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TOLL OF THE MOTOR

Shocking Loss of Life DUTY CAST ON JURIES High Degree of Care Needed JUDGE SPEAKS PLAINLY The necessity for juries to insist upon a high degree of care in the management of motor-vehicles, in view of the heavy loss of life in New Zealand through motor accidents, was stressed by Mr. Justice Reed in the Supreme, Court yesterday. His Honour pointed out that, although it did not necessarily follow that punishment would be severe in the event of a conviction, strictness on the part of juries acted as a strong deterrent to careless handling of motor-vehicles.

These remarks by his Honour were made when summing up at the conclusion of the trial of James Thomas Rutherford, motor-driver, ,of Masterton, on a charge of manslaughter and on a charge, under the Motor Vehicles Act, of negligent driving, thereby causing death. His Honour said every case involving loss of life was important, but where In a case-of loss of life a motor-vehicle was concerned, it assumed a greater importance in view of the appalling loss of life occurring in New Zealand to-day through negligent handling of motorcars. He could say without hesitation, having had some experience of these cases, that fully ninety per cent, of them were due to negligence—probably ten per cent, to inevitable accident. Question of Speed. Speed was often blamed, but his own experience was that speed was not often a factor. One -jvas safer driving with a careful driver at a high speed than driving with a careless driver at a less speed. A careful driver took no risks, a careless driver would often take a risk. '

“I say that these-motor cases involving the death of human beings are of extreme importance,” said his Hqnour, “and my reason is this: It is the juries of this Dominion that have to set the degree of negligence which they will excuse. If juries do, as they have done in many cases, say: ‘Well, the accused is a decent fellow —they generally are decent fellows-—there is nothing against him before, and it is pretty hard luck on him’ that he has killed this person, and therefore he will be excused’; ” that is the wrong way of looking at it. because a duty is cast on juries to see If it is possible to reduce this shocking loss of life by insisting upon a high degree of care in the manageinent of motor vehicles. • ' • Need for Deterrent. ’ “Slackness on the part of juries affords no deterrent to careless drivers, whereas if juries are strict'in the matter—and it does not necessarily follow that the man 'should be severely punished—there is a deterrent provided:. -It is of great importance that , a person should not escape being convicted where the jury are thoroughly satisfied that there has been negligent working of the car. I repeat, juries should exercise the power they have of convicting in cases where they are satisfied upon reasonable grounds that the death of the person concerned would not have occurred had it not been for negligence on the part of the person in charge of the motor-car.”

His Honour said that the observations he had made were of a general nature and did not necessarily apply to the present case, which had to be decided on its own facts, and the jury were the judge of those facts. The responsibility was on the jury to say whether in the circumstances of the case the Crown had satisfied them, as it was the duty of the Crown to do, that the death of Mr. Gillespie was caused by negligence, a want of reasonable care—because that was negligence—on the part of accused when driving his motor-lorry. Cumpulsory Stop Rule.

The rule insisting on compulsory stop, said his Honour, was made for the sole purpose of preventing this type of accident. It was a stringent rule, and it was supposed to be obeyed. He was aware that it was not obeyed, that persons did not actually stop, but, at all events, it was a reasonable ground for exercising due care when approaching a railway crossing. The fact that a person did not obey the rule was not conclusive evidence of negligence, but it was some evidence of negligence. If. in the circumstances, there was a sufficient reason given then it would not be actual negligence, but it would be some evidence of negligence.

His Honour said that'if accused had stopped his vehicle he would have heard the whistle and the noise of the train approaching.. He thought the jury would agree, in fact they could not possibly disagree, that a reasonable man before entering on a level-crossing would carefully look to see whether a train was approaching, and that if he did not do so he was negligent. That was the broad point.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19320729.2.102

Bibliographic details

Dominion, Volume 25, Issue 260, 29 July 1932, Page 12

Word Count
803

TOLL OF THE MOTOR Dominion, Volume 25, Issue 260, 29 July 1932, Page 12

TOLL OF THE MOTOR Dominion, Volume 25, Issue 260, 29 July 1932, Page 12