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Electoral system comes under scrutiny

For years the question of how many members of Parliament there should be in the House of Representatives has been talked about by New Zealanders, sometimes jokingly, but more often on a more serious level.

Debate usually centres on members’ workload, the cost to taxpayers and value for that cost and adequate constituent representation. When the talking is over, the statutory machinery laid down to determine this issue comes into play and the decisions are made. This Justice Department feature, one of a series on those aspects of New Zealand’s machinery being examined by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, looks at the principles of electoral representation, the history of Parliament’s composition, possible ways to change the number of members of Parliament, and the likely effects those changes would have.

Since 1853 the number of elected representatives in New Zealand’s Parliament has been adjusted to both this country’s population growth and changes to its Parliamentary system. During the nineteenth century the number of members of Parliament and, accordingly, the size of electorates was frequently altered.

The Constitution Act, 1852, provided for between 24 and 42 members, the exact figure to be settled by proclamation. The Governor duly issued a proclamation in 1853 fixing the figure at 37.

In 1881 the number was increased to 95, including four Maori seats. This was lowered to 70 by the Representation Amendment Act, 1887.

The Representation Act, 1900, increased the membership of the House to 80 and it remained at this level until 1967, when it was enlarged to 84 after the enactment of the present formula for determining the number of electorates in 1965. Since then the figure has risen steadily to its present level of 95. The following table shows the average number of people represented in an electorate over the years: Average Year population/electorate 1853 799 1881 5,383 1887 8,864 1900 9,954 1965 32,430 1969 33,105 1972 33,447 1978 34,254 1984 34,028 Note: these figures are average, as the Maori population is included within the total population figure with the exception of 1853 and 1881. The following table compares legislation-population ratios in some other countries: Population/Seats Australia 117,600 Belgium 47,170 Canada 85,106 France 109,980 West Germany 123,992 India 1,261,993 Israel 33,333 Italy 90,476 Japan 228,963 Mexico 161,500 Norway 25,807 Sweden 24,355 United Kingdom . 87,874 United States 505,747 For New Zealand the figure is 33,684. It must be remembered that figures on ratios of legislators to population have to be used with considerable caution. Some sys-

terns have more than one house and also state Parliaments. Before an informed decision can be made on how many electors a member can best represent, or how many there must be for the adequate running of this country’s affairs, the criteria and principles for representation should be examined. The first need is for effective representation of the electorate by the member, both in Parliament and on behalf of constituents, in dealing with the various agencies of government. This suggests the need for manageable electorates, both in population size and that of the area.

The more members there are, the more likely more groups will be able to gain representation, particularly for groups that are geographically concentrated and thus are electorally significant.

This holds, though perhaps in different ways, for a first past the post system as well as for a proportional representation system. Members need time to reflect and to deliberate free from the pressures of electorate, select committee and party work. Under the present system the traditional role New Zealand’s members of Parliament have been expected to fulfil is a link between constituents, the executive, and Government departments. With the number of select committees members are on, this makes for overworked rather than reflective legislators. It also reduces the effectiveness of their scrutiny of Government administration and hence increases the dominance of the Executive. Within the Cabinet of about 20, with several Under-Secretaries, a Speaker, Chairman of Committees, and two Whips, a party with a bare majority in the House may have to use more than half its membership to fill official posts. The problem becomes particularly acute if that party has a large number of new members in the House.

A larger size for the House would provide a greater pool of talent. It might also allow members to specialise in ways the present small size effectively prevents, and might encourage more able people to stand for Parliament.

Traditionally, New Zealand’s members are able to participate in the House on may occasions through asking questions, speaking often during the legislative stages of bills, and proposing notices of motion.

All members expect to speak on the Budget and in the Address-in-Reply debate. If there were too many members, this could not happen.

The cost associated with extra members — their salaries, expenses, travel, electoral facilities, support staff in Wellington and in the electorate — must also be considered.

Also, the limits on physical facilities, the size of the present chamber, particularly if desks are retained, the need for more members’ offices should be taken into account. The mechanism for enlarging the size of the House comes under section 16 of the Electoral Act It is an entrenched provision which means it cannot be changed with less than a 75 per cent vote by members in favour of the change. Section 16 provides for

the division of New Zealand into general electoral districts after each census of population. The starting point is the general electoral population of the South Island.

The number of seats for the South Island is fixed at 25. The general electoral South Island population is divided by 25 to give a quota for the South Island. The North Island general electoral population is then divided by the South Island quota, and the resultant figure is the number of general electorates for the North Island.

For the size of the House of Representatives to increase under this formula, there has to be either a decrease in the South Island population with a static or increased population in the North Island, or an increased or static population in the South Island with a greater increase in the North Island population.

Put another way, the number of seats will increase so long as the population of the North Island is increasing proportionately at a greater rate than that of the South Island. The number of Maori seats is fixed at four by section 23 of the Electoral Act (not an entrenched section). The number of South Island seats was fixed at 25 in 1965. This corresponded to the number of South Island members of Parliament at that time. Since then the composition of the House of Representatives following each census has been as follows: Total

The redistribution of boundaries that took place in 1977 resulted in considerable dislocation to boundaries in both islands. There were two principal reasons for this decision. First, although the population of the South Island increased by 6.7 per cent between 1971 and 1976 the population of the North Island increased by 16.2 per cent. This resulted in five new seats in the North Island. As the population growth in the North Island was not uniform, substantial changes to electoral boundaries were required, particularly in the north. Second, although growth in the South Island was modest, there was a considerable drift of population to Christchurch and Nelson between 1971 and 1976 which resulted in major changes to a number of South Island electorates. The Representation Com-

mission, in its 1977 report, said that only five electorates in the North Island and four in the South island were unaffected during the 1977 redistribution.

The report specifically drew attention to what it saw as the inevitable result of retaining the number of South Island seats at 25 when it made the comment: “The slower rate of increase for southern electorates has necessitated boundaries being extended northwards to achieve appropriate levels of population. This movement with the drift of population to urban areas, has resulted in the large electorate of Otago and as long as the South Island seats remain at 25 this situation will continue. It is inevitable South Island rural electorates will continue to grow in area.”

An increase in the number of South Island seats will have two effects. Firstly, it will reduce the size of the South Island electorates.

Secondly it will increase the number of seats in the North Island and therefore the total number of seats in the country. Some arguments for the present incremental system are that it provides a way of increasing the numbers of members of Parliament slowly, without the disruption to the working of the House that would result from a sudden large increase.

It is highly sensitive to changing distributions of population within the country.

The frequent redistributions within the present 5 per cent tolerance ensure observance of the “one vote one value” principle. Arguments against the present incremental system are that it is too disruptive to electorate boundaries too frequently.

Also it will be too slow in increasing the number of

members to the level desir- -■ able to cope with the pre- r sent workload and level of responsibilities. , There are arguments for reducing the size of the ■ House. New Zealand’s population is over-represented j compared with other coun- } tries, and there is no need ‘ for so many Ministers and - portfolios. New Zealand’s system of ; government is too cen- J. tralised. Functions should -5 be abandoned or should be . developed to local and re- - gional government, leading r to a more democratic (and perhaps less intrusive) system and thus to a smaller . need for a large central ■* legislature. ‘ The present large num- v bers are an imposition on the taxpayers and do not represent value for money. Some alternative strate- ' gies for increasing the size ; of the House include: Stay- , ing with the present incremental system; calculating : the number of Maori members on the same basis as other members and incorporate these seats into the incremental system; fixing 1 the number of South Island - seats at more than 25. Alternatively there could be a large initial increase followed by incremental iff- - creases, perhaps at less frequent intervals, perhaps every second census. Others may favour a once-only increase to a fixed number. Another way . would be to introduce large multi-member constituencies, thus avoiding the need for small-scale boundary < adjustments after each census (these multi-member constituencies could replace or supplement single-mem-ber constituencies). In either case, the size of the House can be increased without having to alter electorate boundaries too severely. So how many members of Parliament should there be? The weight of opinion among those who favour an increase suggests a House of about 120 or 130, although some advocate as many as 150. The basis on which to make a choice obviously requires judgments about the quality of representation under the present system compared with an enlarged House. As well, the effects on the facilities and procedures of the House of more members to be accommodated and to be involved in debates and in committee work must be considered. The Royal Commission, after considering all submissions on this issue, will make its recommendations by October next year. Any changes to the number of members that may follow will not, however, affect the 1987 election.

S.I. N.I. inc. Year seats seats Maori 1965 25 51 80 1969 25 55 84 1972 25 58 87 1978 25 63 92 1984 25 66 95

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19850812.2.179.23

Bibliographic details

Press, 12 August 1985, Page 40

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Electoral system comes under scrutiny Press, 12 August 1985, Page 40

Electoral system comes under scrutiny Press, 12 August 1985, Page 40