France’s Socialist President

Press, 14 May 1981, Page 16

France’s Socialist President

.After the first round of the French Presidential election it became clear that M Francois Mitterand, the Socialist leader, had a reasonable chance of winning. When he won in the second round last Sunday no dramatic event had been needed to intervene to swing the voters his way. Probably the most significant event between the two polls was the television debate between Mr Mitterand and President Giscard d’Estaing; but on the whole that was a low-key affair. Mr Mitterand won with a substantial majority — more than enough to be sure that the French people had made their meaning plain. If the election of a Socialist confounds the view that the trend in politics is away from the Left, at least the change of Presidents confirms that other view that present-day electorates are volatile. President Giscard was offering the French people more of the same for yet another seven years; the French people have chosen — and are likely to get — something different.

The President-elect has said that he will dissolve the National Assembly, which is dominated by the Right. The question of whether France is going against what appears to be world trends to the Right may be demonstrated in the Parliamentary election. One of the curiosities of political behaviour in various countries has been the slight influence which high unemployment rates have had. Voters have been thinking of inflation, or tax cuts, or other matters, and the large proportion of the work-force that has been without jobs seems to have carried little political weight. Perhaps in France the end to that phenomenon is being seen. Mr Mitterand' has promised that he will create more jobs; presumably his promise has more credibility among French electors than similar promises have had elsewhere.

The election of Mr Mitterand may, of course, have been the result of the rejection of Mr Giscard. If the French people return candidates of the Right again to the National Assembly so that they form the majority, the conclusion to be drawn is that the French simply want a change oi face and style, not a whole new economic order which Mr Mitterand’s promisee nationalisation of certain industries would help to bring about.

Domestically, Mr Mitterand’s success will produce a complicated situation. Mi Jacques Chirac, who was eliminated from the Presidential election in the first round, is already making a determined bid for the leadership of the Centre and the Right. Under such circumstances it is improbable that he could be seen to support Mr Mitterand in Parliament. This makes it all the more likely that Mr Mitterand will be forced to rely on support from the Left, which may mean making a deal with the Communists and giving them some important portfolios in the Cabinet. After

the defeat of Mr George Marchais, the Communist candidate, in the first round, Communist votes were offered to Mr Mitterand without any announced conditions. But if Mr Mitterand cannot get any of his programmes through the National Assembly, or cannot even appoint a Prime Minister who will command a majority in the National Assembly without relying on full Communist support, Mr Marchais will have a strong hand to play. The key issue in domestic French politics — whether the Communists form part of the Government — is also the key issue for other European countries and North America. The French Communist Party is by far the most aligned with Moscow in Western Europe. It even approved of the invasion of Afghanistan, which shocked more independently-minded European Communists. The problem that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries will face is how far France could be engaged in N.A.T.O. affairs if some French Cabinet Ministers are sympathetic to the Soviet Union against which N.A.T.O.’s defences are directed. The argument is bound to be offered that the French Communists will be nationalists first and Moscow-aligned Communists second; but such an argument will not go unchallenged in the rest of Western Europe or in North America. Even without the complication of the Communists the cast of Europe will be changed. Mr Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of West Germany, and Mr Giscard, have combined to lead the European Economic Community. It is doubtful whether Mr Mitterand and Mr Schmidt will carry on where Mr Giscard and Mr Schmidt left off. A new grouping may evolve. The E.E.C. may even become paralysed. The election of Mr Mitterand may have some effects on the Pacific; this is by no means certain. Possibly Mr Mitterand will be less determined than was Mr Giscard to maintain the status of the French territories in the Pacific as an integral part of France. The heavy support given for Mr Giscard in the Pacific territories suggests that many people there see advantages in staying part of France. What seems more likely to happen is that Mr Mitterand will be so absorbed in affairs close to home that he will not give much attention to the French Pacific and developments there may take their own course.

Mr Mitterand has shown some desire to see the Common Agricultural Policy of the E.E.C. reformed; and if that were done, New Zealand may benefit incidentally. No great store should be put by this possibility. If Mr Mitterand’s election has changed the course of the Fifth Republic he is unlikely to abandon the long-term tendency of putting French interests first and one of the most immediate beneficiaries of that will not be New Zealand.