LORD GORT’S DISPATCHES

Dominion, Volume 35, Issue 20, 18 October 1941, Page 10

LORD GORT’S DISPATCHES

Narrative Of B.E.F* Campaign In France EVENTS PRECEDING EVACUATION The story of Britain’s battle against Nazi Germany in France and Belgium is now told in General Lord Gort’s dispatches (Prance and Belgium 1939-40), which have been issued as a supplement to the ’•'London Gazette.” The following is a summary of the dispatches. The story of the Dunkirk evacuation as an epic of land, sea and air has long been known and is today part of British history. but details of the three weeks’ battle which preceded it have never yet been set forth in a continuous and authoritative form till now, when, with the publication of Lord Gort’s dispatches, the whole narrative is given to the world. No man of British birth will read it without profoundcst emotion and pride.

Briefly, owing to a break through upon part of the Allied line remote ( from their own, the B.E.F. found themselves involved almost from the start in what amounted to a continuous rearguard' action in which the situation deteriorated day by day, and means bad to be devised almost from hour to hour to deal with this emergency or that, let nowhere throughout the whole of the most difficult and harassing operations can we detect any loss either of head' or heart on the part of the British troops; or of the men who led them. Their lines of communication were cut, and they were hungry and lacking essential equipment. Allied support failed them upon either flank, yet they fought their way unbroken to the - Straits of Dover and delivered some SO per cent, of their strength from the enemy’s grasp. Comparison With 1914. The-dispatch begins inevitably with an interesting comparison between the conditions under which the British Expeditionary Force was conveyed to France, in September, 1939, and those prevailing in August, 1914. Time had marched on, and the avoidance of con r centrated air attack was now the overwhelming consideration. Calais and Boulogne were held to be but of the question as the main landing ports, so Cherbourg, Nantes, St. Nazaire and Brest were selected. The move to France was begun on September 10, and was completed, thanks to the elaborate and secret nature of the precautions taken, exactly on schedule time without the loss of a man. After being collected in their assembly area between De Mans and Laval, the British proceeded to their allotted sector and on the agreed date, October 3, the first corps was in position on the Belgian frontier. It should be noted that Lord Gort’s was not an indci>endent command. He was under the orders of General Georges, Commander of the French front of the North-east. New Conditions of Warfare.

The British sector followed the frontier from the village of Maulde to the village of llalluiu, and thence to the river Lys to Armentieres—familiar ter--ritory to many a British veteran. The sector covered Tourcoing, Courtrai and Lille and Lord Gort established his headquarters at Arras, or rather at the village of Habarcq, eight miles to the west. New conditions of warfare had rendered the widest possible dispersion necessary, not merely of the troops of any given area but of the headquarters staffs as well. The winter was spent in the construction of tr line of strong defences in depth along the Franco-Belgian frontier. From every point of view’ it would have been preferable to have sited these defences along the GermanBelgian frontier, thus prolonging the Maginot Line to its logical conclusion as a continuous rampart against German invasion. But the Belgian Government adhered to a policy of strictest neutrality. It was understood that defensive works in form of tank obstacles were under construction in eastern Belgium, but nothing.was known for certain. The Belgian Government, anxious not to compromise their position of neutrality, resolutely declined either to hold joint Staff conferences with the Allies or permit Allied officers to enter Belgium and reconnoitre possible positions. By the end of January the B-E.F. in France stood at 222,000 men, two corps of three divisions each with other troops. Bases had been established and our lines of communication extended from the Belgian frontier in a south-westerly direction through Amiens to 17 ports in western and southern France. Various defence schemes had been considered, and decided upon, so far as the aloof attitude of the Belgian Government permitted, with the French High Command. But plainly, Lord Gort, confident though he was in his men, was far from happy about the equipment situation, and on several occasions he called the attention of the War Office to the shortage of guns, ammunition and various technical apparatus. Violation of Neutrality.

The storm broke on May 10, 1940, with the simultaneous violation of Dutch and Belgian neutrality by the Germans, and the invasion in immense force of both these countries. Belgium. immediately called upon the Allies for assistance, and the B.E.F, together with the French First Army on its right crossed the frontier that day, proceeding at speed for 60 miles, aniid the cheers of the Belgian civilian population, to a selected position along the little river Dyle, which runs north and south through Louvain east of Brussels. These positions had barely been reached when the grave news began to come in that Lhe Belgians had failed to demolish important bridges upou their own eastern frontier and were falling back pressed by the enemy. The next day, May 12, came rumour that the French Ninth Army upon the right of the French First Army opposite Ardennes at Sedan was giving way before a thrust by German armoured divisions. It was more than rumour. It was the tragic truth. The French Ninth Army disintegrated completely, and within a few days German tanks and armoured cars were pouring through a gap 20 miles wide, heading straight for the French coast, and threatening to sever the Allied forces, including the B.E.F. in the north, from the main body of the French army to the south. Meanwhile measures were being taken to re-establish the situation in Belgium which had been rendered difficult by the retirement under pressure of the Belgian army. A conference was held at Mons on the afternoon of May 12 when Jt was agreed that tlie French General Billotte should co-ordinate the dispositions of the 8.E.F., Belgian Army, and French First and Seventh Armies. So for a short time the Dyle line was held with some promise of success. But events elsewhere were moving too fast. Dutch Lay Down Arms.

0)1 May 15 the Dutch laid down their arms, creating ;i new source of danger in the north. It was obvious too that the French First Army on our right could not hold on to their present position. much longer. Owing to the dis-

were completely cut and no more reserves were available. The B.E.F. were on half rations. The AVeygand iilan was flickering out,

sipation of the French Ninth Army their right flank was in the air. ft was therefore decided to abandon the Dyle position and fall back-in accordance with a prepared plan to the River Escaut, GO miles westward. This difficult withdrawal was completed bi' May 19. But the gap to the south remained and was growing wider. Enemy troops had penetrated as far as Amiens and were getting astride the British lines of comniunieation, which, it will be remembered, reached diagonally across France to the south-west instead of running straight back to the Channel. German armoured vehicles actually reached Boulogne as early as May 21. Plainly the situation could only be restored by strong counter attacks across the gap. The initiative and principal effort must come from the south side where the French G.Q.G. and main French forces were situated. But precious hours and days passed; it did not mature. . True, ' after the supercession of General Gamelin by General AA’eygand, a scheme known as the AA’eygand plan was formulated. But it was never put into execution. The situation had deteriorated too swiftly. Lord Gort found himself .almost from the start thrown largely on his own resources. Manning of Canals. The most pressing need was to organize a line of defence along what had now become the southern front of-the Billotte army group. This was accomplished bv manning the chain of canals which runs through Bethune and St. Omer to Gravelines and the sea, and the situation was for the moment relieved. Secondly, the various emergency forces were improvised. These were" called as a rule by the names of the general commanding them —Macforce. Petreforce (lason-Macfarlane, Petrel.

The operation of those forces were particularly creditable, because many of the troops composing them bad been brought out from England, not to light, but to dig ami complete their, training. Half-trained and only partially armed, they clung grimly to the Canal du Nord, the Scarpe, Arras, and other keypoints.

Lastly, on May 20, from bis scanty reserves, Lord Gort even contrived to organize a force (“Frankforce”) sufficient to counter-attack across the corridor. . It was a gallant gesture, and tlie troops concerned reached their objective for the first day. But adequate support was not forthcoming, and the effort ended. Still casualties bad been inflicted upon the enemy, and delay had been imposed upon a greatly superior enemy force, against which Frankforce had blocked a vital road centre.

On May 23 the B.E.F. found itself in the position of a beleaguered garrison contained within a rough triangle of some 50 miles each way. The base of the triangle was the sea coast from Gravelines, near Calais, to Nieuport in Belgium. The apex was at Douai, where most of the French were situated. The southern side followed the canal line and was manned chiefly by our improvised forces. The eastern side was held by the three corps of the original B.E.F. witli the Belgians ou their left. Our lines of comniunieation

and it was obvious now that our only alternatives were surrender, evacuation or tight to the death. Upon May 27 Lord Gort received a definite order from the Secretary of Slate for War, making it clear that his sole task now was to evacuate to England the "maximum number of your force possible.” On the same day news came that the King of the Belgians, faced with the now imminent collapse of his army, had asked for an armistice, and that a new gap some 20 miles wide was thus about to appear in the eastern face of the triangle through which enemy tanks could pour toward the beaches. Withdrawal Io Bridgehead. Nothing now remained but to withdraw’ to the bridgehead (already reconnoitred) round Dunkirk and cover the embarkation of as many troops as possible. Into the Dunkirk jierimeter, as it was called, British and French troops accordingly fought their way back. Here the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force came to their help witli a flotilla of every kind of craft to bear them home. Orders were issued that the British and French troops were thenceforth to be embarked in equal proportions. The story of the Dunkirk evacuation has often been told and need not lie refloated here. Indeed, Dord Gort himself did not witness its completion. He had already received instruct lons from the British Government wlil-.-li left, him no option that ;.s soon as Hie B.E.F. by evacuation fell below the strength of three divisions he was to hand, oyer, to a, Corps commander and

returii home. Upon May 31 he handed over to Major-General Alexander aud sailed that night. Four days later, iu the sniull hums of June 3, his successor, accompanied by the senior Naval Officer, made a tour of Dunkirk beaches. They were deserted and empty. "Ou being satisfied,” we are told, "that no British troops were left un the shore, they themselves left for Englund.” Nearly 225,000 British soldiers (including 13,000 wounded) and 112.000 French soldiers liad preceded them to Englund, not counting some thousands more of French troops evacuated from Dunkirk to oilier ports in France. Lessons of Campaign.

The dispatch closes with '•some lessons of the campaign.” They do not include comment on the question of the High Command of the Allied forces —for ou this question Lord Gort received orders from the Government and through French commanders under whom he was placed. Nor do they include detailed comment on the militarv lessons on which another report has been made to the proper quarter. The dispatch does, however, say that "the offensive has regained the ascendancy” when undertaken by an army amply equipped for the purpose. The fate of the B.E.F. was sealed by the break-through many miles from their own front, and not by any failure of British troops to bold positions of their own choosing, it also emphasizes the paramount importance of equipment, the factors of speed and daring in the enemy’s success, and the military value of parachute troops and dive-bombers. Demolitions proved their value. Refugees were a grave problem. The list of lessons concludes with a tribute to the valuable services rendered bv Ihe corps commanders and staff, and the line behaviour of Ihe troops, as well as recording the debt owed by the B.E.F. to the sister services, the Royal Navy, and the R-A.F.