should be equally certain that these armies will be able to turn Rundstedt s divisions out of their present salient. If Allied armies develop their full striking power in as short a time as the situation demands, the reduction of. the German salient will become a decisive battle. It will decide, in fact, that the Germans cannot hope to defend Germany in the other fellow’s country. It will decide, moreover, that the defence of the Rhine must be left to inferior troops. There will thus develop opportunities for largescale manoeuvring on the part of the Allied armies on the western front. There is reason to hone that Rundstedt has stretched the German neck just where the Allies can cut it off. The spring of 1945 may thus be spent in heavy fighting similar to that observed in Normandy. This time.' however, a break-through when it comes will bring decisions of farreaching significance. The eastern front is a curious mixture of complicated mountains and plains in the south and straightforward lowlands in the north, with an occasional rivetobstruction. One may therefore divide the eastern front into two main areas—the Hungary approach battles and the wrestling match in the Baltic plains. The first cannot give a quick decision. It can. however, inflict mortal wounds. If Budapest falls and war comes to Vienna, the whole of southern Germany will be threatened, as well as the industrial areas of Czechoslovakia. Ultimately this threat, as it develops, seals the fate of Germany. It is. however, a slow death, and it might require more than 19-lu to bring about the end. The Baltic Plains.

There is no question that the most serious of all the threats to Germany lies in the Baltic plains from. Warsaw northward. In fact, once the line of the Vistula is carried, the eastern front will develop a most serious threat, capable of producing quick results. An eventuality of this nature is capable of disorganizing German resistance along the other fronts to a decree, where quick collapse could ensue. Berlin is only just under 200 miles from the Vistula. It should not be beyond the capacity of tiie Allies on all their fronts to apply pressure to an extent that. German organized resistance collapses in the coming spring or summer.' The Allies hold nearly all the cards. Their vast air power is actually increasing. Their industrial outpouring has not yet reached its maximum. They can make many tank's to Germany’s one. They have supplies of oil, whereas Germany has a wasting asset, due to air attacks. Moreover, the Allies have not had such wholesale losses as did the Ger--ns in their disasters during the year in Franco. White Russia and the southern Ukraine. But if the war in Europe is to end iu 1945 it must be taken seriously. The Allies are confronted with a desperate foe. There can be no let-up on any of the fronts, including the home fronts. There is no sense in jeopardizing the war by premature preparations for a peace which, after all. cannot be complete till Japan is knocked out.