Airline strongly defended

Press, 30 January 1981, Page 4

Airline strongly defended

PA f Auckland •• A lawyer representing Air New Zealand;! at the DCIO crash inquiry’ l yesterday responded strongly to accusations that the airline had tried to conceal its responsibility for the Mount Erebus disaster. -J A • Mr Lloyd Brown, Q.C., called the allegations “emotional and extravagant.” "Thev were apparently designed to attract news media attention — and were signally succcessful in doing so — and were unworthy of the cause in which they were uttered,” he said. Mr Brown was referring to submissions made at Wednesday’s Royal Commission of Inquiry hearing byMr P. J. Davison, counsel (for the familv of . the late Captain T. J. Collins. Mr Davison had said that Air New Zealand went to the inquiry “to protect and defend itself.” . Mr Brown yesterday departed from his own final submissions to the Commission, conducted by Mr Justice Mahon, to reply to Mr Davison's submissions.., Mr Brown said that by no.v it should be apparent “to the smallest mind ’ that the airline did not believe that the Mount Erebus crash 01 November 28, 1979. could be attributed to any one cause, let alone a sole case of pilot error. If from the evidence criticism of the flight crew had emerged, it had been modest, - informed, and responsible. But that did not apply to (■ the “unfortunate submissions” heard on Wednesday. He objected totally to the

i 1 allegation- that Air. New Zea-| r land had “ditched”; one of its j Oicaptains and crew,, and said.: jth’at “if-that is,a true state-; . merit of what counsel has ■■ j i tried to achieve in the. last; . few months, we have failed ; miserably.” , , , Air New Zealand had called- 'all the evidence it ’ could glean which was rele- ' vant to the inquiry and in. some cases its witnesses had i fully acknowledged their 1 i own shortcomings. -A - ■. I ’ i There had been “a plain : i i suggestion” that. Aijr.. .New j. ; | Zealand had destroyed rele-1 ''vant documents by- shreddy |. ling them, Mr Brown said. fi ? In spite of . evidence from J- ■ the airlines Chief Executive, .j ’ jMr M. R. .Davis, that only: ,! copies had been destroyed, n ‘ithe suggestion was con-: ' ’■ tinned. J ~ | In his main submissions', ■, *' Mr Brown summarised some;, A of his points tby saying that:].. 3 | — The’DClO and its! 1 .;equipment . were entirely!, ;! suitable for. the Antarctic;, _• flight of November 28, 1979; j, — The aircraft was impec-| t r cably maintained and set’-;, viced and die company had;, , an outstanding reputation* j t for the care and mainten-j, t' ance of its craft; ' I j >l — The crew all held ap-li jlpronriate licences and rat-1" l ings and had adequate ex- L experience to make the flight; I, e — Evidence had been!; given, and not contradicted,! t . that the airline’s structure , 1 and its system of manage- ( ment and decision-making. j communication, and delega- j j tion were sound and effec- j - five and conformed to established international practice; e and |c

j — The collection, - pre | servation collation, and disclosing by the airline of ‘ information relevant to the I accident was full and proper land the suggestion or inferences to the contrary were unfounded and irresponsible. Mr Brown said Air New Zealand had laid down specific criteria for flights descending below the minimum jsafe altitude in the McMurdo Sound area and it I believed these safeguards I would be sufficient. |. The possibility bf “whi•teout” was considered re- ! mote, and ' only significant (had landings-on the ice been i-intended. .’While the ability to cope with “whiteont’’ might have been necessary during a landing, the possibility was considered so Unlikely', that detailed instruction On. “Wliitequts” was' not given to pilots. Before descending below the minimum safe altitude, the crew should have positively identified their position in a prescribed manner,and if the briefing instructions for descent in the McMurdo urea had. been complied with there would have been, no accident, Mr] Brown said. Earlier, Mr J. E. Connell,' for the Ministry of Trans-] port, said the Ministry be-i lieved there was no reason I to change the provisions of the Civil Aviation Act, 1954, or the Civil Aviation Regulations,. 1978, because of the Mount Erebus crash and its aftermath. "■: He criticised ' some changes suggested by the

■-•I Airline Pilots’ Association as -1 misconceived and one sugf gested change was “dane gerously misconceived.” r The recommended change ' would have given the associ?:ation the right to have its own trained investigators] v take part in the work of the; ■ Chief Inspector of Air Acci-I - dents. 1 To give the association; ® that right would mean otherparties would] S !have to be given the same, privilege, Mr Connell said. ‘ Th,at would lead to —in- ’ vestigation by committee; ‘and by comprorpise” ■ and, would be totally unaccep-i 3 table. • i ■ The chief inspector’s >nde- : 3 pendente would be- taken, 3 away. ’ - ■ I ’ , His . Honour .suggested it; ‘ might - be ' advisable to change, the regulations so3 that the Chief Inspector of] Air Accidents would be in-] ' formed; when any c.ircum- • stances had arisen which; could give rise to an acci-] ’ dent, — not when the acci-i ’ dent was proved to have; j happened as was the prac-j : i tice now. ‘ ' . ' In the case of the Mount] .Erebus accident. United; -States Navy signals had suggested the DC 10 could be in 'difficulty at 3 p.m. (N.Z. 'I time) but the Chief Inj J spector (Mr R. Chippindale) I] was not until 9 p.m. ' ' ’’ .i ■ Mr Connell said- he had ] not considered ; such a 'change and that he did not ’ believe it would be helpful, as the Chief. Inspector had ' no responsibility concerning search and rescue.