N.A.T.O. chief ‘on the alert’

Press, 18 March 1988, Page 30

N.A.T.O. chief ‘on the alert’

By

RICHARD

BALMFORTH NZPA-ReuterMons, Belgium Among the • military volumes in the office of United States General John Galvin, N.A.T.O. Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, is a copy of Mikhail Gorbachev's book, “Perestroika" — well thumbed and heavily annotated. But Galvin finds nothing in the views of the re-form-minded Kremlin leader to persuade him that the Soviet threat to the West has diminished. "Where has t he said, 'Let's not build any more Foxbats, let’s not build any more Floggers, let’s cut down on'the classes of submarines that we’re building?' What programmes have been stopped? I don’t find any,” said General Galvin. “In military policy, I don't see a change that has resulted from the appearance of Gorbachev. Not to date,” he said. “This question of (Soviet) military force to intimidate and force accommodation, I see it going on all the time," he said. General Galvin, aged 58, a genial man with a face as lined as military map. took over at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (S.H.A.P.E) last June

amid anxiety in the military leadership that United States arms control policies could erode nuclear defence strategy. General Galvin said that-the challenge from Gorbachev, shifting EastWest relations and problems within the alliance could make 1988 N.A.T.O.'s “most critical year." But he is sure that N.A.T.O.’s doctrine of “flexible response” is the only valid one a strategy endorsed, by the March 2-3 summit of N.A.T.O. leaders which discussed the ; challenge posed by Gorbachev. That means keeping enough nuclear and nonnuclear forces to persuade Moscow that the risk far outweighs the possible gains from attack. His conciliatory air contrasts sharply! with the combative style of his predecessor, Bernard Rogers, who held the top job at S.H.A.P.E. for a record eight years and often clashed with N.A.T.O.’s political authorities. But, style apart, their ideas are identical on the scale of the Soviet conventional force threat and the < conviction that the nuclear weapon is the only sure guarantee against attack. Faced with an irreversible N.A.T.O. decision by

his political masters. Galvin has taken a pragmatic line over the United States-Soviet Intermedi-ate-range Nuclear Forces (1.N.F.) treaty which Rogers once said! gave him "gas pains.”

General Galvin said he could execute his primary mission of deterring war without United j States medium-range nuclear missiles — though Rattles might lie ahead with the politicians over how to reshuffle the remaining nuclear arms and up-date them.

He likens : the withdrawal of the United States Pershing-2 and cruise missiles to i taking bricks out of the wall of defence and sees it as his job to rebuild the wallwith what Is left. I“I would like to make sure that the forces available to me .... to defend are structured in the best possible way. What else would we expect military men v to do?” he said. N.A.T.O, diplomats say Galvin’s more diplomatic approach makes him an easier person to work! with and more to the taste of N.A.T)O.’s political authorities at a time of crucial decision-making. “He listens to j advice; thinks aloud construe--tively. He is less imperial than Bernie,” said one diplomat. j General Galvin used his

diplomatic skills in his last post as commander of United States forces in South America — one of the most sensitive field posts the United States services offers.

I I His job, based in Pan- ! ama, required often delij cate political contacts ; with Latin American mili- ! tary leaders including Chile’s Augusto Pinochet. I But he has also served 10 out of the past 15 years in Europe in various military posts — and feels attuned to the needs and fears of the European allies. i In peace-time. General Galvin commands about 320,000 United States servicemen based in Western Europe but in his N.A.T.O. role has little alliance hardware at his command and few alliance forces. ' In a war he would set up headquarters in an underground bunker situated in a grassy knoll visible from his office and take command of 4.5 million men from the armies of Western Europe. -I His reading of what would happen in the early stages of a conflict with the Warsaw Pact is orthodox, [j ' ! I He .said N.A.T.O. forces would “give aj good account of themselves” in .absorbing the brunt from ; the first wave of Soviet forces and holding the ) line. g

But after 10 to 20 days, the line could be in danger of crumbling and he would have to turn to the political authorities to give the go-ahead to use nuclear weapons. Gorbachev, he believes, has persuaded his military to go along with nuclear arms cuts by holding out the prospect of stripping Europe of its nuclear weapons and leaving Soviet conventional forces in an unassailable position. At what point would he re-assess the Soviet threat? “If the Soviets were willing to do a deep asymetrical reduction of their forces ... to something like parity, I would think we had a change in strategy,” he said. But even if a conventional military balance were achieved General Galvin does not believe N.A.T.O. should dispense with nuclear arms. “We don’t think that even when we have a parity in conventional forces, that we would have a strong enough deterrent for war ... it is still the nuclear forces that provide the deterrent for war,” General Galvin said. He also emphasised that N.A.T.O.'s existing nuclear stockpile will have to be reshuffled to take account of the I.N.F. treaty.