The Dominion. TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 1938. THE NAVAL RACE

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 162, 5 April 1938, Page 10

The Dominion. TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 1938. THE NAVAL RACE

Britain’s naval expenditure ’ since the rearmament policy was launched has been confined to making up the leeway of past years by the replacement of obsolete vessels and building new vessels up to the limits of the Treaty of London. These limits are now to be exceeded by invoking the “escalator clause” of the treaty. 1 his clause enables any of the signatory Powers which may. find itself at war, or may have reason to believe that a non-signatory Power is engaged in a pro- , gramme of naval construction constituting a threat to its own security, to “step up” its own programme in order to preserve the balance ot strength. Both in Italy and Japan naval expansion has created a situation justifying British action under the escalator clause, and a naval race has now commenced. r moo Prior to 1936 the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930 had the effect of keeping naval construction within reasonable limits. Both expired in December of that year, but before that date Japan had already denounced the Washington Treaty, which has not since been renewed. She also refused to adhere to the London Treaty when it was renewed in 1937. Her main objection to both treaties was that she was denied equality of strength with the other signatory Powers. Italy refused to agree to be bound >y the London Treaty restrictions either in 1930 or in 1937. This :ett the position thus: The new London Treaty was ratified by Britain, tie Dominions, the United States, and France; Britain at the same time negotiated bi-lateral agreements with Germany and Russia, providing for the full exchange of informafion concerning naval construction, except that Russia reserved the right to maintain absolute secrecy concerning her naval strength in the Far East; Germany was also bound by the Anglo-German naval agreement not to build in excess of 3j per cent, of Great Britain’s strength, but this percentage has been exceeded, and for all practical purposes the arrangement may be regarded as having ceased to exist. For that matter the London Nava Treaty of 1 1937 has lost its effectiveness through the fact that the United States as well as Great Britain has invoked the escalator clause, and it can hardly be supposed that France, the remaining signatory Power, will be left behind. There has been some argument in England lately as to whether there should not be a return to the old two-Power standard on which British naval construction before the War was based. This policy, it has been contended, was simple and direct. It was not pointed at any particular nation, and was not subject to fluctuations in response to changes in the international situation. But however well this policy may have served in the past, to carry it out now would impose ah unsupportable burden on the nation. Even in the critical years just before the War the question of its abandonment had been seriously discussed., On the ground of expense, a two-to-one programme of naval construction would simply be out of the question. The present basis of construction, as outlined in the House of Commons recently, is tor defence —the defence of the United Kingdom, of the Empire trade routes, and, as far as strategical considerations will allow, of the oveiseas Dominions. The basic requirements are strong, naval forces for Home waters and the Mediterranean, mobile cruising forces for the trade routes, and adequate forces, based on Singapore, for, the. Empire’s eastern sea frontiers. These requirements have yet to be brought, up to full. strength, and in the present state of the international situation, time is the essence of the contract. Having, in due compliance with the procedure laid down, invoked the escalator clause, and freed herself from the restrictions of the Treaty, Britain is now building to the limit of her resources. This policy should be reassuring to the Dominions, where anxiety has been caused through a somewhat cryptic remark by the British Prime Minister recently—since qualified—concerning the possibility of Britain having to suffer temporary losses overseas in the event of her naval forces being fully occupied nearer home.