Briefing on white-outs criticised at hearing

Press, 16 July 1980, Page 3

Briefing on white-outs criticised at hearing

PA Auckland Some earlier conditions laid down for Antarctic scenic flights could have been “overlooked” by the time the ill-fated flight 901 made‘its trip, said the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents (Mr R. Chippindale), yesterday. Approval for flights to the Antarctic each season was an “on-going procedure,” Mr Chippindale told Mr Justice Mahon, the one - man commission of inquiry into the Mount Erebus crash. “As a result of this procedure the list of conditions was not re-stated each season,” he said when being cross-examined by Mr R. L. MacLaren who appeared for the family of First Officer G. M. Cassin, “Possibly as.a result of this,” said Mr Chippindale, , “some conditions were overlooked.” Earlier in the hearing, Mr Chippindale told the commission that more details of the phenomena of the whiteout should have been given in an Air New Zealand written briefing to the crew of the DCIO which crashed on Mount Erebus on November 28 last year. Asked by Mr MacLaren if he agreed that the crew were not given the opportunity to have a comprehensive discussion on white-outs, Mr Chippindale said he believed that comments about the phenomena were confined to a document which said white-outs were common and weather changes rapid in the Antarctic.,

He believed the subject came up at a “talk through” session during z -a briefing attended by Captain. T. J. Colins, the command pilot of the aircraft which crashed, and there was “some little . discussion” about.it. ' ■ The discussion was one of general rather than authoritative, knowledge, he said. Answering a further question asked by'Mr MacLaren, Mr Chippindale said whiteouts were not confined to polar regions. They could occur in any area with extensive falls of snow. He did not agree that the absence of a full explanation of white-outs for DCIO Antarctic flights was, as described by Mr MacLaren, an “alarming deficiency.” Mr Chippindale said restrictions and limitations placed on the . Antarctic flights to stay in a specific sector at a certain minimum height should have kept the aircraft clear, of any hazard posed by a' white-out. But because an emergency might necessitate an Antarctic landing, more details about the phenomena should have been given to the DC 10 crew. Commenting on a weather report radioed to TE9OI, which mentioned surface and horizon definition at McMurdo, Mr Chippindale agreed that the aircraft captain, if he had had a comprehensive briefing and considered the total weather situation might well have expected white-out conditions. Mr Chippindale said that

the timing of route qualification briefings depended on the availability of crew members on roster for normal schedules. First Officer G. N. Lucas did not attend the TE9OI Antarctic briefing on November 9. Mr Chippindale said durng his inquiries he was not advised of any specific requirements for a crew member to be present other than the pilot in command of the flight. Asked what role First Officer Lucas played in the flight, Mr Chippindale said comments made by him in a radio transmission in the Cook Strait area indicated he had the “outward bound leg.”. First . Officer Lucas did not participate iri the .flying of the aircraft from the top of the descent near Ross Island to the point of impact on Mount Erebus. Mr Chippindale agreed with Mr MacLaren that the captain of the ill-fated DCIO had got permission to descend into an area controlled by United States authorities. The two-way radio transmissions were recorded on tape at McMurdo base. However, said Mr Chippindale, it was not a formal descent clearance and not proper procedure. Answering further questions, Mr Chippindale said he had examined the training documents and other records relating to First Officer G. M. Cassin and there was no indication of adverse performance nor any degree of incompetency indicated.

The witness agreed that when First Officer Cassin made repeated attempts to raise McMurdo radar control on VHF radio he was doing “what any reasonable copilot would do in the circumstances.” Answering another question, Mr Chippindale said he had not been able to resolve the issue of who had the authority to control a civil aircraft when it entered a zone controlled by the United States. He said he did not agree with Mr MacLaren that a more probable cause of the accident than he (the chief inspector) had proposed .was that, without notification of the crew, a change of navigational tracks was made Which routed aircraft over Mount* Erebus. ’ - J Neither would Mr Chippindale agree with Mr MacLaren that there had been a failure to inform the crew of the DCIO of a change in navigational co-ordinates. Cross-examined by Mr P. J. Davison, who is representing, the family of Captain Collins and the New Zealand Airline Pilots’ Association, Mr Chippindale said it would be reasonable to assume that if Air New Zealand knew of instances in which aircraft were flying too low in Antarctica, the company would take steps to see it did not happen again. Mr Chippindale agreed that there had been a failure of Air New Zealand to appreciate the nature of a white-out.