AIR LESSONS IN NORWAY

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 226, 19 June 1940, Page 5

AIR LESSONS IN NORWAY

German Aviation Methods BRITISH STRENGTH IN >- DEFENCE a '■ Once again the concise German - method of applying air power has had a a measure of success,-said the aeronautical correspondent of "The Times,” commenting early iu April on o the air lessons to be learnt in the Nor- • wegian campaign. In Norway, as in Poland, the Germans used a close . combination of air power and land ■ power. They did not waste an aeroplane on extraneous bombings. Every ■- flight ministered to the main purpose: i the advance of the ground troops and I the consolidation of their positions, • with the complementary harassing of any troops which sought to bar their ’ way. Even when the Royal Air i Force went over and hammered the German bases, as it still continues to ; do, the Luftwaffe was not diverted from that purpose. Though the Ger- : man newspapers breathed threats about bombing London iu reprisal, the German General Staff bad no intention of bombing any objective other than those which stood iu the way of the Norway advance. Norway was a test of air power' if ever there was one. It was announced as a test of sea power; and so it may have been at the beginning. Then, however, there came the test of air power, in which so far the Allies have been found wanting. It will do no good to blink that fact. The reason reflects no discredit on the men or the machines, nor on the present administration. Local air supremacy iu Norway could not be secured and held during the early stages of the campaign because no land bases could be established there quickly and because neither British nor French aircraft were suited to working in daylight at great, distances from their bases against strong opposition.. Strength in Defence. That is the whole story of the difficulties that have beset the Royal Air Force in gaining local air superiority, and so iu creating the conditions in which Allied troops could everywhere move with reasonable security. The strength of the Allied Air Forces lies mainly iu home defence, and there can be little doubt that in that sphere they ' are very strong indeed. German bomb- ■ ing aeroplanes stand little chance of getting back when they are intercepted .by British or French fighters, though German bombing aeroplanes, sacrificing armament, and the complexities of gun turrets for speed and production, are, for the most part, very slight- i ly faster than British bombing aeroplanes. 1 The early stages of the campaign in 1 Norway, however, forced the Air Staff , to use fighter aircraft which are not : the latest we possess because of the re- ] stricted size of the landing-grounds 1 and the consequent need for low land- 1 ing speeds. Similarly it is to be noted 1 that most of the raiding of enemy ( bases has been done by night. The night raiding has been brilliantly effective and has seriously damaged the ’. German Air Force, but it is limited in a scope and there are difficulties iu finding targets such as might be presented by troop concentrations. There was, of course, no possibility of developing r quickly the special types of aircraft ' which might have been suited to this j campaign and few people could be r blamed for not foreseeing the need for I such machines three or four years ago. ? This much is clear: that future ttroop movements must be attempted c only when the air situation is favour- 1 able. Where there is small chance of ? establishing air superiority troop move- & ments must not be begun. German Use of the Air. t<

There are other useful points to be noted about the German use of aircraft in Norway. They have proved that aircraft can be successful as troop carcriers for fairly large numbers of men with their equipment, and apparently for light guns. Tanks have been carried experimentally in aircraft, and the Germans may even have brought light tanks to Norway by air. Thej dropping of food and supplies has been practised extensively. The Germans are everywhere forcing their aviation technique to the utmost limits. Where we think of ships as the only possible means of transport, they turn to the aeroplane. The aeroplane is being forecd to take on more and more duties. Parachute troops, although they do not seem Io have been any more successful in Norway than they were when used by the Russians in Finland, are another example of tlie way in which tlie military scope of aviation is being extended.

The Allies have experience of all these uses of aircraft. Both Britain and France have used aircraft for troop-carrying on a relatively small scale. II is not that Hie Germans have introduced any remarkable novelties: but simply thai they have transferred additional responsibilities to aviation.

The close study of the relationship between air and other activities promoted by the Allied failure to establish general air superiority in Norway may prevent mistakes in the future and prove in Hie end of great value to Hie success of the Allied cause. Where aviation does not enjoy Hie initiative it, works under great difficulties. When it is forestalled in the establishment of bases in Hie theatre of war —even by n few hours —it suffers-a considerable disadvantage. The one hopefui aspect of Hie Norway campaign up to tlie present is that it lias demonstrated beyond question Hie tremendous striking power of Ihe British night bomber force. That is a point which the enemy will not have overlooked. Moreover, it lias further demonstrated Ithe courage and skill of Allied airmen.