A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 120, 14 February 1941, Page 6

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Resistance .To Japan

DUTCH EAST INDIES

The European war has had a ~pe< tacular and unexpected result in the raising of Hie Netherlands East Indies, with .lava as the focal point, from the stains of a colony to that of a seini-inilepeudeiit nation. It is generally conceded in Batavia, writes Hailetl Abend in the "New York Tinies,” Unit wiieii Hie war ends, tlie Netherlands indies must necessarily receive Hie equivalent of British Dominion status, but maintaining loyalty to Queen Wilhelmina's throne. The importance of the abrupt rise of virtual nationhood in this vast archipelago in the equatorial seas is not realized till it is known that its laud and water total area equals the land area of continental United States. Status Of Indies Today a large majority of even the Dutch officials sent out from the Netherlands, as well as virtually all the Indies-born Netherlanders, openly declare that a semi-iudependent Dominion status will be their demand when the war ends. The Netherlands East Indies do not have any such problem as that which faces India. It is true that there is a Nationalist party there, but it. is largely comprised of the leaders of the group that is racially half Dutch and half native. They are not seeking political independence, but instead want racial equality with the whites. If Germany Is hoping for any serious internal disturbances in the Netherlands Indies she will be bitterly disappointed, for fully 98 per cent, of the Netherlands Indies’ Malay population ask and want nothing beyond plenty of rice and fish and not too much work. The islands collectively have about 63,000,000 inhabitants, of whom 43,000.000 live on Java. This island is about the size of the North Island of New Zealand. Today close cable contact is maintained between the Batavia Government of the Netherlands East Indies and Queen YVilhelmina’s Government in London. In a general way London’s wishes and policies arc courteously observed. Anti-Japanese Feeling However, many officials in Batavia are amazingly outspoken on one crucial point. They fear, they say, that certain members of the Queen’s Cabinet are probably in favour of a policy ot “appeasement” toward Japan. This is actuated, they feel, by the desire that the Netherlands Indies, this great source of wealth, should not suffer the ravages of war, hut instead furnish the riches for the Netherlands for the building and restoration when peace conies.

On this point, however, the Netherlands Indies Government is willing to defy Cabinet orders. It will resist any excessive demands from Tokio and will be prepared militarily to defend the archipelago against a Japanese attack. Whatever history may decide was responsible for the ineptitudes that resulted in the Netherlands’ quick military collapse, the same history must give full credit to the magnificent defence efforts that have been made in the Netherlands East Indies since lasi May, YVith important and increasing imports of American aeroplanes, tanks, munitions and other essentials, these islands are now ready to offer stout resistance to any invader. They will fight, Indeed, more for their future nationhood than for the interests of their motherland.

Moreover, anti-Japauese feeling i- s amazingly strong and widespread even among tho untutored natives. The .Malays in the Netherlands Easr Indies are very largely Mohammedans, and in all tho, mosques, the hajis daily preach the gospel that if Japan conquers the islands all the Malays will be degraded to the rank of coolie labourers. Defence Plans

In official circles the conviction is widespread that while the local efforts to perfect defence plans has been highly successful, (he basic weakness of the xvh'ole situation is the lack of c*e ordination plans made with British Army and Navy headquarters at Singapore, and also, if possible, with th - . Americans at Manila.

They point out tlmt Adolf Hitler's conquest of the Low Countries in Europe and other countries was vastly facilitated by the lack of co-ordination of defence plans between the countries overrun and the British and I'Tcnch High Commands. It is true, they say. that Herr Hitler would have made th*' existence of such joint defence pro grammes an excuse for his invasions, but he invaded those countries anyway.

So to'day, they say, although Japan might strenuously object if Batavia, Singapore, and Manila should agree upon the broad principles of the defence of these areas, nevertheless the existence of such plans might deter the would-be invader. Such plans certainly would make the aggressor's task much more difficult, if invasion came. No false senee of security exists in Batavia, but. responsible authorities bo lieve-lliat Japan cannot, attack Java am) Borneo as long as the British liobl Hong Kong and Singapore, from which thinking operations are feasible. Hong Kong. (liev say, could withstand at tacks for at least six weeks, by which lime the American licet could .-irrivc in I lies*' wafers from 1 lawaii. Sumatra’s Oil While Java and Borneo would be rich prizes for the Japanese, actually Sumatra has the ‘ greatest potential weath. Sumatra is nearly seven times as large as Java, and has only 9,006,000 inhabitants, against Java’s 43,000,000. Moreover, Sumatra is exceptionally rich in oil. Bur. it will be impossible for the Japanese to attack Sumatra mlong as the British hold Singapore. In Hiis connexion, says Mr. Abend Batavia censorships suppressed one of he most dramatic developments of the ■lai*ancse-.\elherlands negotiations before Ichizo Kobayashi, hon'd of the • apunese mission, returned to Tokio. Mr. Kobayashi suffered intensely from the tropical heal and often lapsed into a. si'ini-somuolent condition during th*' protracted sessions of the delegate.-. One afternoon, suddenly arousing hintself, he e.vclaime'd. apropos of nothing :-- "Of course, if Germany meets reverses, Japan must act to come to her rescue.” The delegates adjourned in mutual consternation. The next day the incident was smoothed over and a joint signed statement was issued saying in effect that Mr. Kobayashi had not in the least meani what he had been understood to say. Nevertheless, this is remembered and preparations to meet emergenci.'s are being made accordingly.