LLOYD GEORGE’S “WAR MEMOIRS”

Dominion, Volume 30, Issue 154, 27 March 1937, Page VIII (Supplement)

LLOYD GEORGE’S “WAR MEMOIRS”

Completion of a Brilliant Work "Mar Memoirs. Vol. VI," by David Lloyd George (London: Nicholson and Watson). With the conclusion of volume six, Mr. Lloyd George has completed his -War Memoirs” that engaged him for five years. Both for their subject matter, the position which the author occupied throughout the four years of the greatest war in history, and the copious index, these volumes will remain indispensable to all students of the period. Tile sixth volume maintains the interest. of tlie preceding five, indeed, at, times it is more enthralling, for Mr. Lloyd George seeks the opportunity to cross swords with critics of bis earlier volumes, and in reply be is a formidable, even devastating, antagonist. Where lie considers it necessary he wades in without apology, sparing no one who has crossed his path. In a preface he puts himself on side with the world. "These volumes . . . are the most carefully and richly documented account of the great Armageddon.” lie says. Mr. Lloyd George reiterates his view that a mistake was made during the War in concentrating the forces altogether on the Western Front,-“thus allowing the Central Powers with a few divisions to conquer the Balkans.” But, be adds, "this mistake was more than counterbalanced by the incredible blunder committed by the German staff in the spring and summer of 1916, when they hurled their best legions against Verdun in a vain endeavour to capture it. The Allied mistake prolonged the War. The German mistake lost them the War , . . ’The blunders of Germany saved us from the consequences of our own.”

Nor does Mr. Lloyd George omit to enforce the lesson that w.ar settles nothing—not even the righteousness of a cause —and that its cost is prohibitive. “But let all who trust justice to the arbitrament of war,” he says, “bear in mind that the issue may depend less ou the righteousness of the cause than ou cunning and tlie craft of the contestants. It is the teaching of history, and this war enforces the lesson. And the cost is prohibitive. It cripples all the litigants. The death of ten millions and the mutilation of another twenty millions amongst tlie best young men of a generation is a terrible bill of costs to pay in a suit for determining the responsibility and penalty for the murder of two persons, however exalted their rank." To this bill is added £50,000,000 expended in devastation, in slaughter, and the complete dislocation of the economic life of the world. In this volume Mr. Lloyd George narrates Germany’s last desperate throw for victory; the Allied counterattack; ami the imposition of the armistice terms on Germany. He also enters into a detailed criticism of Lord Haig's diaries and after, and offers some reflections on tlie functions of governments and soldiers respectively in a war.

The volume opens with the Allies in sore straits. But. optimistic about it all is General Foch, who is seen standing in front of the late Lord Balfour “indulging in violent, pugilistic gestures first witli his fists and then with his feet. We discovered afterwards that, he was illustrating tlie great plan of his counter-offensive. When it began. he would hit there aud hit there—lie would use not only his two arms but bot|) bis feet, hitting aud kicking without cease so as to give the enemy no time to recover. It turned out.to be a dramatic forecast of the method which tlie great soldier was soon to employ, and which ended in complete victory for the Allies.”

Throughout this volume Mr. Lloyd George forms no very high opinion of those in charge of German policy, Ludendorff least of all. He makes quite clear, however, that, while atemptiug still to present, a brave front, the Gorman loaders were, only too well aware that theirs was a lost, cause and that it was not for them to suggest terms of peace, but. to accept those which the victorious Allies were ready to impose. The Allies wore going to sec Io it too, that tiie terms of peace were to be accepted by a people that: had got rid of the Junker tradition. “We knew,” he says, "that if this war ended in a sort of armed truce, leaving the present militarist regime of the Central Empires still in authority and undefeated, they would have only one purpose—to prepare for a renewal of the conflict at a more favourable moment, with more formidable arms and better-laid plans. Thus our only hope was to keep on till they had been defeated in the field and discredited at home.” Thou at length came the realisation by the German people that all was lost that, they could no longer continue. All was chaos. The fleet mutinied in October rather than go out and fight, and the Kaiser fled. Ou November 8, Germany capitulated, a delegation meeting loch in a. railway carriage in a French forest. Mr. Lloyd George tells the story of. that historic meeting. "What do you want,' gentlemen?” asked Focb. "Tour proposals for an armistice,” they replied. “Oh. we’re not making any proposals for an armistice,” said Foch. "We are quite happy to go ou fighting.” The German delegates looked at one another. “But we must have terms,” they protested. “We cannot continue the conflict.” "Ah, you come for an armistice? That is a different thing.”

The terms appalled the German delegation. They were given 72 hours in which to sign. What went on in Germany between the receipt of the terras and their acceptance is vividly told by Mr. Lloyd George. He also describes the affairs in Russia and the Near East following Germany’s defeat. In offering some reflection on the War, Mr. Lloyd George advances the belief that the war could have been averted; that, it could not have been terminated earlier by negotiation; but that it could have been shortened by better handling on cither side. Dealing with Germany's part in the war he says: "I am convinced after a careful perusal of all the documents available on all sides that the Kaiser never had the remotest, idea that he was plunging—or being plunged—into a European war. His policy was one of bluff.” Of the Allies he says: “France shrank from war and there was nothing further from the mind of Britain or her Government . . . than the staging of a Continental war.” He finds Germany's defeat attributable in some measure to making costly attacks of no strategic importance even had they succeeded. He finds the Allies blind to their own advantages by -refusing to organise a formidable Balkan Confederation on the side of the Entente as could have been done early in 1915 if tiie Allied Powers had taken it.earnestly in band. The delay in creating the unity of command was,

in his view, another blunder on the part of the Allies.

Readers will turn with interest from Mr. Lloyd George’s account of the progress of the war to his replies to allegations and statements made in Lord Haig's diaries, as published in Mr. Duff Cooper’s “Life of Lord Haig.” “During the critical days of the War,” lie says, “when it was important not to undermine public confidence in the commandcr-in chief of our owu army, I made no public attack on his personal fitness for so immense a responsibility, but I never concealed from myself or my colleagues that 1 thought Sir Douglas Haig was intellectually and temperamentally unequal to the command of an army of millions fighting battles on fields which were invisible to any commander. . . . He was above the average of his profession in intelligence and industry—perhaps more in industry than intelligence. He was always a steady and conscientious worker. No one could impute to him •indolence or slackness in the discharge of his duty. He possessed an untiring tenacity of purpose. . . . But he was not endowed witli any of the elements of imagination and vision which determine the line of demarcation between genius and ordinary capacity. And he certainly had none of that peusonal magnetism which has enabled great leaders of men to inspire multitudes with courage, faith and spirit of sacrifice. . . . His' name never sent a thrill through the ranks on the eve of a battle —his presence he never vouchsafed on those occasions. ... He was incapable of planning vast campaigns on the scale demanded ou so immense a battle area. ... He did not possess that eye within an eye which is imagination. . . . Selfish he was not. but lie was essentially self-centred. ... No victory was thinkable except, in battles he planned.”

Having delivered his opinion of Haig in these unflattering terms, Mr. Lloyd George turns his batcries ou Io the "Life.” witli a view to demolishing the idol that Mr. Duff Cooper has erected. It all makes interesting and valuable reading, bill which view is correct will

long be the subject of dispute. “No amount of circumspection can prevent war leading to the death of multitudes of brave men,” he concludes, “but now generals are not partaking iu the personal hazards of a fight, they ought to take greater personal risks in satisfying themselves as to the feasibility of their plans, and as to whether the objectives they wish to attain lire worth the sacrifice entailed, and whether there is no better way of achieving the same result at less eost of gallant lives.”