THE UKRAINIAN MINORITIES

Dominion, Volume 32, Issue 127, 22 February 1939, Page 8

THE UKRAINIAN MINORITIES

If it be true, as President Roosevelt has hinted, that the Euiopean democracies are facing a new threat of aggression,. the probability is that it concerns the Mediterranean area. This, is the principal danger zone in Europe-today, insofar as direct action by the totalitarian Powers is concerned. But there are other spots where the crust of security is thin, where events may move in courses not directly menacing to the principal democracies, yet in such conflict with the interests of European nations outside the Berlin-Rome axiS as to represent a very tangible threat to peace. Nowhere in Europe today is there more unease than in the spreading, territory east of Germany known as the Greater Ukraine. German influence there has become incomparably stronger since Munich, and in recent months there has been plenty of evidence to show that Herr Hitler is working steadily to extend that influence among the Ukrainian minorities. Every reported move gives clearer shape to his drive-to-the-East policy. From Prague this week it is reported that leaders of the Ukiainian Cossacks have been discussing in Berlin the formation of a Ukiainian Federation —an independent State of .15,000,000 inhabitants ( Uiider anti-Communistic Cossack control. This, it was pointed out, would make it possible for the Reich to shelve for the time being plans to create a Greater Ukraine (as a national rather than a geographic entity), which obviously at present could not be realized without conflict with the Soviet.” In other words, Herr Hitler, for the time being, could content himself with striking an indirect blow at Russia by fathering a new anti-Soviet State—the “Federation of the SouthEast ” But it is a tall order. The Soviet Ukraine, the southeastern State of the U.S.S.R., contains about 30,000,000 inhabitants, by far the largest part of the Ukrainian population, and it is highly unlikely that Russia would be prepared 'tamely to abandon her influence over 194,000 square miles of this territory, together with half its population, at the behest of a restive Cossack faction working hand in glove with the Reich. The move by Germany to “liberate” the Ukraine, which, besides the Soviet-controlled area, consists of a region of 6,000,000 inhabitants under Polish rule, a Rumanian area of 500,000 people, and Czechoslovakia's Ruthenian minority of about 900,000, now known as Carpatho-Ukrainians, began immediately after the Munich Agreement. She insisted on the rights of autonomy for Ruthenia, obviously in order that this little wedge of country dividing northern Hungary from southern Poland might remain as a buffer State heavily subject to German influence; and, incidentally, become a fountain-head for Nazi separatist propaganda, If the Cossack-Ukrainians can be encouraged to help themselves to autonomy, Herr Hitler may be able to avoid furthering his programme at the expense of Poland or Rumania, for the Cossack-Ukraine would be prize enough in itself. As a writer in Current History has pointed out: The Soviet’s Ukraine, with its most fruitful land in all Europe and its population of 30,000,000 souls is, from an economic point of view, one of the most important territorial units on the European continent. The country is so rich in every conceivable product that Germany would be more than willing' to leave well enough alone and leave Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia their respective Ukrainian minorities—if that were possible without completely alienating the nationalist feeling of the Ukrainians themselves. And, in addition to this, a Cossack (ex-Soviet) Ukraine controlled and supported by the Reich would bring Herr Hitler into Russia itself, and a great step nearer his ultimate goal of breaking the power of the Soviet Government. Poland, Russia and Rumania all have good reason to view this programme with apprehension. A united stand by those nations, supported by the Scandinavian countries and by Britain and France, should hold Germany in check. On the other hand an effective understanding between Poland and the Soviet and Poland and Rumania seems difficult to achieve and' to maintain. Herr Hitler has gained much by threats and by subversive diplomacy, and has been encouraged in the belief that he can go further. Iheie must come a time of crisis when his eastern*neighbours are faced with the choice of either making way for him or taking the risk of calling a halt.