THE NEW SPIRIT IN RUSSIA

Dominion, Volume 16, Issue 120, 6 February 1923, Page 4

THE NEW SPIRIT IN RUSSIA

CHANGED MENTALITY

A SURVEY BY ZINOVIEV THE DICTATORSHIP AND ITS ENEMIES Do the Communists realise the dangers of tho new economic policy, and do they sco that tho psychology of tho party is changing? The above question is asked, and answered, by a special correspondent to the London “Observer.” He says ; The chief characteristic of tho Bolsheviks is their belief in themselves, iiic.ir optimism. They’ never allow the dangers that they see in front of them to make them uneasy, and in most ruses succeed m explaining them away, to their own satisfaction at least. A good example ’of how tho Bolsheviks gqt round a difficulty can be seen in Radek’s reply’ to a straight question from mo; “Is there a danger of the party degenerating or being transformed ?”

“Cei'tainly,” he replied, “we are being transiorine l. In Switzerland, as revolutionary exiles, we never paid any attention to rainfall, being preoccupied with Marxian discussions. And now wo arc more concerned with rainfall and drought than with the philosophy of -Mach or .of Avenarius. Ossinsky, the present Commissary for Agriculture, was then translating Verlaine, and was totally indifferent to ploughing and sowing. Now ho is completely submerged in agriculture, and fights only with locusts and other pests. Kissilov was absorbed in plans for annoying the bourgeoisie; now all his thoughts are. on how to organise the Moscow tramways. Chicherin, then a Mdhshevik, .was only busy’ in diplomatic wars with us; now his transformation has gone so far that he busies himself exclusively’ with making diplomatic peace with European Governments. In former days wo thought a bourgeois only worth wiping out; now we wonder if ho will make a good director of a factory. The party of agitators has been transformed into tho Government ot the biggest State in Europe. We are steadily, daily changing, and vet we remain the same. A party which did not transform itself could not -live two days.”

This was', a clever evasion of the question. In n way’ it indeed confirms the fact of 'the transformation in th« psychology of the party. But when I asked Radek whether he did not apprehend that tho changes ho enumerates may become strong and numerous 'enough to constitute, in the language of the Marxian dialectic, a new quality, and that everything but the name of the party may be transformed, the reply was, short and typical of tho man. Literally he said: "Those who expect it will never live to sec it.” This temperamental and emotional reply lacks the force of argument. But nevertboll’ss' it is the most revealing answer possible. It manifests tho will to remain, to carry on, to exist: this is the strongest quality of the Bolsheviks.

Signs of Uneasiness. Still, there are sufficient signs that the Bolsheviks are more apprehensive about tho situation than they allow themselves to show. Many’ recent developments of their policy cannot bo understood except in the light of a certain uneasiness. And sometimes the uneasiness goes so far and affects such wide circles of the Communist Barty that the leaders feel obliged to reassure themselves and the rank and file. At the recent Congress of the Communist Barty such an attempt was made to reassure tho party’ in a speech by Zinoviev. Zinoviev’s main contention was that the confident expectation of their opponents, that the new economic' poliev was sure to disintegrate the Communist Barty, had not been fulfilled. On the contrary, the Communist Barty had consolidated its ranks to a degree unsurpassed in former years’’ while the parties of the. Opposition, both bourgeois and Socialist, were clearly showing signs .of dissolutionThe Cadets split practically into two parties; the Mensheviks developed a Right and Left Wing; tho Socialist Revolutionaries broke up into many fractions,.;. An influential part of the intelligentsia has been drifting towards recognition of the Soviet regime, and even 'the Church is no longer the stronghold of reaction, and is in a state of utter confusion and -mutual antagonism. Anti-Soviet Forces. Presenting this reassuring picture to', the Communist Barty, Zinoviev warned them, however, against taking a too optimistic view of tho position “I am far from wishing to say,” said Zinoviev, “that we arc opt of danger now. On the. contrary, the present period is charged with tremendous dangers which must be clearly understood if we want to avoid them.” Chief among these dangers is the fact that the anti-Soviet forces have been reorganising themselves during the past year, and have manifested considerable vitality—a process winch lio expressed in the follow'mp scientific formula: “We are observing now a. cohesion of molecular forces against us.” And the common aim of the anti-Soviet forces is a demand for political concessions corresponding to rhe change in the economic .phere tliat bls taken place during the ';.st year To meet this danger Zinoviev adnses the party to proclaim that the retreat in tho economic sphere is at an end. while the advance in the political ’’sphere is still to continue. But he hastens to add that the’political offensive of the Communist Barty can in no cireustiinees be condiicte'l on the lines and in the forms of .bst of 1918-19: — “Now, in 1922, wo cannot renew the militant’ methods' of tliM time We ] have to adapt ourselves to th? changed I methods and forms ol political mufare ■ used by our opponents.”

“Peaceful Penetration.”

According .to Zinoviev, tho greatpoi'ibicnl fact in present-day Russia is th« design of Mensheviks, Social Uelolntionists. and other parties of the Opposition, to conquer tho Bolsheviks In- peaceful penetration into the Soviets? Itehing on their greater pohiieai experience, intelligence, and culture, flies' hope to destroy and to assimilate’ the Soviet organiation, • amt to create a. democratic State. 'i he Mensheviks are now pretending to be the real leaders of tho working class and hope to got the workers behnid them bv "Rd talk and by flowery promises- “But.” said Zinoviev, “the pretensions of the Mensheviks to be tho lenders of the Left Wing are only ridiculous, and cannot harm us. . . . To-d.av the mood of the workers is not such that they will follow those who premise them the most;. The y<’.nr-= of suffering and civil wa* t ; have worked a change in the Ruslan masses. Now they know what can end what canrot be done. . . - Everyone is aware that the dominant sentiment in. the imissen to-day is tho devre Air a full belly, for order and for knowledge. The tactics of the Mensheviks would bo much more injurious to us if they held up before tho working class a rather moderate programme; but one which appealed close!” to their everyday lives.

It becomes dangerous when the Mensheviks tlrrow out to the students the watchword, ‘the autonomy of tjio school,’ to the peasants ‘cheap credits,’ to the Red Army’ ‘a six uionths’ service,’ and to trade unions ‘a subsistence minimum wage.’ ” Power of the Press. And again there ;» danger when men of” liberal profossions come together at conferences and congresses not in order to fight with tho Soviet regime, but to adapt the Soviet regime a.% a moans for figjituig the Communist Party. And Zinoviev enumerates lite weJl-known . conlctences of doctors n.iid agricultural experts, manifestation's all of which were impossible as little as a year ago. And danger lies also in the new outburst of publishing; in Moscow alone there are 337 new publishing firms, in Petrograd eighty-tiiree, not to mention those in the provinces, the Ukraine. etc. Zinoviev protests against the idea that lie wishes the printing-presses to stop; he only wants to point out how tremendous a vitality has been shown by’ the enemy in one year alone. It must be admitted, he says, that the work of the presses is escaping from tlio control of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And the co-operatives? “I think.” said Zinoviev, “we have underestimated the role of co-operation as a basis for the anti-Soviet parties and movements in the broad sense of the wjrd. . At the first All-Russian Conferonco of Agricultural Co-operatives last summer, out of oighty-four delegates, thirty-two were Social Revolutionists, twenty-five Cadets and ilonarchists, twenty-one non-partisans, and only two were Communists. During the twelve months since that time the situation has only’ improved very slightly.” , Limits of Repression. Zinoviev disclaims any intention to pronounce an interdict on the . uew wave of political and social activities among tho bourgeoisie and tho intelligentsia. “I don’t want to say, ‘Down with co-operation,’ or ‘Let us apply surgical methods to it.’ AVe all agree with Ossinsky when he says that it is impossible to conquer the co-opera-tives by sheer repression. In general, I want'no one to interpret any theses as tho ideology of repression. To-day is not 1.918. The situation is complicated. By repressions alone nothing can be achieved.

But at the same time it is necessary to realise the potentialities of the Menshevik's, tho possible sources or thdir strength and. energy There you have the conferences of the bourgeoisdoiuocratic intelligentsia, tnere is tho bourgeois literature just creeping up to the surface again, there are the U11 J" versifies, there are tho co-operatives.

These are tho dangers; what ara the remedies that Zinoviev proposes. The enemies of tho Soviets must bo watched, and their differences studied. “An immense revolution, as it reaches the stage of ultimate victory, is bound to attract the best, the most vital elements of tho country. . - • The attraction of supporters to the Soviets must become the chief tactics of the Communist Barty. But that should by no means bo interpreted as the final relinquishment of repressive measures. Wo are nob thinking of giving iip' for good all repressive measures; we aro only interpreting them differ ently now. In tho midst of tho civil war wo were able to apply severe measuros; now wo may us® more complex and less mechanical mentis-”' This is Zinoviev’s way of meeting tho danger of the transformation of the Communist Barty. When this speech was delivered it Tyas advertised as a masterpiece of statesmanship. But soon it became clear that, optimistic and boastful as it was in tone, it could comfort only the least critical minds in the party. Tho theoretical brains of the party and the honest adherents of the Communist creed reject Zinoviev’s militant tactics and display of police force along with his stunt of “attracting” anti-Soviet forces into acceptance' of the Soviet’s regime.