TRAGEDY OF BELGIUM

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 232, 26 June 1940, Page 7

TRAGEDY OF BELGIUM

King Leopold's Policy Of Neutrality At Any Price ANTI-FRENCH CONFIDANT “King Leopold 111 of the Belgians always made on me the impression of a very sad man,” states Sir Robert Clive, British Ambassador to Belgium from 1937 to 1939, in an article in “The Times.” “He was born, I imagine, with no sense of fun, let alone a sense of humour. “I. have never seen him laugh. I doubt if be ever has laughed-since the tragic death of his consort, that gay and lovable woman Queen Astrid, in the summer of 1935. By nature morbid and introspective, at the same time very obstinate and autocratic, yet with an intense love of bis country, he is today realty an object of pity. “His temper, never easily controlled, at times became violent. No one in his entourage ever dared to stand up to him. lie is lacking in geniality, though he has a charming smile and a soft and attractive voice. He was starved of friendship, both of men and of women. The loss of his wife was irreparable. It is to be regretted that he did not marry again. Principal Aide-de-Camp. “His chief confidant in the past two years has been General van Overstraeten, who was both head of the Ecole Militaire and his principal aide-de-camp. The general was notoriously anti-French, and shared to the full the King's policy of neutrality at any price. “No one ever questioned King Leopold's patriotism, however misguided. He was ardently pro-Belgian. The, French maintained he was pro-German. I do not believe this, but he certainly was not pro-French. The so-called policy of independence which be announced to an astonished world in October, 1936. was inspired by the hope, which developed into an obsession, that in this way alone would lie bo able to save Belgium from the horrors of war. Maintaining a Fiction. “This obsession made him blind to other considerations. Equal weight, he felt, must be attached to the German and to ihe British and French guarantees. The fiction must be maintained that Belgium was as liable to attack from the French as from the German side. No details of (lie Belgian defence plans could be given to us or to the French for fear of infringing the policy of absolute neutrality. All idea of staff conversations was taboo. “In this attitude of stand-offishness from his former Allies he was aided and abetted by his evil genius, General van Overstraeten. . . . The result of this policy was that, in spite of the definite warning the Belgian Government received on November 10, when at the very last moment Hitler accepted the advice of his generals to defer the attack, till after the winter, in spite, too, of the ever-increasing danger to Belgium, no staff conversations ar all took place between the Belgian and Allied staffs before the invasion of Belgium on .May JO.”