An end to one hijacking

Press, 3 July 1985, Page 16

An end to one hijacking

There will be world-wide relief that the remaining 39 American hostages from the Trans World Airlines plane hijacked on June 14 have been freed. The hostages had done nothing wrong; their involvement in an aspect of Middle East politics was accidental. As it turned out, all but one of the passengers and crew on the airliner survived. The one, who had been in the United States military forces in Lebanon, was shot. That was an outrageous criminal act. It is worth pondering that, had his death provoked an attempted act of revenge, there might have been many more to be mourned. Patient negotiations eventually brought about the release of the others. Practically, all hijackings are complicated. This one was outstandingly complicated. It raises a serious question about airport security. The hijacking occurred after the flight had left Athens for Rome. How the hijackers got on board with a pistol and grenades will be a matter that will haunt the minds not only of airport authorities in Athens, but of airport authorities everywhere, as well as the minds of those who travel internationally by air. The hijacking happened to coincide with a number of other terrorist attacks concerned with aircraft and airports. An Air India aircraft crashed into the sea off the coast of Ireland, apparently after an explosion. An internal Norwegian flight was hijacked, and there were explosions at airports in Japan, at Frankfurt, in Madrid, and in Rome. These incidents need to be analysed and steps taken to prevent similar incidents. Only a limited number of measures can be taken, but these will certainly entail more stringent checks of passengers and their luggage. All major international airports will have to conform to rigid security procedures. One of the startling aspects of the Lebanese hijack was the fact that the Lebanese Government became involved in the way that it did. Mr Nabih Berri, the Lebanese Minister of Justice, became a key figure. Ministers from other Governments have become enmeshed in hijackings and negotiations for the release of hostages before; but Mr Berri became, in effect, the jailer of a number of the hostages for the period. To a large extent, his role in the affair is a reflection of the sorry state' of the Lebanese Government. For all intents and purposes Mr Berri was not acting as a Minister of that Government at all, but as the leader of a private army called the Amal. This group is Shi’ite Muslim and, since the hijackers were themselves Shi’ites, the Amal and Mr Berri had some influence. If Mr Berri is considered as a Minister of the Lebanese

Government, his role deserved complete condemnation. If, however, the Lebanese Government is considered near enough to being defunct, and Mr Berri is regarded as the leader and to some extent the proprietor of a private army, the fact that he brought about the release of the hostages in due course puts him in a different light. The United States and Israel were the countries against which the action was being taken. What the hijackers wanted was the release of Lebanese Shi’ites held by Israel in Israel. The hostages were Americans and so the United States was under enormous pressure to effect their release. The United States and Israel both have firm policies of refusing to give in to the demands of terrorists. Syria tried to get the United States to say that the Shi’ites held by Israel should be released in return for the freeing of the hostages. The United States refused to make any public appeal to that effect. Had it done so, apart from departing from a policy of giving way to terrorist demands, it would have placed itself under a strong obligation to Israel. In the end, Syria intervened and secured the release of the hostages. Syria obviously considers that the United States gave some undertaking for this intervention. The United States considers that it has not compromised its principle of refusing to be blackmailed by hijackers. Nevertheless, the United States will have to acknowledge that Syria was able to exercise influence and this acknowledgement may be one of the long-term outcomes of the whole affair. One of the comments made during the affair was that the United States should give more attention to coming to grips with Islam, and less attention to seeing the whole of the Middle East in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States is rightly concerned about terrorism and President Reagan and the Administration may come under some pressure to strike against any known centres of Shi’ite terrorism. Whether such a strike would have any effect in curbing terrorism seems doubtful. One of the reasons for such dreadful acts as the hijacking is that there is a strong belief among some Muslims that Israel is able to get away with such actions as the invasion of Lebanon with American compliance. If the United States is going to strike at the root of Shi’ite terrorism, it will not achieve this by bombing camps believed to harbour terrorists, but by establishing better relations with some of the other Governments in the area. Then, and only then, will the madmen who seize airliners become isolated.