Suspicions hurt Indonesia’s Chinese

Press, 4 March 1983, Page 16

Suspicions hurt Indonesia’s Chinese

By

Gilles Berlin,

in Jakarta, through NZPA

of Agence France-Press

Often accused of being a “fifth column for Peking." Indonesia's six million resident Chinese still have difficulty being accepted in spite of the official policy of assimilation.

Recent anti-Chinese riots in the island of Sumbawa, 1500 km east of Jakarta, during which dozens of stores were looted, bear witness to the underlying hostility towards the Chinese minority. This minority has always been a scapegoat when there has been an economic or political crisis in Indonesia. Descendants of Chinese immigrants, who represent barely 4 per cent of the population of 150 million, are often envied for their social success. Indonesians of Chinese descent are estimated to control 80 per cent of distributive trades and more than half the investments in the private sector. Businessmen of Chinese descent, who often associate with Indonesians (especially in military circles), benefit from useful contacts in SouthEast Asia, especially in Hong Kong and Singapore, President Suharto’s family has many ties with the Chinese business community. The policy of assimilation,

practised on a large scale for five years, aims to diminish the Chinese monopoly in trade (especially in small businesses), and is an attempt to integrate the Chinese through naturalisation or changes in their religion.

Those who do not become Indonesian nationals do not have the right to do. business or open shops. Administrators are also requested to shop, whenever possible, at “native" suppliers. Statistics on Chinese are hard to establish because many have no civil status or have taken an Indonesian name “to facilitate their integration” in compliance with the wishes of the authorities. Out of six million Chinese immigrants, 600,000 are estimated to be stateless. About 500,000 are from China and 80,000 are from Taiwan. Moreover, officials in charge of the assimilation have urged Indonesians of Chinese descent to become Muslims (90 per cent of Indonesians are Muslims), but the majority keep their religion (Taoism, Confucianism, or Buddhism), or convert to Christianity. Although Indonesia trades with

China through Hong Kong. President Suharto, and especially the generals close to him. are unwilling to reestablish diplomatic relations with Peking, as they consider the Chinese community a "fifth column" of power. Although Chinese families began to settle in the Indonesian archipelago from the fourteenth century, the migrations were particularly numerous in the seventeenth and at the end of the nineteenth centuries. Often encouraged by Dutch settlement in the East Indies, these emigrants were mostly of peasant stock from southern China’s Guangdong and Fujian provinces. They adapted quickly and began to establish themselves in the archipelago as merchants who served as privileged intermediaries for the Dutch. Their role vis-a-vis the colonial power and their success in trade were at the root of the native population’s anti-Chinese feelings. Moreover, the underlying aggressiveness towards them was maintained and used by different parties and governments according to which way the political winds were blowing. During World War Two, the Japanese occupied Indonesia and used the Chinese as trade intermediaries and also gave the Chinese high position to replace the defeated Dutch. After independence, they remained in key

positions in the private sector while the administration became completely Indonesian. "When the Dutch left.-and at the time of the large-scale nationalisation. only the Chinese with their business experience were capable of assuming responsible posts," a former minister said. In the 19505, the harmonious relations between Jakarta and Peking, which President Sukarno visited in 1956, were darkened by anti-Chinese riots which broke out sporadically and were used by some conservative elements (notably Muslims) to alienate the two countries. At the end of the 19505. relations deteriorated. President Sukarno decided to ban Chinese business in the villages. This decision, which was aimed at appeasing a wave of nationalism supported by associations of Indonesian businessmen and religious groups, caused more than 100,000 Chinese to leave the country. With the deterioration of the economic situation, violent anti-Chin-ese riots were unleashed in most cities through the archipelago, especially in Surabaya, Solo, Bandung, Java, and Medan (north of Sumatra). The army's intervention was either inefficient or too late against the rioters.

After the attempted coup d’etat in 1965, supposedly by Communists, the ensuing repression especially af-

fected the Chinese community, who were accused bv the military and by Muslim parties of being "Peking's agents" in Indonesia. It is estimated that at least 580,000 people (communist or suspected to be) were killed between 1965 and 1968.

Muslim parties and several newspapers "demanded” a breaking off of relations with Peking, which happened in October, 1967. The new leaders, among them General Suharto, who very quickly emerged as the strongman of the “new order." decided to do away with the 600 Chinese schools, dissolve Chinese organisations, and ban the Chinese press and Chinese written characters.

The only paper left was a minor semi-official daily with a limited readership. Again, many Chinese, especially teachers and journalists, left Indonesia for China, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Today, Chinese characters that appear "in the foreign press received in Jakarta are blackened out by censorship. When political tension builds up, such as the March, 1982, riots during the legislative elections, Chinese quarters are a target. If the assimilation policy seems to be marking time, Indonesia's severe economic problems may cause a fresh outbreak of nationalistic and anti-Chin-ese violence.