WORLD NAVIES

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 151, 23 March 1938, Page 6

WORLD NAVIES

Japan Subject To No Limitations From 1922 until the last day of 1936 the Navies of the Powers fronting on the Pacific Ocean were subject to limits agreed upon and embodied in two successive treaties, says "The Times” in a leader. The first of these was the Five-Power Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, under which the American and Japanese battle fleets were to consist of 15 and nine ships respectively; this treaty laid down limits of total tonnage in the same ratio for aircraft-carriers, but not for any other classes of warship. The fact that the process of limitation thus .Stopped, short was a disappointment to the American Government; and as a result the original American proposal at the subsequent Naval Conferences of 1927 and 1930 was that the lesser classes of warship should be limited in the same ratio. It proved impossible to translate this proposal unchanged into definite terms of limitation; but the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which emerged from the conference of that vear, did embody provisions for limiting all classes of warship, though giving to Japan ratios in the lesser classes more advantageous than the threefifths she whs allowed in capital sliips. The improvement ranged from a small fraction in A-class cruiser tonnage up to equality in submarines; but the “treaty limits” still allotted to America a preponderance in cruiser tonnage of some 114,000 tons. The figures embodied in the treaty, however, were based upon ships actually existing in the Japanese Navy, while the American cruiser fleet was still far short of its limit; and indeed the Vinson-Trammell Act, which at present governs the volume of new construction for the American Navy, merely authorises building “up to treaty strength”—a goal which, so far as cruisers are concerned, has not yet been reached. Japan’s Navy. Since January 1, 1937, when the two treaties mentioned expired, the Japanese Navy has been subect' to no limitations at all; and Japan, not being a member of the League of Nations or a party to the 1936 London Naval Treaty, is under no obligation to furnish any foreign Rower with information regarding her armaments. It is natural that there should be much speculation in other countries regarding them; but so far, despite certain though irresponsible assertions of detailed knowledge, no information on the subject has emerged from Japan. If the Japanese naval constructors were actually building the monster ships with which rumour credits them, the London Treaty Powers would doubtless desire to discuss the situation thus created, and concert the relaxation of their present qualitative limitations, as provided by the treaty. If Japan has in the last 12 months taken steps largely to increase the number of her cruisers, then other Powers, in view of recent developments in the Far East, might not unreasonably decide to add to their building programmes hitherto adopted. But, even apart from such contingencies, the United States may well feel that the Vinson-Trammell Act hardly gives the freedom of action desirable in the international situation of a disturbed world. “Treaty limits” which were adopted in a tranquil international atmosphere may no longer be appropriate now, and that is the explanation of the request for increase of naval appropriations foreshadowed by President Roosevelt.